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Voluntary cooperation on climate change has grown rapidly since 2000, and presents a 
potential pathway to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. Many intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) seek to cultivate such multi-stakeholder partnerships or 
international cooperative initiatives in greenhouse gas-emitting sectors. But are IGOs 
an effective class of actors to do so? Evidence has lagged behind practice.  
This study fills three gaps in empirical knowledge: (1) Have large-scale efforts by IGOs 
(such as summits) to promote voluntary cooperation caused the growth of cooperation? 
If so, how? (2) By participating in partnerships within specific sectors, to what degree 
have IGOs influenced the growth of voluntary cooperation in those sectors? (3) How 
do large-scale IGO efforts interact with IGOs working within initiatives, and what is 
their combined effect on the quality of initiatives?  
This study analyses large-scale efforts during 2000-2015, and conducts three case 
studies, in forests, short-lived climate pollutants, and land transport. Two methods are 
  
employed: qualitative process tracing (including 71 interviews) and dynamic social 
network analysis of a dataset comprising 252 initiatives and their participants. 
Community detection and node centrality measures probe for influence over time.   
This study finds that: (1) Cooperative initiatives form sectoral ecosystems 
among inter-connected entities. New initiatives represent evolutionary changes to the 
strength—or quality—of cooperation within sectors. Thus, the quality of cooperation 
must be assessed at the sectoral level in addition to the initiative level; (2) Many IGOs 
participate in partnerships, but a select few have become central community-builders 
and these few wield strong influence over the evolution of the sectoral ecosystems; (3) 
IGOs (and governments) that have convening power and autonomy can choreograph a 
surge in the growth of voluntary cooperation. Of all IGOs, having established a ‘good 
offices’ role on climate change, the office of the UN Secretary-General is uniquely able 
to do so; (4) The surge requires six organizational attributes, which together 
characterize “collective choreography of cooperation”: strategic timing, high visibility, 
sectoral orientation, emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments; subsidiarity, 
and leadership with centralized decision-making; and (5) Sustained and adequate 
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1 Introduction: The Roles of Intergovernmental Organizations 
in Voluntary Cooperation on Climate Change 
On November 30th 2015, one hundred and fifty world leaders met in an 
airplane hangar on the outskirts of Paris.1 Comprising the largest gathering of heads 
of state and government outside the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to 
date, they had convened at the start of the highly anticipated twenty-first conference 
of parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC or “the climate convention” henceforth).2 The French government, host 
and president of COP21, had invited the leaders in the hope that their presence and 
speeches would publicly signal joint support for a global agreement on climate 
change, which was the intended outcome of the intergovernmental conference.  
The official family photos of this gathering are all curiously cropped, with 
several leaders at the edges not fully captured in the frame. It is perhaps a fitting 
tribute to the size of the assembly that even after deploying their widest-angle lenses 
and creatively positioning their cameras to the side, the hundreds of media 
                                               
1 UNFCCC, ‘COP21 Leaders and High-Level Segment’. 
2 While the UNFCCC and the French government reported the presence of 150 leaders, the number of 
plenary speakers was 143, as some countries were represented by more than leader. This was the case 
for the UK, for example, with the participation of David Cameron and Prince Charles. Likewise, 
former heads of government were also present. Considering the then-current heads of state or 
government only, this gathering was surpassed by only two others in history, the Millennium Summit 






photographers present were not able to fit all the leaders standing shoulder to 
shoulder and three rows deep within one shot.  The hall was simply not big enough.  
But while the photo fails to capture the total number of national government 
leaders in the hall, it also omits the thousands of other leaders, including CEOs, 
mayors, governors, religious leaders and heads of NGOs, gathered at COP21 to show 
their support and make voluntary commitments themselves to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change.3 Many participated in the ‘Fourth Pillar’ of COP21, the multi-
stakeholder series of events alongside the negotiations, devised by the French 
government specifically for the announcement of voluntary commitments.  
This phenomenon of voluntary cooperation and the roles played by 
intergovernmental organizations in its evolution form the subject of this study. 
1.1 Voluntary Cooperation on Climate Change: From Caboose to 
Engine 
By December 12th 2015, the two streams of activity at COP21—
intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder—had resulted in two outcomes, primary and 
secondary. The primary outcome was the Paris Agreement, the accord reached by the 
197 Parties to the UNFCCC (196 national governments and the European Union), 
which experts hailed for its ambition, universality, national ownership and 
dynamism.4 Ambition, because the Paris Agreement commits the world for the first 
                                               
3 While no official tally of these leaders exists, accreditation data alone indicates some 330 CEOs, over 
100 mayors and over 80 governors were given badges to enter the COP21 venue. This does not include 
the many who attended side events in Paris but not within the COP venue. 
4 For succinct overviews of the salient features of the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, ‘Ambition and 
Differentiation in the Paris Agreement’; and Falkner, ‘The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of 
International Climate Politics’; For an analysis of the implications of the Paris Agreement for a variety 





time to the science-based goal of limiting global temperature rise to “well below 2ºC 
above pre-industrial levels” and ideally below 1.5ºC, as well as to achieving carbon 
neutrality before 2100.5 Universality, because unlike its predecessor the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Paris Agreement applies to greenhouse gas emissions from all Parties, 
whether developed or developing. National ownership, because the greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions targets of any given Party are not imposed by the supranational 
authority of the Agreement, but rather are determined by the Party through a domestic 
process run by its national government. Parties therefore bring their own pledges 
(“nationally determined contributions” or NDCs) as contributions to the Paris 
Agreement. Dynamism, because the Paris Agreement allows Parties time to make the 
massive economic shifts needed through an ambition cycle or “ratchet-up” 
mechanism, whereby all Parties commit themselves to determining increasingly 
ambitious national contributions every five years, with the aim of eventually closing 
the ambition gap while concurrently implementing their pledges to reach the Paris 
goals.  
The secondary outcome was the magnitude of voluntary commitments made 
by stakeholders, whether individually or in cooperation with each other, which were 
recorded on a web portal called the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action 
(NAZCA).  According to the secretariat to the climate convention, almost 100,000 
individual commitments were registered on NAZCA by the end of COP21, “including 
2,250 cities and 150 regions covering 1.25 billion inhabitants; 2,025 companies, 424 
                                               





investors, and 235 civil society organizations.”6 Not only that, many of these actors 
had entered into partnerships with each other and with national governments, 
resulting in the announcement of seventy cooperative initiatives, which showed high 
potential to reduce greenhouse emissions.7 While scholarship had argued for some 
years that carefully devised cooperative actions by stakeholders within greenhouse 
gas-emitting sectors could significantly reduce emissions and help achieve 
sustainable development, and indeed, such cooperative action had been on the rise 
since the early 2000s, the sheer number of such partnerships announced in Paris and 
during the previous year in the run up to the Paris Agreement dwarfed the growth 
seen during the previous decades.8 The significance of voluntary cooperation for 
achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement were not lost on the Parties, which 
committed to promoting the growth of such voluntary action in the same Decision in 
which they adopted the Paris Agreement itself.9 
Four years on, with the Agreement having entered into force in November 
2016, the task of ensuring compliance with the Agreement to reach the goals set is 
paramount. Therein rises a mountainous challenge. Current NDCs are evidently 
insufficient to meet these goals; their sum puts the world on a trajectory of 3°C rise in 
global temperature.10 In other words, there exists a gap between the commitments 
                                               
6 UNFCCC, ‘Massive Mobilization by Non-State Stakeholders Summarized at COP21’. 
7 See GGCA, ‘Lima-Paris Action Agenda Independent Assessment Report’ for an assessment of these 
cooperative initiatives. 
8 For examples of scholarship on the potential of cooperative initiatives and their increasing 
prevalence, see Hale and Mauzerall, ‘Thinking Globally and Acting Locally’; Andonova, Betsill, and 
Bulkeley, ‘Transnational Climate Governance’; Blok et al., ‘Bridging the Greenhous-Gas Emissions 
Gap’; Deng et al., ‘Wedging the Gap: Defining the next Steps to Implementation’; and Abbott, ‘The 
Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’. 
9 UNFCCC, ‘Decision 1/CP.20’. 





necessary to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, and the commitments that 
have thus far been made by Parties—an “emissions gap”. Although the ratchet-up 
mechanism is designed to address this gap, Parties show little evidence that they are 
willing to make significant improvements to their existing commitments. This is 
especially true for those Parties with the largest economies—that is, those that 
contribute most to global greenhouse gas emissions. At the 2019 climate summit 
hosted by the UN Secretary-General, almost no G20 countries pledged to increase 
their existing NDCs, resulting in the observation that, “a key aim of the Summit was 
to secure commitment from countries to enhance their NDCs, which was met to some 
extent, but largely by smaller economies. With most of the G20 members visibly 
absent, the likely impact on the emissions gap will be limited.”11 This reticence has 
been attributed by many to the U-turn in climate policy announced by the United 
States government on 1 June 2017, when President Trump stated his government’s 
intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 
In this context, attention to the potential of voluntary commitments to bridge 
the emissions gap has soared among practitioners and scholars alike, for two primary 
reasons. One, it is hoped that the voluntary commitments would help reverse the loss 
of intergovernmental momentum. Two, as figure 1.1 illustrates, the commitments are 
inherently valuable for climate change mitigation. Recent estimates suggest that, if 
fully implemented, existing commitments may reduce emissions by up to nineteen 
gigatons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (19GtCO2e/yr)—a game-changing amount, 
when current national contributions by countries under the Paris Agreement only add 
                                               





up to 6GtCO2e/yr and when the total remaining gap to bend the emissions trajectory 
to a two degree-compatible world by 2030 is 12GtCO2e/yr.12  
Figure 1.1 The emissions reductions potential of voluntary cooperation. Voluntary cooperative 
initiatives show potential to move global temperature trajectory to +2ºC range by 2030 (i.e. in keeping 
with Paris Agreement goals), while voluntary commitments by individual actors show significantly less 
potential to bend the trajectory within the same time frame.  
Source: NewClimate Institute et al., ‘Global Climate Action from Cities, Regions and Businesses’, 41. 
Yet, for full implementation of these voluntary commitments, “a great 
diversity of institutions and stakeholders from different countries, levels of 
governance, sectors, and branches of civil society must collaborate and coordinate 
willingly and effectively.”13 Scholarship on the effectiveness of the initiatives has 
                                               
12 See UNEP, ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2019’ for estimates of national contributions and the 
emissions gap; and NewClimate Institute et al., ‘Global Climate Action from Cities, Regions and 
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NDCs are taken here. 






found that they show significant variation.14 The quality of the commitments and their 
implementation is therefore paramount, and investing in more and high-quality 
voluntary cooperation could inject momentum in the ratchet-up mechanism as well as 
directly contribute to greenhouse gas emissions reductions. 
1.2 What Roles for Intergovernmental Organizations? 
Subsequent to COP21, for the past four years many different actors have been 
accelerating their pursuit of the growth of such cooperation. These actors include 
national governments, subnational authorities, civil society organizations such as 
NGOs or professional associations, research institutes, intergovernmental 
organizations, and businesses (whether financial institutions or otherwise) and 
industry associations.  
Among these actors, intergovernmental organizations such as the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies, or the multilateral development banks, have 
been making highly visible and purposive efforts to cultivate voluntary cooperation. 
Most obviously, this has occurred under the aegis of the climate convention, 
following the decision by Parties at COP21 to promote such cooperation going 
forward. Recognizing the significance and potential of voluntary commitments to 
enhance ambition by Parties for their own nationally determined contributions, 
Parties institutionalized the role of so-called “non-Party stakeholders” (that is, the 
variety of actors such as civil society organizations, businesses and so on, enumerated 
above, excluding national governments which are Parties to the convention) and their 
                                               





commitments, and put in place measures to promote such commitments. Specifically, 
they established: i) rotating high-level champions under the presidencies of the COP 
to cultivate greater voluntary commitments by non-Party stakeholders; ii) annual 
high-level meetings at each COP to assess progress; iii) technical examination 
meetings to raise awareness of options and solutions within greenhouse gas-emitting 
sectors; and iv) an online platform hosted by the secretariat that showcases these 
voluntary commitments.15 Thus, having been tasked by the Parties, the UNFCCC 
secretariat and the high-level champions have convened non-Party stakeholders 
annually, seeking to cultivate more commitments.16 To support these efforts, the 
UNFCCC secretariat has invested in the development of a climate action team.17 
In addition, however, intergovernmental organizations have been attempting 
to cultivate voluntary cooperation outside of the institutional framework set out by the 
UNFCCC Parties. In 2018, when Governor Jerry Brown of California hosted the 
Global Climate Action Summit, which aimed to spur cooperative action, the 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Secretariat acted as co-chair. Under the United 
Nations, the UN Ocean Conference in 2017 and the Global Sustainable Transport 
Conference in 2016 both heavily focused on developing cooperative partnerships.18 In 
2019, the UN Secretary-General hosted a summit to mobilize political will and 
catalyze voluntary cooperation ahead of 2020, the first ratchet-up deadline of national 
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ambition under the Paris Agreement. In short, a variety of intergovernmental 
organizations with varying mandates and membership have been attempting to 
cultivate the phenomenon of voluntary cooperation on climate change. 
If voluntary cooperation on climate change is a priority, are intergovernmental 
organizations an effective class of actors to cultivate and accelerate its growth? The 
answer to this must be informed by an examination of the roles that such 
organizations have played in the past, and the differentiated effects of these roles on 
the phenomenon. Indeed, purposive efforts by intergovernmental organizations to 
increase voluntary cooperation on climate change have been undertaken primary at 
two different levels since the 1970s.  
Intergovernmental organizations have supported the growth of voluntary 
cooperation at the system-wide level, that is, across all the different sectors that 
pertain to greenhouse gas emissions, at major multilateral conferences, such as the 
conferences on sustainable development; conferences of parties to the framework 
convention on climate change; and summits hosted by the Secretary-General.19 The 
launch of new initiatives has been hailed as a significant outcome at each of these 
events, and the IGOs making these system-wide efforts typically do not participate 
within initiatives themselves (that is, system-wide efforts are undertaken from the 
‘outside’). Intergovernmental organizations have also played specific roles at the 
initiative level, within particular cooperative initiatives, most notably as secretariats, 
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but also as ordinary participants and lead entities and occasionally as funders.20 These 
levels of engagement, while distinct, have not always been separate. Nor has the 
engagement of organizations been consistent over time. The growth pattern of the 
commitments themselves has been highly variable, with the quantity of commitments 
being made spiking in some years while waning in others, and the quality of 
commitments showing significant variation.  
Of course, the efforts of intergovernmental organizations in voluntary 
cooperation are not in themselves evidence of their effectiveness in advancing it. 
Assessing their effectiveness needs one to grapple with the counterfactual statement: 
had intergovernmental organizations not made efforts to advance voluntary 
cooperation on climate change, the growth of such cooperation would be significantly 
less than that seen today. This leads to the formulation of the central research 
question that this dissertation seeks to answer: Did intergovernmental 
organizations drive the growth of voluntary cooperation on climate change? 
1.3 The Gap in Current Knowledge 
Answering the research question requires an understanding of existing 
knowledge on the drivers of partnership and the roles of IGOs therein. A 
consideration of existing knowledge on these topics is in order before the precise gaps 
can be identified for this study to fill.  
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Why do actors cooperate with each other? Scholarship on public goods and 
climate governance has highlighted many drivers for partnerships or voluntary 
cooperation among states and non-state actors. Cooperation is a functional response 
to the prisoner’s dilemma of optimizing a joint result among rationally motivated 
actors. In the context of providing public goods that cannot be delivered by one actor 
alone or the management of common-pool resources, and the need to avoid the 
“tragedy of the commons”, such cooperation can optimally take place among 
governments, private entities (whether firms or NGOs), or a combination, depending 
on the specific context of the problem.21  
Within the context of this macro functional driver, different types of actors 
experience localized and varied motivations to partner on specific problems that 
confront them and to which they may be contributing. For example, in the case of 
climate change, civil society organizations with specific priorities (such as indigenous 
groups seeking preservation of their lands and property rights, or environmental 
NGOs seeking stronger regulation), and which may hold limited influence over their 
national governments, cooperate with one another transnationally by forming 
advocacy networks to increase international pressure for domestic action.22 On the 
other hand, with the rise of consumer awareness and increased preferences of 
consumers for corporate social responsibility and Environmental and Social 
Governance (ESG), private firms pertinent to the climate problem (such as consumer 
goods companies that contribute to deforestation, one of the major causes of 
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greenhouse gas emissions) are often motivated to make voluntary commitments to 
protect their reputations, but also wish to avoid loss of market share if they are the 
only ones committing, which compels them to engage in cooperation with each other 
to set standards and make incremental changes to operations.23 Likewise, they may be 
seeking a first mover advantage in new technologies or markets. Complementary 
capacities among different types of actors can compel cooperation across 
constituency types. For example, firms may gain legitimacy by partnering with 
NGOs, which in turn may gain access to capacities and expertise to solve the 
problem.24  
One strand of scholarship has conceptualized the three types of actors 
involved in cooperation—the states, NGOs and firms—as three points of a 
“Governance Triangle”, with each cooperative initiative appearing within the triangle, 
its placement determined by the ratio of its membership or governance actors among 
the three actor types at the vertices of the triangle.25 Based on this, typologies of 
partnerships have been developed, distinguishing between the groupings of 
constituencies. Another strand of scholarship develops typologies of partnerships 
based on their immediate functional purpose for cooperation, such as information-
sharing, capacity-building, standard-setting, and so on.26  
What drove the growth of voluntary cooperation over the past few decades, in 
particular the increasing prevalence of multi-stakeholder partnerships or initiatives? 
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Scholarship identifies several political and economic drivers. Following the end of the 
Cold War and lessons learned from the early decades of the application of the 
neoliberal paradigm, a policy space that encourages closer engagement between the 
public and private domains has driven the growth of partnerships (instead of solely 
governmental or private actions) particularly at the national level.27 This has diffused 
to the global level in the context of globalization since the late twentieth century. In 
addition, at the global level, while intergovernmental agreement among sovereign 
nation states followed by compliance has traditionally been the instrument of 
cooperation to deliver global public goods, frustration with the inability of this 
instrument to deliver the goods in cases such as climate change has caused pertinent 
non-state actors as well as states to increasingly turn towards voluntary cooperation, 
in effect resulting in a “transnational regime complex” or fragmentation of 
governance.28  
Finally, given these drivers of the growth of voluntary cooperation, what roles 
do intergovernmental organizations play vis-a-vis this phenomenon? For the specific 
phenomenon of voluntary cooperation on climate change, the question of IGO 
influence has begun to receive scholarly attention in recent years, but has not been 
answered satisfactorily. Two areas of focus in the scholarship on this topic are 
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discernible (although they are not always distinguished as such in the literature), as 
follows.  
The first concerns the roles that IGOs play within initiatives or partnerships, in 
particular how they contribute to their formation, quality, effectiveness or legitimacy. 
Case studies on specific initiatives as well as large-n studies suggest that particular 
IGOs (notably UNEP and the World Bank) with focality in specific issue areas (that 
is, with the convening power, autonomy, authority and technical capacity) are 
important influencers, instigating and supporting many cooperative initiatives.29 Their 
convening power, technical expertise, perceived legitimacy and relative autonomy 
make them particularly valuable in the formation and sustainment of multi-
stakeholder cooperation, enabling them to lower barriers for cooperation that actors 
are not able to themselves. The second concerns the efforts taken by IGOs from the 
‘outside’—that is, without participating in initiatives themselves. Such ‘system-wide’ 
efforts of IGOs to promote climate-focused voluntary cooperation include the 
promotion of Type-II Partnerships under the Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002 (WSSD or “Johannesburg Summit” hereafter); 
similar efforts under its follow-up summit in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, and efforts 
undertaken by the UN Secretary-General and the UNFCCC Secretariat in the 2014 
Climate Summit and the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) in 2014 and 2015. 
Scholarship on such efforts has remained largely descriptive and analytically has 
                                               






focused on their consequences rather than uncovering the causal mechanism by which 
such efforts may have given rise to voluntary cooperation.30 
In recent years, both strands areas of focus have begun to increasingly use 
“orchestration theory”, which describes a pervasive behavior of IGOs. Orchestration 
theory submits that when IGOs lack sufficient authority to direct changes in 
behaviour of other actors in order to achieve their mandates, they resort to using 
intermediaries with sufficient authority to do so. Thus, as orchestrators (O), 
intergovernmental organizations use intermediaries (I) to influence the behaviour of 
their targets (T).31 In the context of voluntary cooperation, scholars argue that there 
exists an “orchestration deficit”, which can be overcome by IGOs or states, to 
improve voluntary cooperation as a part of “transnational new governance” and 
contribute to effective delivery of global public goods.  
In the context of climate change, empirical description of system-wide efforts 
suggest that an orchestration role may have been utilized by these IGOs to cause 
actors to launch new initiatives in 2014 and 2015.32 Likewise, by participating in 
initiatives, scholars argue that IGOs have “orchestrated” voluntary cooperation by 
lowering barriers to cooperation and enabling partnerships to form, as well as by 
lending legitimacy and capacity to existing initiatives to sustain them.33  
Despite these steps towards discerning the influence of IGOs in the growth of 
climate-focused voluntary cooperation, three notable gaps remain, which currently 
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limit our understanding of whether and how IGOs may have driven the growth of this 
phenomenon over time. 
The first gap is a system-wide analysis. There has been no empirical 
analysis to investigate the purported causal link between the growth in the number of 
climate-focused voluntary initiatives over time and the system-wide efforts of IGOs 
to spur the growth of this growth (that is, efforts taken by IGOs on the ‘outside’—to 
promote voluntary cooperation on climate change without participating in initiatives 
themselves). Existing studies establish correlation and intent, but not causation, either 
by focusing on the IGO-side of the equation without tracing the effect of these efforts 
on the formation of partnerships, or by considering only the subset of partnerships 
that were a result of the IGO efforts. This empirical gap has been noted in the 
literature, and a framework based on orchestration theory proposed to assess the 
influence of IGOs in the context of efforts under COP21 (the LPAA).34 To answer the 
question posed by this dissertation however, a review of all pertinent system-wide 
efforts by IGOs to promote voluntary cooperation over the years in which this 
phenomenon has been observed must be conducted. Were some efforts more 
successful than others? If so, why? Under what conditions have IGOs successfully 
spurred the launch of new initiatives by states, private firms and NGOs? How did 
these efforts by IGOs affect the existing driving motivations of these actors to 
cooperate? 
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The second gap is a sector-wide analysis. No empirical analysis exists of 
how the involvement of IGOs in particular initiatives affects the capabilities and 
propensity for voluntary cooperation beyond the initiative—that is, among actors in 
the wider sector in which the IGO is focal. While the importance of the context of 
initiatives has been highlighted in the literature, if the initiative is considered the 
micro level, then at the meso-level the context has frequently been assumed to consist 
of the domestic policy and economic environment in which the initiative is being 
implemented, and at the macro level, the international arena.35 However, for 
voluntary initiatives that are by definition transnational in nature, situating them 
within the context of other initiatives within their sector, such as renewable energy, or 
aviation, is another, novel and pertinent way of contextualizing them, and this need 
has been recognized in recent years.36 Since initiatives are known to interact with 
each other, with both negative and positive effects, and since particular IGOs focal 
within a sector are known to engage in multiple initiatives in the sector, 
understanding what effects, if any, these IGOs have had over time on shaping the 
growth of cooperation within their respective areas of focality is key to answering the 
research question. 
The third gap is a multilevel analysis. There is no empirical analysis of the 
ways in which different IGOs working at different levels interact with each other in 
the growth of voluntary cooperation, although scholars have noted that that multilevel 
management, convening and leadership is needed by intergovernmental organizations 
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if partnerships are to fulfil their potential.37 In particular, how do the efforts of IGOs 
at the system-wide level interact with the efforts of those participating within 
initiatives themselves, and what is the combined effect of these efforts on the growth 
of voluntary cooperation? Given that IGOs do engage in both ways, such a multilevel 
analysis is necessary if a comprehensive answer to the question is to be obtained.  
This study therefore seeks to fill these existing lacunae in knowledge and 
answer the research question posed, by: (1) conducting an empirical investigation into 
the various system-wide efforts by IGOs over time to promote climate-focused 
voluntary cooperation, and assessing whether and how these efforts were successful; 
(2) assessing the level of influence that IGOs participating in initiatives wield in 
shaping or steering the growth of cooperation within their focal sectors over time; and 
(3) conducting a multilevel analysis to understand the interactive effect of IGOs 
working at the system-wide and initiative levels to advance voluntary cooperation on 
climate change, on the growth of such cooperation. 
In filling these gaps and answering the question, this study will make use of 
insights and concepts from existing literature on IGOs, but refrains from entering a 
theory-testing mode. The most commonly used theory today, that of orchestration, 
seems inadequate by design. First, this study aims to understand a complex 
phenomenon in which many different actors are engaging with each other in many 
different ways. There is no single orchestrator (O), since the multi-level, sector-wide 
and system-wide investigations all demand a consideration of the multiple actors 
acting together or over time and their combined effects. The differentiated abilities, 
                                               





preferences and actions of the various actors involved will need to be described to 
illuminate the causal mechanisms at work. As well, this study does not presuppose 
that the efforts by IGOs to promote voluntary cooperation are always or necessarily to 
influence the behavior of a particular target, nor that there is only one target. This 
study therefore adopts an inductive approach while using insights from current 
theories as and when they appear applicable.  
1.4 Definitions 
To answer the research question, the terms “intergovernmental organization”, 
“voluntary cooperation on climate change”, “drive” and “growth” demand definition 
in the context of this study. 
1.4.1 Intergovernmental Organizations 
This study considers an intergovernmental organization as having been 
established by and among national governments, who remain the organization’s only 
full members. This definition does not preclude the admittance of other actors as 
observers or special members, as is common for many intergovernmental 
organizations, but such actors do not have the same deliberative and voting rights 
within the organization as do the member states. Examples of such organizations 
include the United Nations and its many specialized agencies, funds and programmes, 
as well as multilateral development banks, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), among many others. As such, the term 
corresponds to ‘international organizations’ as commonly used in international 





Economic Forum, which consider themselves ‘international organizations’, and may 
be given such a title under Swiss law but are not established by national governments, 
this study will deliberately use the term ‘intergovernmental organizations’ to maintain 
clarity on the type of actor meant. In addition, this study demarcates between types of 
intergovernmental organizations and focuses on a specific subset. Some 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Union, are designed with an 
explicit delegation of national sovereignty by member states. These regional supra-
national entities will not be the focus of this study.   
Within this definition, the conceptual framework afforded by the Principal-
Agent (PA) or First UN-Second UN distinctions provides further clarity for this 
analysis. Inis Claude’s categorization of the United Nations as consisting of a First 
UN and a Second UN provides a useful distinction between venues of power within 
the United Nations and, more generally, within intergovernmental organizations.38 
The First UN (or, generalized, a ‘First IGO’) refers to the member states that 
comprise the organization and that are its primary decision makers. The Second UN 
(or, generalized, a ‘Second IGO’) consists of the staff members that make up the 
secretariats or bureaucracies of the organization. In theories of intergovernmental 
organizations, this demarcation is also commonly characterized as the Principal-
Agent (PA) relationship, whereby as rational actors, states, the principals, delegate 
responsibilities to IGOs as their agents.  
The conventional PA model assumes that agents do not act independently of, 
nor in contradiction to, the wishes of the states. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
                                               





however, scholarship has highlighted the proactive, autonomous and influential roles 
that agents can have over the decision-making of the IGOs they serve.39 For example, 
in the context of peace and security, the influence of the UN Secretary-General has 
been the focus. Good offices and the mediation role of the Secretary-General 
demonstrate a degree of autonomy and influence that is significantly greater than 
simply being an agent of the principals, but more akin to being an independent 
actor.40 In the context of development assistance and peacekeeping, IGO 
bureaucracies have been known to act with agency, with both positive and negative 
effects for the achievement of their mandates.41 Autonomy and capacities of Second 
IGOs may vary based on their bureaucratic culture, governance structures, leadership, 
and over time. The secretariats to treaty bodies, such as the climate convention, for 
example, are significantly more constrained in their autonomy than an organization 
such as UNEP. The agents are therefore differentially autonomous from their 
Principals. Likewise, different groupings of member states can be more or less 
effective in purpose. In answering the research question, this study makes a 
distinction between efforts led primarily by the principal(s) or the agent(s) of an 
IGO—that is, whether efforts are led by the First IGO or the second IGO. The 
question of the autonomy, influence and convening power available to the particular 
IGO in question is therefore highly pertinent in this study.  
One final distinction that provides clarity on the definition of 
intergovernmental organizations as used in this study is the notion of a “Third UN” or 
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“Third IGO”, which is considered to include actors not employed by the secretariats 
or member states of the United Nations, but engaged with either or both in efforts to 
influence the agendas or outcomes of multilateral deliberations.42 Such actors could 
include academia and think tanks, civil society organizations, business organizations, 
businesses, and commissions of eminent persons.43 Enjoying an “insider-outsider” 
status with respect to the IGO in question, this group wields uneven but palpable 
influence over the principals and agents. This study specifically excludes this group 
of actors from the definition of intergovernmental organizations. Rather, the different 
types of entities that form a Third IGO are treated as external influencers of the 
organization. 
1.4.2 Voluntary Cooperation on Climate Change 
This study defines voluntary cooperation on climate change as all identifiable 
examples of cooperative initiatives on climate change, commonly seen as 
“commitments to action that are being undertaken collectively by a variety of 
companies, cities, subnational regions, investors and civil society organizations – 
often in partnership with countries”.44 Other than being focused specifically on 
climate change, these initiatives can be considered the same phenomenon as “multi-
stakeholder partnerships” or “partnerships” more generally, which have generated 
significant interest in recent decades as a mode of governance. Several important 
features of such cooperative initiatives or partnerships are highlighted in the 
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literature.45 Cooperative initiatives are often Transnational, which entails groups that 
are not solely national governments transcending national boundaries to form 
alliances and forge roles for themselves as actors in global governance.46 In addition, 
partnerships are voluntary, that is, they are not specifically mandated by national 
governments through regulation or legislation, nor by intergovernmental treaty. 
Rather, entities are acting out of self-interested motivations by engaging in 
partnerships and not out of a legal obligation.47 Initiatives are also cooperative and 
participatory—that is, they are partnerships, or networks. They do not consist of 
commitments made by single entities, such as targets set by an individual company or 
city. Rather, they involve joint commitments made by a group of entities, whether 
public (such as cities of regional governments), private (such as businesses or civil 
society organizations) or hybrid. Finally, some scholars distinguish between 
partnerships that are horizontal rather than vertical.48 Vertical partnerships involve 
commercial, contractual relationships, in which partners exist in a hierarchy. A 
typical example is when a private sector company supplements public investment for 
an infrastructure project in return for future dividends such as toll revenues. By 
contrast, a horizontal partnership entails no contractual arrangement, and no loss in 
autonomy of the partners engaged.  
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While there is general agreement on the nature of partnerships, full consensus 
does not exist—whether among academics or practitioners. The various datasets and 
studies that gather information on such climate initiatives define their parameters in 
slightly different ways. This laxness in definition is partly a function of the nebulous 
nature of voluntary cooperation. Unlike an intergovernmental organization, the 
constitution of a cooperative initiative may evolve quite rapidly. What may be 
accepted as a novel initiative at the time of formation may concretize into an NGO or 
business association over time. The World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) is an illustrative example. At the time of its formation, the 
WBCSD could arguable be defined as a cooperative initiative. It consists of 
companies voluntarily committing to sustainable practices. However, today the 
WBCSD is established as a business organization, which cultivates and hosts 
cooperative initiatives itself. Another example is the International Solar Alliance, an 
initiative launched by the Government of India, which consists of only national 
governments as its members. As such, it bears the hallmarks of being an 
intergovernmental organization, with no members that are non-state actors. 
Nevertheless, it is viewed as an example of a cooperative initiative, even being 
featured as such on the climate action portal of the UNFCCC. 
This study accepts that definitional imprecision is an inherent feature of the 
evolving phenomenon. As such, it employs a flexible approach to defining initiatives. 
First, the following six guidelines, adapted from the literature, are used: initiatives 
must be voluntary, horizontal and participatory; they may consist of multiple types of 





governments together); they must aim at large-scale systemic change, which can 
cause them to be global in scope or subnational with very high ambition; and they 
must have a significant focus on climate change. Second, existing academic and 
practitioner consensus on whether particular initiatives are to be defined as such are 
taken into consideration, thus allowing some flexibility in this definition.  
Furthermore, this study draws on insights from theories of networked 
governance and in keeping with recent scholarship on voluntary cooperation on 
climate change, views the phenomenon as a network of actors interacting with each 
other, through co-membership of cooperative initiatives. Thus, not only are individual 
initiatives treated as networks of actors, but also the various initiatives together, 
which have some overlap in actors, are conceptualized and treated as a network of 
these networks. This network of initiatives and their members is considered at the 
system-wide level, which includes all initiatives across sectors, as well as at the 
sectoral level, which includes the specific subset of initiatives and their members that 
are focused on the particular sector in question.  
Finally, in considering the universe of cooperative initiatives, this study 
maintains an agnostic view regarding the context in which initiatives were formed. 
The literature on voluntary cooperation and intergovernmental organizations traces 
two threads of activity. On the one hand, scholars have examined the so-called Type-
II partnerships arising in the context of the conferences on sustainable development in 
2002 and 2012. These analyses are limited to only those partnerships officially 
announced in these conferences, which cover the range of issues under sustainable 





climate change considers the partnerships arising in the context of the 
intergovernmental negotiations on climate change, some of which overlap with the 
Type-II partnerships. In this study, care is taken to consider all relevant initiatives, no 
matter their institutional origins or association. 
1.4.3 Growth 
Conceptualized as a network of initiatives and their members, the growth of 
voluntary cooperation is understood first as the rise in the quantity of initiatives in 
existence. The quantity can be measured for the entire network, or sectoral 
subnetworks, with the latter yielding insights into the differential growth of 
cooperation in various sectors pertinent to greenhouse gas emissions. The quantity of 
initiatives is relatively easy to measure and capture, which has led to a particular 
focus among practitioners on the number of initiatives in existence as a litmus test for 
the strength of cooperation.49 This may or may not be a good assumption. 
The quality of cooperation is another way to consider the strength of 
cooperation, and therefore the growth of cooperation. In this regard, the best measure 
of the quality of a cooperative initiative is the extent to which it achieved its goal(s). 
Due to the long-term nature of efforts to curb climate change, such ex-post 
information is as yet largely unavailable to us, even for those initiatives that may aim 
to build capacity rather than directly implement emissions-mitigating measures. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to indirectly measure the quality of an initiative, by 
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understanding and tracking conditions that are likely to enable an initiative to achieve 
its goals, and by assessing the ambition level of the goals set. 
This approach has been prolifically applied in the study of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships, of which cooperative initiatives on climate change are a subset. Many 
case studies as well as large-n studies have attempted to create a typology of enabling 
conditions of success for partnerships.50 A summary of this extant literature points to 
conditions for success within such partnerships, spanning three categories of ‘actor’, 
‘process’ and ‘context’.51 In this study, I explicitly use these conditions of success as 
a proxy measure of the quality of an initiative, focusing in particular on the groupings 
of actor and process.  
Under the ‘actor’ category, these conditions include an optimal partner mix 
(having all the necessary partners at the table) and effective leadership (specifically, 
an effective ‘broker’, ‘convener’ or ‘orchestrator’). Under the ‘process’ category, 
conditions include stringent goal-setting (goals that are both, ambitious and precise); 
sustained funding for the initiative to achieve its stated goals; professional process 
management (for example, an adequately staffed and permanent secretariat and a 
clear governance structure); and regular monitoring, reporting and evaluation to 
support organizational learning.  
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The research question is concerned with the causal influence of the actions of 
intergovernmental organizations on the growth of voluntary cooperation on climate 
change. As such, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition of the 
verb drive: To impel forcibly to action, or into some state; to constrain, compel.52 
This study distinguishes between an indirect and a direct sense of the word as applied 
to actions of intergovernmental organizations.  
In the indirect sense, for an intergovernmental organization to drive something 
might mean for it to create an enabling environment, such as by providing a platform 
for stakeholders. Or, it might mean compelling stakeholders to act by failing to fulfil 
a necessary function, thus creating an incentive due to lack of action. The literature 
recognizes, for instance, that the lack of progress in the intergovernmental 
negotiations on climate change have driven actors to engage in voluntary cooperation. 
In the direct sense, an intergovernmental organization might drive a process or to a 
result through a variety of functions it proactively fulfils, such as purposive 
information sharing, funding, organizing, convening, and so on.  
The two senses of the word imply quite different roles of intergovernmental 
organizations, and although both will be considered, it is the ‘direct’ sense that is the 
primary focus of this study. 
                                               





1.5 Key Findings 
The key findings of this study are presented in an argument of five parts, as 
follows. 
Cooperative initiatives on climate change form ecosystems among inter-
connected entities within sectors that emit greenhouse gases. New initiatives are 
best understood as evolutionary changes to the strength—or quality—of 
cooperation in these sectors. Given this, the quality of cooperation must be 
understood at the sectoral level in addition to the initiative level.  
Thus, rather than treating the quality and effectiveness of an initiative as 
intrinsic attributes, as is currently the case, it is more apt to consider how an initiative 
may have improved the quality of cooperation that already existed within the sector, 
such as the optimality of the partners engaged vis-à-vis the problem and the ambition 
of goals articulated, as well as how it may have led to the formation of new initiatives 
within the sector.  
As members of voluntary cooperative initiatives, technical IGOs can have 
a significant, positive and often decisive effect on the quality of cooperation over 
time in the wider sector, in addition to the initiatives in which they participate, 
and are among the most central drivers of evolutionary growth of the sectoral 
ecosystems. By taking up secretariat and funding roles consistently and deploying 
their convening, organizational and knowledge-generation functions, IGOs such as 
UNEP, UNDP, the World Bank and others have mediated among governments, 
private sector entities, civil society organizations and subnational authorities to forge 





entities in the network (that is, by engaging in many, consequential initiatives), a core 
group of IGOs have positioned themselves very strongly as bridge-builders, 
conveners and preferred partners (especially of businesses) in their sectoral networks. 
As such, by virtue of their strategic participation in initiatives, these IGOs have 
become central and relied-upon community-builders for the wider network. 
IGOs that have convening power and autonomy can catalyse a surge in 
the growth of voluntary cooperation, effectively acting as choreographers of 
participants in the network. Governments that possess the convening power, 
autonomy and internationally-sanctioned legitimacy are also able to perform 
this role. Having established a good offices role on climate change, the office of the 
UN Secretary-General currently stands unique among intergovernmental 
organizations in possessing the convening power and autonomy sufficient to 
choreograph surges in the growth of voluntary cooperation. This is particularly 
relevant given that the only other entities with similar convening power and high 
autonomy are national governments, whose motivations to undertake such a 
choreographic effort to advance the climate agenda are vulnerable to the vagaries of 
domestic political contexts. 
The catalytic surge in cooperation depends on the presence of six 
enabling organizational attributes, which together characterize the collective 
choreography that accelerates the growth of cooperation. The conditions include: 
strategic timing vis-à-vis the intergovernmental process; sectoral rather than 
constituency-based orientation of the preparatory efforts; high visibility and potential 





commitments as the measure of success; empowerment of already influential actors 
within the network as conveners, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity; and the 
exercise of leadership with central decision-making by the organizer. 
 Together, these six organizational attributes create a strong imperative for 
motivated entities to expand and deepen partnerships within sectors, in effect creating 
a ‘pipeline’ of cooperative commitments. Critically, while the process requires lead 
organizers with high convening power and autonomy, it builds on existing 
motivations of entities in the network, has their enthusiastic support, and benefits 
from their inputs, since doing so enables them to overcome existing barriers to 
cooperation and accelerate their voluntary efforts. In short, if the entities in the 
network are the performers in a modern dance, then this catalytic approach is its 
collective choreography—an act of mutual creation that generates the dance.  
Sustained and adequate institutional support over time is necessary for 
the gains resulting from the collective choreography to be impactful. Conversely, 
efforts that don’t receive this sustained support, often fail to be sustained, or to 
grow and deliver on their initial promise. In contexts as diverse as forests, short-
lived climate pollutants and land transport, the importance of sustained catalytic 
engagement and follow-up for the effective implementation of voluntary cooperation 
has been clear. In short, given the dominance of intergovernmental organizations as 
choreographer as well as dancer, the combined efforts of intergovernmental 
organizations from both outside and within the network of voluntary cooperation 





1.6 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter two presents the research design and the selection of case studies. 
The research design consists of a mixture of qualitative process tracing and 
dynamic social network analysis. Relying on elite interviews of 71 individuals from a 
range of institutions including governments, business, industry associations, civil 
society organizations and intergovernmental organizations, as well as archival 
material sourced from each of these institutions, the study traces the causal 
mechanisms that connect the efforts of intergovernmental organizations with the 
quantity and quality of voluntary cooperation on climate change. The qualitative data 
and analysis are layered with social network analysis, which reveals actor types and 
actors that have been influential in the network of initiatives over time. This analysis 
benefits from an original network dataset of cooperative initiatives on climate change 
developed for this study, taking as a primary base the crowd-sourced Climate 
Initiatives Platform maintained via a partnership between UNEP and the government 
of Norway, while adding data from internet-based searches and other datasets. The 
use of social network analysis in this study represents a methodological innovation in 
the study of voluntary cooperation on climate change as well as on intergovernmental 
organizations.  
The analytical organization of the study consists of a review of system-wide 
efforts by intergovernmental organizations in the context of efforts by other 
stakeholders, and three case-studies that fill the sector-wide and multilevel knowledge 
gaps. The review of system-wide efforts primarily traces the effects of IGOs on the 





identified—that of an empirical investigation establishing causal connection between 
system-wide IGO efforts and the growth of cooperative initiatives over time. The 
three case studies are designed to trace the effects of IGOs on the quality of 
initiatives, and serve to fill the second and third knowledge gaps identified: how the 
involvement of IGOs in particular initiatives affects the capabilities and propensity 
for voluntary cooperation among actors in the wider sector or issue area in which the 
IGO is focal (that is, beyond the initiative(s) in which the IGO participates); and 
multi-level analysis that considers the combined effects of different IGOs together on 
the quality of cooperation. 
This chapter also presents the rationale for the three sectors and initiatives 
chosen as case studies, which include short-lived climate pollutants (focusing on the 
Climate and Clean Air Coalition), forests (focusing on the New York Declaration on 
Forests), and land transport (focusing on the Partnership for Sustainable, Low Carbon 
Transport). 
Chapter three conducts the system-wide analysis, and assesses whether and 
how the various system-wide efforts of IGOs to promote voluntary cooperation on 
climate change have been successful. It primarily tackles the quantity aspect of the 
growth 
First observing that the growth in number of cooperative initiatives has 
occurred in three distinct phases, with significant differences between each phase in 
the rate of growth, the connectivity among initiatives in the network, and the primary 
stakeholders driving the growth, this chapter focuses on phases two and three (that is, 





and accelerated growth respectively. This chapter then identifies the most central and 
influential actors that were members of the network of voluntary cooperation during 
these phases. These include a core group of governments, IGOs, businesses and civil 
society organizations. Next, the main system-wide IGO efforts to spur cooperation 
are identified, with several First IGO-led and Second-IGO led efforts in both phases, 
and a mixed approach in phase three. This chapter then uses archives and interviews 
to trace whether the efforts of the IGOs had any impact on the decisions of the actors 
most central in the network to form new initiatives.  
This chapter finds that the growth trajectory of the number of initiatives has 
been positively influenced by IGOs’ system-wide efforts only when these efforts 
adhered to six organizations principles: strategic timing; high visibility; sectoral 
orientation; emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments; subsidiarity;53 and 
leadership with central decision-making. This has occurred in phase three, but not in 
phase two. Further, only those IGOs (and national governments) with very high 
convening power and autonomy are able to ensure these six organizational principles. 
Among IGOs, the office of the UN Secretary-General stands unique in possessing this 
convening power and autonomy on the climate change issue—the latter having been 
developed over decades, a process not dissimilar to the development of the “good 
offices” role of the Secretary-General in peace and security.  
Chapter four focuses on the network of initiatives related to the forests sector 
and in particular the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF), and conducts a 
sector-wide analysis to understand the influence of IGOs in the growth of the forest 
                                               





network of voluntary cooperation, and a multilevel analysis to understand the 
interactive effects of system-wide and initiative-level IGO efforts on the formation 
and growth of the NYDF, which also tests the findings of chapter three. 
For the sector-wide analysis, this chapter finds that by participating in 
initiatives, IGOs have strongly influenced the growth of cooperation in the forests 
sector. In particular, UNEP, UNDP, FAO, UNFCCC and the World Bank are among 
the most prolific entities, most relied-upon connectors and highly valued partners in 
the network. For the multilevel analysis, this chapter finds that the formation and 
quality of the NYDF depended on the joint efforts of a range of governments, 
businesses and civil society organizations that were already influential in the network 
of initiatives on forests, but that the combined system-wide and initiative-level efforts 
by EOSG and UNDP in enabling these efforts were determinant in the formation and 
several aspects of quality of the NYDF, particularly in its range of partners, its 
leadership and its ambition level. This strongly supports the findings of chapter three 
of six organizational elements that are necessary for a surge in the growth of the 
network. This chapter also finds evidence to suggest defining quality of cooperation 
at the initiative level may be too limiting; that the notion of quality of voluntary 
cooperation may be aptly applied at the sectoral level; and that particular instances of 
cooperation—i.e. individual initiatives—may aptly be considered attempts to improve 
quality of cooperation within the wider sector. 
Chapter five turns to the network of initiatives on short-lived climate 
pollutants (SLCPs), tracing in particular the formation and growth of the Climate and 





understand the influence of IGOs in the growth of the SLCP network of voluntary 
cooperation, and a multilevel analysis to understand the interactive effects of system-
wide and initiative-level IGO efforts on the formation and growth of the CCAC, 
which also tests the findings of chapter three.  
Through the sector-wide analysis, this chapter finds that by being among the 
most prolific actors in the network and consistently taking up secretariat and funding 
roles from the early 2000s, UNEP has positioned itself as a convener and bridge-
builder among disparate entities as well as being seen as the partner of choice by 
other influential entities in the network, notably governments. As such, UNEP, has 
played a highly influential role in shaping the growth trajectory of the SLCPs network 
of voluntary cooperation. Through the multilevel analysis, this chapter finds that the 
interactive effects of system-wide and initiative-level IGO efforts can be such that 
they spur a growth in cooperation--whether as more ambitious and stringent goals, or 
new partners, or both. This effect is seen when the six organizational attributes of 
effective system-wide IGO efforts are present. At the same time, this analysis shows a 
strong interactive effect between UNEP and the United States Government on the 
formation of the CCAC and its growth in early years. This chapter therefore provides 
strong support for the findings of chapter three while nuancing them: well-positioned 
lead governments are evidently able to choreograph the growth of cooperation, since 
they possess the convening power and autonomy to do so. Finally, this case study 
illustrates the fluidity of the network of SLCP initiatives and finds that the quantity of 
initiatives has often increased as a direct result of efforts to improve the quality of 





the quality of cooperation at the sectoral level rather than only at the initiative level. 
These include the mix of partners and the goal-setting. 
Chapter six examines the network of initiatives on land transport, and pays 
particular attention to the formation and growth of the Partnership on Sustainable, 
Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT). This chapter conducts a sector-wide analysis to 
understand the influence of IGOs in the growth of the land transport network of 
voluntary cooperation, and a multilevel analysis to understand the interactive effects 
of system-wide and initiative-level IGO efforts on the formation and growth of 
SLoCaT, which also tests the findings of chapter three. 
Although land transport is a sector with no lead focal intergovernmental 
organization, through the sector-wide analysis this chapter finds that IGOs, in 
particular UNEP and the World Bank, have consistently positioned themselves as 
essential connectors for different entity types, as well as becoming the preferred 
partner for businesses seeking to make voluntary cooperative commitments in 
transport. In short, IGOs have significantly influenced in the composition and 
topology of the network over time. The multilevel analysis provides strong and 
nuanced support to the six organizational attributes for successful promotion of 
voluntary cooperation. This analysis underlines that in the subsidiarity-leadership 
relationship, the initiative-level lead actor need not be an IGO in order for the results 
to be strong. This chapter also provides the strongest evidence of all three case studies 
that an essential concept in understanding the growth of the network is that these 
improvements in partner mix and goal-setting have occurred at the sectoral level, with 





additional partners or new targets. Quality of cooperation is best understood at the 
sectoral level.  
Chapter seven synthesizes the key findings of chapters three to six, 
considering together the system-wide analysis of chapter three and the multi-level and 
sector-wide analyses of the case studies. The contributions made to existing 







This dissertation seeks to answer the question: “did intergovernmental 
organizations drive the growth of voluntary cooperation on climate change?” This 
question demands an examination of processes and interaction among various types 
of actors in order to describe and infer roles that intergovernmental organizations 
played, if any, in causing changes to the quantity and quality of cooperative initiatives 
over time. In other words, the study intends to open the black box of the influence of 
intergovernmental organizations on voluntary cooperation on climate change. 
More specifically, as identified in chapter one, this study seeks to fill three 
knowledge gaps in answering the research question: an empirical understanding of 
the causal connection between system-wide efforts of IGOs to promote voluntary 
cooperation on climate change, and the growth of such cooperation over time; an 
understanding of the effects of IGO participation within initiatives on the growth of 
voluntary cooperation in their wider focal issue area over time; and an understanding 
of the interactive effect of IGOs at the system-wide and initiative levels on the growth 
of voluntary cooperation. The research design and methods therefore need to be 
optimized appropriately. 
In addition, the sector-oriented structure of the climate problem itself is 
pertinent to the design of this study. As figure 2.1 illustrates, different economic 
sectors are responsible for different amounts of greenhouse gas. Since greenhouse gas 





specific gases, many attempts at voluntary solutions by actors in these sectors have 
been similarly oriented. At the same time, many attempts have been primarily 
oriented around actor types (for example, cooperation among municipal authorities to 
reduce emissions related to cities such as from urban transport, buildings and waste 
management) while others have focused on specific geographic areas.54 Nevertheless, 
these efforts can be categorized by the sector(s) within which their efforts aim to bear 
fruit and the gases (or particulate matter) they aim to curb. While boundaries between 
sectors are porous and individual cooperative initiatives can and do aim to reduce 
emissions from multiple sectors, nevertheless the self-organization and categorization 
of voluntary cooperation along sectoral lines creates natural fault lines of the 
phenomenon along which the study can be oriented.  
This chapter provides an overview of the research design of this study and 
how it responds to the question asked as well as the gaps in knowledge identified; the 
two methods employed to answer the question most effectively (qualitative process 
tracing and dynamic social network analysis); and data used for each method.  
                                               







Figure 2.1 Greenhouse gas emissions are linked to a variety of economic sectors.  
Source: UNEP 2012. 
2.1 Research Design 
This study consists of one system-wide investigation that addresses the first 
knowledge gap, and three case studies that address the remaining two knowledge 
gaps.  
2.1.1 A System-Wide Investigation 
The system-wide analysis primarily considers the growth in quantity of 
voluntary cooperation on climate change over time and pertinent system-wide IGO 
efforts to promote it. As such, it addresses the knowledge gap of whether and how 
system-wide efforts of IGOs may have influenced the growth of initiatives. This 
requires a dataset of climate-focused initiatives and their launch dates, as well as the 





chapter, the Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP) maintained by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) provides the base for the dataset used in this study, 
with a large amount of data supplemented through a web search and the database on 
partnerships for sustainable development maintained by UN DESA. A review of 
extant literature on partnerships and climate change suggests that the primary venues 
for the promotion of climate-focused cooperation by IGOs were the United Nations 
General Assembly or Economic and Social Council, and the climate convention, with 
their associated secretariats. These form the object of inquiry of this investigation. 
This analysis is time-bound, from 2000 to 2015. Bounding the investigation 
appropriately was necessary to ensure its manageability (to ensure it is not too long 
and demanding) while providing adequate material for insights. The 2000-2015 
period covers a diversity of efforts by IGOs, while also being the period in which 
voluntary cooperation became a noticeable phenomenon. This study ends the system-
wide analysis at the end of 2015, when voluntary cooperation became codified in the 
intergovernmental climate negotiations. This was deemed a natural cut-off point for 
the historical analysis, the results of which could then be tested in future studies on 
the post-2015 period. As well, since the study was being conducted during 2018 and 
2019, when some significant system-wide efforts were being undertaken by IGOs, an 
in-situ analysis was not deemed feasible. 
2.1.2 Three Case Studies 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine every initiative in every 
greenhouse gas-emitting sector to assess how IGOs contribute to the growth of 





contributes to the growth of particular initiatives. A case study approach is used 
instead, to fill the two remaining knowledge gaps: an understanding of the sector-
level impacts on voluntary cooperation when focal IGOs engage in initiatives, and an 
understanding of the interactive effects of different IGOs at the system-wide and 
initiative levels, on the growth of voluntary cooperation. In these case studies, the 
emphasis is on the both the quality and quantity aspects of the growth of cooperation.  
The time span for the specific initiatives in these case studies, given their 
specific histories, is necessarily shorter than that for the system-wide study, and for 
each will begin at around the formation of the initiative and consider significant 
moments in the evolution of the initiative and sector. By being multilevel, the case 
studies “meet” the system-wide investigation at specific moments in time, while 
providing in-depth analysis in specific sectors and in specific initiatives, which is not 
possible in the system-wide study. In doing so, they address the knowledge gap on the 
interactive effects of IGOs at multiple levels. In additions, by considering the roles 
played by IGOs within the wider sector (and in particular considering how the IGOs’ 
engagement in initiatives influences cooperation within the wider sector), the case 
studies also address the knowledge gap on the influence of focal IGOs on the growth 
of voluntary cooperation within their sector. For this, the years 2000-2015 remain the 
bounds for the analysis. 
The selection of case studies is guided by four central concerns. First, the 
sectors chosen must be relevant and significant for the climate problem. For example, 
as figure 2.1 illustrates, sectors identified as dominant in causing greenhouse gas 





and buildings, among others. Some of these sectors contribute to carbon dioxide 
levels, while others contribute to other greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous 
oxide and fluorinated gases. It is important to select from these sectors, and choose 
those that contribute to significant greenhouse gas emissions. If treated as self-
contained investigations, the case studies would then be relevant and valuable for 
actors working within the sectors and can thus maximize this study’s contribution to 
the climate mitigation problem, even if it were to transpire that no generalizable 
conclusions may be drawn regarding the influence of intergovernmental organizations 
across sectors. Second, it is important to maximize the variation of the engagement of 
intergovernmental organizations across these case studies, to enable a higher 
probability of generalization. Since the engagement of intergovernmental 
organizations can occur at the initiative and system-wide level, and can vary over 
time (e.g. engagement may be high at the conceptualization and formation stage, but 
may reduce in the growth and implementation phase, or vice versa), this needs to be 
considered when assessing the degree of variation. Third, it is important to maximize 
variation of the quality of the initiatives selected to ensure robustness of results. 
Fourth, the variation in the sectoral contexts should be maximized to support 
generalizability. For example, a sector that may be seen as contentious among entities 
engaged in cooperation may be contrasted with a sector in which there is less 
disagreement, with differing roles for IGOs. With these criteria in mind, the case 





2.1.3 Case Study 1: Forests 
Case study one focuses on the network on voluntary initiatives related to 
forests, and specifically considers the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) 
launched in 2014. The potential of forests to limit global GHG emissions is extremely 
high, as they are carbon sinks as well as a source of direct emissions through 
deforestation (for commodities such as palm oil, soy, cocoa, coffee, timber, and pulp 
and paper) and degradation. Mitigation action in the forestry sector could contribute 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4.2 GtCO2e/yr by 2030, or about 12% 
of total emissions (see Figure 2.1).55  
The NYDF demonstrates high involvement of intergovernmental 
organizations at all three levels. It was launched at the 2014 Climate Summit hosted 
by the UN Secretary-general, which aimed to “catalyze action” across sectors. The 
secretariat for the NYDF is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In 
addition, various intergovernmental organizations, including UNDP, UNEP, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank are active in the governance of 
forests at the sectoral level, through programmes such as the UN-REDD and the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.56  
 The quality of the NYDF was deemed to be high when it was launched. 
Scholars estimated that if fully implemented, the NYDF could contribute to emissions 
reductions of 2.2 GtCO2e/y by 2030.57 In terms of the conditions for success for 
partnerships identified in the literature and noted in chapter one, the initiative appears 
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to have a wide range of actors involved, a permanent secretariat established, and an 
independent monitoring and reporting system in place and running. However, the 
monitoring and reporting system was not established at the time of the launch, but 
two years after it. This provides some temporal variation in at least part of the quality 
of the initiative that can be investigated. 
Finally, the governance of forests has the hallmarks of being among the 
knottiest of wicked problems. A sector consisting of a range of actors with competing 
interests--commodities growers and producers (palm oil, cocoa, soy, coffee), 
indigenous peoples, local and national governments with significant differences in 
views on the appropriate use of forests--means issues of land tenure, economic and 
development rights, and sovereignty are at the centre of forest governance. As a 
result, forests have long been an under-served and contested issue area in the climate 
negotiations, and the difficulty with ensuring additionality and permanence of efforts 
to reduce deforestation and degradation, as well as issues such as leakage and 
challenges with monitoring, reporting and verification have meant that other than for 
conservation and afforestation, efforts under land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) have not been included in the financing mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol (and their inclusion under the Paris Agreement remains in doubt). Efforts by 
the full range of actors on emissions reductions in the forests sector have therefore 
occurred largely outside the remit of formal treaty compliance. This makes the forests 





2.1.4 Case Study 2: Short-Lived Climate Pollutants 
Case study two focuses on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs), and 
specifically considers the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) initiative 
launched in 2012. SLCPs are a category of greenhouse gases and particulate matter 
that, while lasting a relatively small period of time in the atmosphere compared to 
carbon dioxide (from a few days to about a decade), are mostly of high Global 
Warming Potential (GWP), which makes them particularly potent contributors to 
climate change.58 SLCPs include methane, black carbon (soot), tropospheric ozone 
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). With the exception of Ozone, SLCPs are the result 
of a range of industries. For example, Methane emissions result from agriculture (in 
particular, livestock and rice cultivation), the oil and gas industry (gas flaring 
practices), wastewater management and coal mines. Black carbon, a component of 
soot, is produced from burning of biomass, wood, and coal (most commonly 
practiced in residential contexts), and from diesel engines. SLCPs comprise about 24% 
of all global greenhouse gas emissions (see figure 2.1) but curbing is estimated to have an 
outsize effect due to their high GWP, with potential to reduce global warming by 
0.5ºC by 2040.59 In addition to the climate benefits of curbing SLCPs, there are also 
short-term co-benefits, such as in the case of black carbon, which causes respiratory 
disease. The high emissions reductions potential, accompanied by co-benefits and the 
short-term results associated with curbing SLCPs has made this sector politically 
attractive for climate action, especially for developing countries. As the former 
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Environment minister of one Latin American country put it, “It is very difficult to 
convince the leader of a developing country to focus on climate change. Any political 
leader wants results in the short term. So SLCPs really stood out, because they can 
provide results within an election cycle, on air quality and health. And they can have 
a mitigating effect on global temperature.”60 The generally strong agreement among 
actor types on pathways to mitigate SLCPs provides a contrast with the Forests case 
study. 
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition is a dominant initiative on SLCPs, and 
was launched in 2012 by six governments and UNEP to curb SLCPs on an urgent 
basis. UNEP plays a secretariat role in this initiative, and has also been active at the 
sectoral level by promoting attention to SLCPs as a cohesive category. However, the 
CCAC does not appear to have had much engagement with intergovernmental 
system-wide efforts at the time of its formation and launch. The initiative was 
launched at the U.S. State Department by then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. In 
subsequent years, however, engagement of intergovernmental organizations at the 
system-wide level have addressed SLCPs and also engaged the CCAC with regard to 
forming new initiatives within the sector. The involvement and efforts of 
intergovernmental organizations in the formation and sustainment of the CCAC 
therefore varies across the three levels.  
The CCAC appears to have several elements of high quality and likelihood of 
success. Together, the various sub-initiatives of the CCAC have quantifiable 
                                               






commitments that are estimated to contribute to reduce GHG emissions by at least 
1500 MtCO2e/yr by 2030 if implemented fully.61 As well, the initiative has a wide 
range of partners, a strong donor base and a robust governance structure.62 
2.1.5 Case Study 3: Land Transport 
Case study three focuses on the land transport sector, and in particular pays 
attention to the Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT) 
launched in 2009. The transport sector is conventionally taken to include both 
passenger and freight transport, within and across countries. A variety of industries 
therefore comprise this sector, including road and rail. Mitigation action in the 
transport sector could contribute to reducing GHG emissions by up to 2.5 GtCO2e/yr 
by 2030, or about 13% of total emissions (See figure 2.1).63  
SLoCaT is an umbrella initiative for the coordination of voluntary cooperation 
on transport. SLoCaT was launched in 2009 with very limited involvement of 
intergovernmental organizations, which do not play any secretariat role in the 
initiative. Furthermore, in comparison to other sectors, there is limited engagement of 
intergovernmental organizations in land transport, with no one organization holding 
the mandate for the sector. Neither were the system-wide efforts by 
intergovernmental organizations relevant for the launch of SLoCaT. However, in the 
years after its launch, there was greater engagement with intergovernmental 
organizations at the system-wide level, in efforts to expand the work of SLoCaT. This 
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case study therefore sees low to medium engagement of intergovernmental 
organizations across the three levels over time, and with important temporal variation 
which provides opportunity for within-case comparison. 
Based on information available on its website, SLoCaT demonstrates some 
markers of likelihood of success within an initiative. It has a robust governance 
structure including a secretariat, conducts regular monitoring and reporting, has a 
wide range of actors as partners and evidently a strong donor base. SLoCaT does not 
have a quantitative target on emission reductions itself, but has helped form and 
sustain several initiatives with quantitative targets.  
2.2 Methods Employed 
This study employs a mixed methods approach in answering the research 
question, relying on qualitative process tracing and dynamic social network analysis. 
The two methods are used in complementary and iterative ways to obtain insights into 
the roles and influences of intergovernmental organizations at all three levels. 
2.2.1 Qualitative Process Tracing 
As a method that enables the researcher to empirically uncover causal 
dynamics within a case and also make comparisons between cases, process tracing is 
an excellent tool to use for answering the research question. The literature on process 
tracing is mired in debates on the nature of causal mechanisms, with two dominant 
modes of thought. On the one hand, drawing on the Humean tradition, scholars 
contend that evidence for event A causing event B must include several observed 





scholars argue for a mechanistic understanding of causal mechanism that “unpacks 
the black box” of causation and allows for within-case tracing of events and actions 
that logically connect the cause to the effect, without the need for comparison 
between cases.64  
This study uses both types of process tracing. Within the case studies 
identified and for the system-wide analysis, the mechanistic form of process tracing is 
primarily used to link (or not) the actions of intergovernmental organizations and 
other actors to the quality and quantity of initiatives. Due to the changes in the roles 
of the various actors over time and at different levels, it is also possible to assess 
whether the observed or expected link between the intergovernmental organization 
and the growth of the initiative(s) occurs repeatedly within a case. For example, as 
intergovernmental organizations have made several efforts to promote voluntary 
cooperation by convening conferences and summits for this purpose, the relative 
success at the various events can be compared with each other. But the specific ways 
by which the existence of such events compelled different actors to make voluntary 
commitments and engage in partnerships are traced mechanistically. The absence or 
presence of given mechanistic evidence across events can then be used to fine-tune 
the argument concerning the driving effect (if any) of intergovernmental 
organizations on voluntary cooperation.  
The method of process tracing falls into three functional categories: theory 
testing, theory building and outcome-explaining.65 Theory-testing and theory-building 
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are both theory-oriented processes, relying on deductive and inductive inference 
respectively. This study, being case-centric rather than theory-centric, uses the 
outcome-explaining variant of process tracing, simultaneously deploying both, 
deductive and inductive logics, to provide a causal account for the growth of 
voluntary cooperation that captures the roles of intergovernmental organizations at 
multiple levels and their effects.  
In doing so, this study heeds three pieces of advice that scholarship provides 
on addressing the particular challenges of process tracing in environmental 
governance.66 As many scholars have noted, there is a tendency among those using 
process tracing to ignore the issue of equifinality, that is, various different 
explanations for an effect. In environmental governance, these alternative 
explanations may operate at different levels than the outcome under consideration. 
This study therefore actively seeks out contrary explanations at multiple levels, rather 
than looking for additional positivistic evidence. As well, the potential for bias among 
sources is particularly high in environmental governance, given the range of highly 
and differently motivated actors involved. This is especially so for the phenomenon 
of voluntary cooperation, which engages a range of actors. Claims by actors on their 
own roles are therefore treated with scepticism and require verification. This is done, 
for example, by actively seeking interviewees that may offer alternative views. 
Finally, the pertinent time frame when considering cause and effect in environmental 
governance can be quite long, and it is important to keep an appropriate start and end 
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date for the investigation. This consideration has been incorporated into the research 
design by maintaining a 15-year horizon for the system-wide analysis and not 
hesitating to increase this if evidence calls for it.  
2.2.2 Dynamic Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis based on formal Graph Theory has been used in the 
Natural Sciences as well as the Social Sciences over the past two decades to obtain 
insights into the form of such a network as well as the varying “importance” of actors 
within it.67 Dynamic social network analysis allows the researcher to consider 
changes in the network over time, including changes to the importance of specific 
actors as new relationships form or existing ones end. This makes it a particularly 
useful tool for the present study, as the actors engaged in the cooperative initiatives 
form a network consisting of initiatives and their members, with some members being 
part of multiple initiatives, thereby imposing structural relationships in the network 
that can be probed to assess relative importance of actors in the network. In other 
words, the initiatives and their members can be considered nodes (or vertices) which 
are connected to each other by virtue of the type of membership that connects each 
member to an initiative. For example, an actor can be an ordinary participant in an 
initiative, a funder, or act as the secretariat of the initiative. Additional information 
(“attributes”) such as the entity type of the member and the sectors(s) in which the 
initiative operates add to the descriptive power of the network configuration. As 
                                               





figure 2.2 illustrates, conceived in this way, the network of initiatives has connections 
(“edges”) only between members and the initiatives, with data on attributes included. 
 
Figure 2.2 Network conceptualization. The network of cooperative initiatives is conceptualized as 
initiatives connected to their respective members, and contains data on attributes such as entity type of 
initiatives and members, and the sector(s) of the initiative. Note that a given entity can be a member of 
multiple initiatives, and initiatives can be members of other initiatives.  
This study constructs a dynamic network dataset of cooperative initiatives on 
climate change and uses it in three ways, primarily to respond to the second gap this 
study aims to fill, namely the influence of participating IGOs on the growth of 
voluntary cooperation in their sector. First, using the various attributes illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, it describes and visualizes the growth of the network, to understand how 
different types of actors have engaged in the network in different capacities over time. 
Second, it uses the network analysis tool of ‘community detection’, which reveals 
groups of nodes that are more densely connected to each other than they are to the 
rest of the network. This allows insights into the network organization and 
relationships among entities that may not be discernible from membership 
information alone. For example, in the network of initiatives on forests, if five distinct 












































entity types, but one of which consists of initiatives dominated by businesses, and if 
most of the businesses in the forests network are found in this community, then we 
could infer that businesses have grouped together in this network, and that businesses 
have engaged in cooperation in an isolated manner to the rest of the entity types. 
While a variety of community detection algorithms are available, this study uses the 
standard algorithm available in Gephi, a specialized software for network analysis, 
which is in line with consensus on the appropriate for  a network of this size.68 Third, 
it seeks to gain insights into the ‘importance’ of different actors in the network over 
time, using three measures of node centrality that are commonly used in network 
analysis, and which are of relevance to ascertaining the driving roles of actors in the 
network: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality.  
Degree centrality is simply the number of nodes to which a particular node is 
directly connected. In practical terms, for the network of cooperative initiatives, 
measuring the degree of a cooperative initiative in the network therefore is a measure 
of the membership size of the initiative. Conversely, measuring the degree of an actor 
in the network that is not a cooperative initiative is a measurement of the number of 
initiatives in which that actor is a member. Degree centrality therefore allows us to 
assess which initiatives attract more members, and which actors are engaging 
prolifically in the network by becoming members of many initiatives, or which actors 
are picky. Combined with knowledge about the attributes of the actors, such as 
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whether they are a government or intergovernmental organization, and what role(s) 
they play in each initiative (e.g. funder, secretariat), degree centrality of actors can 
provide clues and insights about influence wielded through prolific engagement via 
specific roles. For instance, a specific government that has taken up funding roles in 
many initiatives may, have been influential and played a driving role in the 
development of the network. 
Formally, for a network 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) in which 𝑉 and 𝐸 denote the sets of 
vertices (or nodes), 𝑣, and edges, 𝑒, respectively, the degree centrality	𝐶,(𝑣) of a 
vertex or node 𝑣	is given as the number of edges, |E(v)| at 𝑣, which is also equivalent 
to the number of neighbours of 𝑣: 
	𝐶,(𝑣) = |𝐸(𝑣)| 
Betweenness centrality is defined in terms of flows of information in the 
network. In practical terms, for the network of cooperative initiatives on climate 
change, the betweenness centrality of an actors that is not an initiative reflects the 
extent to which the actor could be thought of as playing an information-sharing, 
connecting (bridge-building), or convening role upon which other actors in the 
network depend. If an intergovernmental organization has high betweenness 
centrality, it may be connecting disparate parts of the network consisting of actors 
that would otherwise not be engaging with each other much, since a large number of 
entities depend on this organization to help form their shortest connecting paths. This 
potentially implies the deployment of a convening power. In short, actors with high 
betweenness centrality play a glue-like function in the network while those with low 





The formal definition of betweenness centrality is given thus. For a given 
network, for every possible pair of nodes 𝑠 and 𝑡, there exist a number of “paths” of 
different lengths which connect them, via other nodes. Of these, there exists a shortest 
path, 𝜎23 , between each pair. The betweenness centrality of a node, 𝐶4(𝑣)	, is a score 
that is higher if the node lies on a greater number of such shortest paths in the 





Eigenvector centrality can be considered a nuanced version of degree 
centrality. Whereas degree centrality counts the number of neighbours of a node, 
eigenvector centrality takes into consideration both, the number of neighbours, and 
the importance of each of those neighbours, creating a ranking score of relative 
importance among the nodes in a network. In practical terms, in the network of 
cooperative initiatives on climate change, if a member of an initiative has high 
eigenvector centrality, then it is a sought-after entity, with many connections to 
entities who themselves are sought-after as partners in the network. A group of actors 
with high eigenvector centrality is then indicative of prestige within the network—the 
equivalent of the popular clique in a high school or an old boys’ club. Combined with 
information on entity types, this can reveal, for example, if particular types of actors 
have strong preferences to partner with the same or other particular types. If an entity 
has low eigenvector centrality, this can be interpreted as the entity is not prioritized 
by important entities in the network. In other words, it is “unattractive”. 
Eigenvector centrality is defined by first creating a score of relative ranking 





𝐴 = ;𝑎7,3= and 𝑎7,3 = 1 if the vertices 𝑣 and 𝑡 are connected, and 𝑎7,3 = 0 if they are 







in which 𝜆 is a constant. This equation is rearranged as the eigenvector 
equation and solved, with the resulting greatest eigenvalue 𝜆 being the eigenvector 
centrality score. 
While each of the centrality measures yields insights by themselves, 
considered together, even more inferences may be possible, particularly when a high 
score in one centrality measure is accompanied by a low score in another. Table 2.1 
provides an overview of the indicative insights associated with various high-low 
combinations of node centralities.69 
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The above centrality measures, combined with information on the roles that 
actors play in initiatives, can provide powerful clues regarding the driving roles that 
actors may have played in the network over time, particularly if there is a temporal 
pattern to these measures. For instance, if a certain group of actors has been highly 
central in all measures of centrality, by providing funding, and has remained so over 
time, this would be compelling evidence for a driving role for the group. Such 
evidence would be used in combination with insights from the qualitative process 
tracing.  
The use of network analysis in this study reflects a methodological 
contribution to the study of intergovernmental organizations as well as environmental 
politics. Within the field of international relations, networked governance and the 
notion of transnational actors engaging as networks of actors connected in various 
ways has gained momentum in recent years as a way of understanding how influence 
is wielded.70 While the tools of network analysis provide ways to measure and trace 
centres of power and influence within a network of actors, this method has not been 
applied significantly in international relations, although its application is now 
increasing and is being recognized as potentially valuable in international relations.71 
In environmental governance, civil society actors and the interactions between them 
have been analyzed formally as networks to reveal an ideational contagion effect that 
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is spread through the network, using data on their social media interactions.72 Public 
actors and institutions active in environmental governance have been mapped using 
network analysis.73 The application of network analysis to the study of cooperative 
initiatives has been limited, however. An approach based on referential linkage has 
been explored in the context of voluntary carbon certification schemes and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. 74 Another approach based 
on membership of initiatives and the potential to identify influential actors has been 
explored and suggested.75 The present study builds on this membership approach 
pioneered by Widerberg and improves it in three ways. First, this study draws on a 
much wider pool of initiatives and applies a more rigorous definition of partnerships, 
to more accurately reflect the universe of voluntary cooperation on climate change. 
Second, while the Widerberg study imposes a bipartite or two-mode structure to the 
network, whereby initiatives cannot be members of other initiatives, this study does 
not make such an imposition. This allows the observation of the network as it exists, 
and enables inferences to be drawn on the nature of interactions among initiatives, 
which would not be possible if a bipartite structure were imposed on the network. 
Third, this study creates a dynamic network dataset, with information on when 
initiatives are launched and when entities stop being members of initiatives (if such 
information is available). This allows us to trace the evolution of the network over 
time and observe trends.  
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Finally, practitioners have recognized the need to better understand the 
ecosystem of cooperative initiatives and for new cooperation to build on existing 
cooperation in productive ways: “Any instigator of a new initiative should assess the 
landscape before beginning something new. In issue areas with a high number of 
existing initiatives, a consolidation of efforts could be considered.”76 This study 
therefore builds upon the conceptual and methodological innovations in scholarship 
on global governance and environmental governance in recent years, and fills a noted 
methodological gap, in addition to creating a means for practitioners to better 
understand the ecosystem of the network of initiatives.  
2.3 Data Used 
This study draws on a variety of evidence, in keeping with its mixed methods 
design. These include interviews with individuals who have engaged in the formation 
and sustainment of these initiatives from a variety of contexts; archival information 
available on website and digital archives as well as traditional archives of 
governments and IGOs; and a network dataset containing information on all 
identifiable cooperative initiatives on climate change and their attributes. Descriptions 
of each of these sources follow.  
2.3.1 Interviews 
Seventy-one semi-structured interviews have been conducted to gather 
qualitative data for this dissertation. Approximately ten individuals were initially 
identified on the basis of their specific involvement in initiatives, through 
                                               





examination of websites, press releases and media accounts. Additional individuals 
were identified based on the recommendations of those individuals already 
interviewed, and through this “snowballing” technique, interviews were conducted 
until saturation was reached (that is, new interviewees provided no significant 
additional insights). Each interviewee was targeted to maximize the amount of 
additional information that could be gleaned from them. Thus, for example, 
individuals that played decision-making or strategic roles within ICIs were prioritized 
above those engaged at the staff level only. Individuals that had engaged in relevant 
processes from a variety of organizational settings over the years were likewise 
prioritized. While maximization of information was a principle adopted, a degree of 
flexibility was necessary to adapt to the availability of interviewees. In keeping with 
requirements of the Institutional Review Board, interviewees gave informed consent 
to the interviews and their identities have been protected unless otherwise instructed 
by the interviewee. Thirty interviews were audio-recorded following permission from 
the interviewees; the rest were recorded as written notes only.  
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the entity types covered by the 
interviewees and table 2.2 summarizes the functional level of the interviewees in their 
respective organizations (it must be noted since some interviewees had extensive 
experience in multiple organizations, they are reflected in the tallies of multiple 
organization, resulting in a total count higher than the distinct number of individuals 
interviewed. Only those interviewees who provided insights during the interviews 






Figure 2.3 Distribution of interviewees by type of organization. Interviewees came from a variety of 
entity types, with high representation from national governments and intergovernmental organizations. 
 















































































































































Decision-Maker 3 9 2 1 0 0 4 2 5 2 
Senior Advisor/ 
Managerial 19 11 2 2 5 2 1 3 6 1 





























2.3.2 Archives and Documents 
In addition to interviews, qualitative data sources used in this study include 
institutional archives (electronic, print and video footage); institutional reports; 
agendas, preparatory documents and records of meetings not recorded in official 
archives; and related media reports. 
Institutional archives include those of the United States government 
(electronic archives of the Obama administration and George W. Bush 
administration), United Kingdom government, government of Norway, government 
of France, the United Nations and the UNFCCC. Institutional reports include those of 
companies, business organizations, NGOs, and those of cooperative initiatives. 
Several interviewees shared documents with the author that were otherwise not 
available in archives or in the public domain. These mainly included agendas and 
records of meetings, presentations, concept notes and correspondence. This study also 
relied heavily on the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, an independent newsletter that has 
covered major meetings in environmental governance since the early 1990s.  
2.3.3 Network Dataset 
For the dynamic social network analysis, this study uses a network dataset 
consisting of 6914 entities, including 252 cooperative initiatives and 6662 various 
entities of other types that are members of the cooperative initiatives. The network 
dataset has been prepared in the format of an edge list and a node list, in keeping with 
the requirements for network analysis. The edge list contains the member-cooperative 
initiative pairings for each member of each cooperative initiative and the relevant 





role(s) played by the member in the initiative; the start year of the pairing; and the 
end year of the pairing (if applicable). The roles identified include secretariat, funder 
and participant and there are eleven sectoral categories. The node list contains the 
identities of all members and cooperative initiatives (i.e. all entities) found in the edge 
list and their relevant attributes, including the name of the entity and the entity type. 
The entity type of each node has been allocated from a list of fourteen mutually 
exclusive categories developed by the author including, among others, cooperative 
initiative, national government, intergovernmental organization (non-financial), 
subnational authority, corporate (non-financial), private finance, civil society 
organization, and philanthropic foundation. Annex 1 provides a list of all sectors and 
entity types and their definitions. In addition to the full network, three subnetworks 
were generated for the case studies, which contain only those initiatives and their 
members that belong to the Transport, Forests and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants 
sectors respectively (notably, there is some overlap among these thematic sub-
networks, as a single initiative can be active in multiple sectors).  
The network dataset was developed using the Climate Initiatives Platform 
(CIP) dataset as a base.77 Originally developed by Ecofys, the University of 
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL)and the World Resources 
Institute (WRI), the CIP is now housed under UNEP. The CIP contains information 
on an initiative’s start and end dates (if applicable), the thematic areas in which the 
ICI operates; the members of the initiative (whether as lead, secretariat, funder or 
participant); the functions of the initiative; its geographic scope; the geographic 
                                               





location of the members of the initiative; the type of entity that an ICI's participants is 
(for example, a company or a civil society organization). However, in its current 
state, the CIP is not conducive to network analysis, primarily for three reasons. First, 
members of initiatives are represented inconsistently, with the result that there are 
numerous instances of a single member appearing as multiple distinct members. 
Second, the definitions of entity types are vague, inconsistently applied, and not 
mutually exclusive, which undermines attempts to track how different entity types 
may have different levels of influence in the network. Third, the dataset is 
incomplete, with many initiatives having no information on partners, and many 
known ICIs missing.  
The network dataset presented in this dissertation reflects an improvement 
over the CIP dataset in the following ways: (i) 13 additional ICIs have been added 
while 15 were removed as they were far from meeting the criteria for partnerships 
used in this study; (ii) All entity names have been harmonized such that each entity 
has only one designation in the dataset (this has reduced the number of nodes from 
over 14,000 to 6914, ensuring that each node is a distinct entity and thereby allowing 
the valid calculation of centrality measures); (iii) a mutually exclusive categorization 
of entity types, with precise definitions for all categories has been applied; and (iv) 
for over 100 cooperative initiatives in the CIP dataset, missing data has been filled in 
on their members and the relevant attributes (although it has not been possible to 
obtain membership information for all initiatives due to unavailability of data in the 





The centrality scores were all calculated using R and its relevant packages 
(Igraph and Network).78 Cleaning of the CIP dataset and its transformation into a 
network dataset was conducted using Stata and Excel. 
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3 The Effects of System-Wide Efforts by Intergovernmental 
Organizations on the Number of Cooperative Initiatives on 
Climate Change  
Intergovernmental organizations have been known to engage in voluntary 
cooperation on climate change in two broad ways, internal and external: first, 
internally, by participating in specific initiatives themselves and helping overcome 
barriers to cooperation; and second, externally, by promoting the growth of such 
cooperation write large (that is, across sectors, or system-wide) without necessarily 
participating in such initiatives themselves. The external, system-wide engagement of 
IGOs is the focus on this chapter. In particular, this chapter focuses on the growth in 
the number of cooperative initiatives on climate change over time; the system-wide 
efforts of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to promote this growth; and the 
causal influence of the latter on the former.  
The key findings of the chapter are twofold. First, system-wide IGO efforts 
have successfully accelerated the growth of the number of cooperative initiatives 
observed, but they have only done so when their efforts displayed six organizing 
attributes, which together created highly conducive conditions for actors to make 
cooperative commitments. The six attributes are: strategic timing, high visibility, 
sectoral orientation, emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments, subsidiarity, 





efforts by IGOs to promote such cooperation, many did not succeed due to the 
absence of one or more of these attributes in the organization of these efforts. Second, 
high convening power and autonomy are both necessary to ensure that the six 
organizational attributes are present. Among IGOs, the UN Secretary-General alone 
currently possesses both, which uniquely situates this office to accelerate voluntary 
cooperation. This autonomy of the Secretary-General is the result of a highly path-
dependent trajectory of the Secretary-General’s engagement on climate change and 
partnerships over several decades, and as such is an extension of the range of these 
“good offices” from peace and security to climate change and their breadth from the 
UN’s member states to the full range of actors in the global economy. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section sets the 
stage, by: (a) identifying three distinct phases in the growth of the network over time, 
with a formational ‘phase one’ occurring before 2000, a ‘phase two’ of steady growth 
in the 2000s, and ‘phase three’ of accelerated growth in the 2011-2015 period; (b) 
identifying the major efforts undertaken by IGOs to promote the growth of voluntary 
cooperation during phases two and three, categorizing them into seven ‘streams’ of 
activity over the two phases; and (c) identifying the most influential actors engaged in 
the initiatives themselves, to guide the prioritization of the process tracing analysis. 
Then, with these parameters set, the next two sections consider the streams of IGO 
system-wide activity in phases two and three respectively, and trace their effects on 
the growth of the network during those years, in particular focusing on the actions 
and decision-making of the most influential actors in the network which were 





IGO activities spurred the actors to engage in voluntary cooperation any more than 
they would have. Instead, these actors were acting of their own volition and 
motivations. By contrast, the analysis finds that in phase three, the 2014 Climate 
Summit and the LPAA both succeeded in accelerating the efforts of the actors most 
influential in the network, in effect catalyzing a surge in cooperation. The final 
section synthesizes these findings, discusses their implications, and concludes. 
3.1 Setting the Parameters for the Investigation 
To understand whether and how IGOs played any causal driving roles in the 
growth of this network, the interaction between the central actors in the network and 
each of the system-wide efforts must be described, understood and compared, which 
is the focus of the following two sections. This section sets the parameters to enable 
that analysis, in effect providing a map to guide and focus the exploratory study of the 
following two sections. In particular, it provides an overview of the contours of the 
network growth; an identification of the main system-wide efforts made by IGOs 
from 2000 to 2015 to promote voluntary cooperation on climate change; and an 
understanding of the likely “important” or “driving” actors within the network of 
cooperation (that is, entities participating in initiatives). This final identification of 
central actors serves to make this chapter’s investigation manageable, as it is beyond 
the scope of this study to trace the motivations and actions of every entity engaged in 





3.1.1 The Phased Evolution of the Network 
The network of cooperative initiatives on climate change has grown from zero 
to 252 known and documented initiatives from 1972 to 2015. The number of 
initiatives has grown unevenly over time, with the pattern of growth suggesting three 
distinct phases (Figure 3.1A). While the earliest initiative on record dates back to 
1973, the formation of new initiatives was minimal and sporadic up to the mid 1990s, 
when ten initiatives were in existence. Since the late 1990s, each year has seen the 
launch of at least one new initiative. The period 2000 to 2010 shows steady growth, 
when about a hundred new initiatives were formed, with an average of 6.3 initiatives 
launched each year. The greatest growth in the number of initiatives has occurred 
since 2010, with 139 initiatives formed. The years 2010, 2014, and 2015 stand out as 






Figure 3.1 The quantitative growth of the cooperative initiatives on climate change. 3.1A: The 
network has grown unevenly over time, with the number of initiatives increasing most in 2015, 2014 and 
2010. 3.1B: The total number of nodes in the network is significantly higher than the number of 
initiatives, but their growth pattern has largely echoed that of the initiatives. Edges connecting nodes 
have outpaced the number of nodes since the early 2000s, and their growth pattern has also echoed that 













































































In addition, as figure 3.1B illustrates, the wider network, which includes 
members of initiatives in addition to the initiatives themselves, has grown in parallel 
to the number of initiatives. This is most noticeable in the sharp increases in the 
number of nodes in 2010, 2014 and 2015, which is similar to the increases in the 
number of initiatives in those years. The total number of entities in the network (that 
is, the number of initiatives plus the number of distinct members of all initiatives) had 
grown to 6,914 by the end of 2015—about twenty-seven times the number of 
initiatives. The launch of new initiatives is therefore strongly associated with the 
introduction of new entities to the network. It is also associated with greater 
connectivity among existing entities in the network, as evidenced by the increase in 
the number of edges over time and the increasing difference between the number of 
edges and nodes over time. Notably, the number of edges started to outpace the 
number of nodes in the late 1990s, with the ratio of edges to nodes steadily increasing 
from 1 in 1992 to 1.6 in 2015, when there were 11,518 edges. In other words, in 
2015, on average, each entity was a member of 1.6 initiatives in the network. 
The types of entities engaged in the network as members of initiatives has 
varied over time (figure 3.2). Up to the mid-nineties, the network consisted largely of 
businesses, business organizations and subnational governments as members of 
initiatives, with a very few national governments and intergovernmental 
organizations. National governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil 
society organizations began to make up an increasingly large percentage of the 





types increased significantly during the 2000s, with reduced (but still significant) 
dominance of businesses and subnational governments. 
 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of entity types comprising the network of cooperative initiatives. The network 
began with participation dominated by subnational actors and businesses. The diversity of actors began 
to grow in the 1990s, increasing significantly during the 2000s. Source: This study’s dataset. 
3.1.2 Major System-Wide Efforts by Intergovernmental Organizations. 
Intergovernmental organizations have also made significant efforts to advance 
cooperative initiatives without directly taking part in the initiatives themselves—
efforts that are not captured within the network data. The efforts have tended to be 
dominated in their decision-making and organization either by the member states of 
IGOs or by the secretariats. Occasionally, they were a mixture of the two.  
In the first phase, up to the year 2000, IGO efforts at the system-wide level to 
cultivate voluntary cooperation were limited and informal. Although the Stockholm 
conference in 1972 and the Rio conference in 1992 both prioritized the participation 
of “stakeholders” and the latter ushered in the era of “Major Groups” in the United 
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the intergovernmental process. There was still sufficient enthusiasm for and faith in 
the intergovernmental process to deliver on its purpose and promise. However, in his 
capacities as Secretary-General of the Stockholm and Rio conferences, as well as in 
his role as the first Executive Director of UNEP, Maurice Strong collaborated closely 
with local authorities, civil society organizations and businesses and industry to 
develop organized constituencies to help advance his mandates such as the 
formulation of Agenda 21 at the Rio conference.79 In this, his office acted as “the 
catalyst of work done mainly by others.”80 
 
Figure 3.3 System-wide efforts by intergovernmental organizations to promote voluntary 
cooperation on climate change, 2000-2015. In the 2000s, these included member state-led efforts on 
sustainable development, and climate summits by the UN Secretary-General. In the 2011-2015 period, 
additional activity streams included efforts by Parties to the climate convention; the secretariat to the 
climate convention; and a mixed stream of activity with governments and secretariats together forming 
the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and culminating at COP21. Source: Author’s own chart. 
The next two phases, which are the focus of this study, saw more overt, 
purposive efforts by intergovernmental organizations to promote voluntary 
cooperation. As figure 3.5 illustrates, in the second phase, the 2000s, the purposive 
system-wide activity by intergovernmental organizations to increase the number of 
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cooperative initiatives fell into two clear categories: UN member state-led efforts and 
those of the UN secretaries-general. The former consisted of the 2002 Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) mandated by the UN General 
Assembly, in which “Type II Partnerships” were promoted as an official outcome, 
and, relatedly, the Commission on Sustainable Development, which oversaw the 
preparation for the summit and its follow-up. The latter stream of activity consisted of 
two summits on climate change convened and hosted by the UN secretary general, the 
2007 high level event on climate change and the 2009 climate summit. Although not 
visualized in figure 3.5, these two summits built upon a series of autonomy-enhancing 
efforts of the Secretary-General in previous years, including the UN Global Compact, 
the UN Fund for International Partnerships, and the Millennium Summit as well as its 
follow-up in 2005. 
In the third phase, the 2011 to 2015 period, the streams of IGO activity to 
promote voluntary cooperation can once again be categorized as member state-led or 
secretariat-led, but in addition, some activities have a clearly mixed leadership. In the 
member state-led category lie the Rio+20 conference held in 2012, and the 
negotiations for the Paris Agreement, specifically those under Ad-Hoc Durban 
Platform (ADP) Working Group Two (“ADP2”). Thus, the member state-led 
activities expanded during this period to span two intergovernmental settings—the 
negotiations under the climate convention and the negotiations under the UN General 
Assembly. In the secretariat-led category lie the 2014 climate summit hosted by the 
UN Secretary-General and the efforts of the UNFCCC Secretariat to promote 





Agenda (LPAA), led by the Government of France together with the Government of 
Peru, the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General (EOSG) and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. This process was bookended by COP20 in November 2014, which was 
presided over by Peru, and COP21, which was presided over by France.  
In light of these efforts in phases two and three, the data on the “moments” of 
launch or formation of initiatives during these years are instructive. Overall, in the 
2000-2015 period, of all the known initiatives, the launches of [60] were at IGO 
events designed to spur voluntary cooperation. There is, however, significant 
temporal variation in this. In the 2000s (that is, during the second phase), few 
initiatives were launched at, or in association with, the IGO-led system wide efforts 
identified (that is, the Johannesburg summit and the CSD follow-up process; and the 
2007 and 2009 summits of the Secretary-General Ban). Indeed, none were launched 
at the Secretary-General’s summits, and only four were launched at the Johannesburg 
summit or in association with the CSD. While more initiatives are officially 
registered as Type II partnerships (i.e. associated with the WSSD and CSD process), 
their launch moments are separate from these processes, often occurring at events 
hosted by national governments, industry association events, or at special events 
designed specifically for the launch, and in many cases occurring after the WSSD. 
There were no data readily available for [22] initiatives launched during this period, 
but it may be assumed with reasonable confidence that they were not launched under 
the aegis of the two IGO threads of activity in this decade, since no reference to them 
was found in the relevant IGO archives. In the 2011-2015 period, of the 139 





at the 2014 Climate Summit and the LPAA sessions of COP21, with a further [30] 
being launched at side events hosted in the margins of these events.  
While no causal inference is possible based on these patterns alone, any 
explanation of the effects of system-wide IGO efforts on the existence of initiatives 
must address these patterns. These patterns are therefore used as a basis for 
investigation later in this chapter. 
3.1.3 “Important” Actors Within the Network 
Network centrality measures yield insights into which entities may have 
potentially driven the growth of the network through their participation. In particular, 
the centrality measures of degree and betweenness are two pertinent ways to probe 
“driving” influence: Degree centrality measures how prolific an entity is in a network, 
with out-degree measuring how many edges start at an entity, and in-degree 
measuring how many edges end at an entity. The more initiatives in which an entity 
counts itself a member, the higher its out-degree centrality. Betweenness centrality 
measures the extent to which an entity plays a connecting role vis-à-vis other entities 
in the network. The higher the betweenness centrality score, the more likely an entity 
plays an information-sharing, convening or bridging role in the network.81  
These scores indicate that in the years up to the mid to late 1990s, there were 
no dominantly central actors within the network, due to all initiatives being 
disconnected from each other. If an actor was present in the network, it was engaged 
in one initiative only. However, as figure 3.4 illustrates, from 2000 onwards, a clear 
                                               





cadre of leaders emerged in terms of those engaged in the highest number of 
initiatives in the network (that is, those with highest out-degree centrality scores), 
with particular governments dominant, and some intergovernmental organizations 
and civil society organizations also a part of this prolific group. In addition, a core 
group of actors, predominantly intergovernmental organizations, national 
governments, civil society organizations and businesses also emerged as the 
connectors of the network, with high betweenness centrality, suggesting potential 
convening or bridge-building roles played by these actors. After 2010, the influence 
of a very small group of intergovernmental organizations, governments and civil 
society organizations increased significantly. Further, the group of actors most central 
to the network has grown over time, but has also not shown much attrition. Those 
actors that were central in the early 2000s generally maintained high centrality over 
the years, as other actors joined the ranks of high centrality.  
Among those with highest centrality measures, governments include the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia and 
Japan. Businesses include Siemens AG, Unilever, Coca Cola, Danfoss Group, and 
Nestle. Civil society organizations include the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and 
World Resources Institute (WRI). Intergovernmental organizations include UNEP 
and the World Bank, with UNEP leading on betweenness centrality among all actors.  
 The motivations of actors from this core group to make cooperative 
commitments, and an understanding of how they were influenced by, if at all, the 
efforts IGOs to promote such cooperation, is an important focus for the remainder of 





highest centrality scores consistently over time points to a high likelihood that their 
engagement in initiatives results in them wielding influence at the network level over 
time. Existing scholarship has highlighted the leading roles that UNEP and the World 
Bank have both played in the partnerships in which they participate, drawing on their 
technical capacities and funding mandates respectively, and exercising uncommon 
autonomy is doing so.82 These data suggest that by participating in their initiatives, 
these IGOs may have significantly shaped the wider network of cooperative action, in 
particular through connecting actors and communities. This will be further explored 
in the case studies, at the sectoral level, in keeping with the research design.  
  
                                               








Figure 3.4. Centrality measures for members of cooperative initiatives on climate change. These 
measures indicate that a core group of governments, intergovernmental organizations, businesses and 
civil society organizations have been highly central in the network over time. NB: betweenness centrality 
measures of cooperative initiatives are omitted in this chart for clarity (due to their significantly greater 
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3.2 Correlation but no Causation in the 2000s  
During the 2000s, the two main streams of system-wide IGOs efforts to 
promote voluntary cooperation on climate change were: the Johannesburg summit in 
2002 and its associated follow-up under the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, and the summits of the UN Secretary-General. Did either of these 
streams of activity spur actors to make cooperative commitments on climate change 
that they otherwise would not have? If yes, what added value did these efforts provide 
to the actors to cause them to make cooperative commitments? If not, in what ways 
were these efforts suboptimal, and what were drivers of cooperation during this time? 
These questions focus this section, which first examines the motivations of actors that 
were central to initiative-formation, followed by a consideration of the two streams of 
IGO activity are considered in turn. 
This section argues that the overall growth in the network during this time 
cannot be attributed to the purposive system-wide efforts by intergovernmental 
organizations to increase such cooperation writ large. Rather, actors engaged in the 
network were primarily motivated to cooperate for the reasons identified in the 
literature: overcoming intergovernmental gridlock; promoting national interests; a 
desire to reap reputational rewards and maintain competitiveness; and so on. Against 
this context, the system-wide efforts of IGOs failed to appreciably accelerate or 
further motivate these actors due to limitations in the way these IGO efforts were 
organized. These include, variously, inadequate convening power; diffuse decision-





actors in the network; adherence to constituency-based organizations rather than 
sectoral; and poor timing. 
Importantly, however, this section argues that while the overall causal effect 
by intergovernmental organizations during this time was not commensurate with their 
efforts at the system-wide level, these efforts served to lay the institutional 
groundwork to accelerate growth seen after 2010, most notably by establishing a 
norm of ‘good offices’ on climate change by the UN Secretary-General and 
enhancing the autonomy of the Secretary-General vis-à-vis member states in this 
regard. This autonomy was an essential element for the success of IGO efforts in 
2014 and 2015.  
3.2.1 Dancing to their Own Music: Motivations of Central Actors in the 
Network 
As the network data indicated, governments of several developed countries, 
and some intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, companies and 
philanthropic foundations have been highly central to the growth of the network. 
Among these central actors, those showing consistently high centrality as funders and 
secretariats, and as prolific and connective entities in the network, are the United 
States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Norway, UNEP and the World Bank. 
In addition, civil society organizations such as the WWF, WRI and NRDC, 
transnational organizations such as the WBCSD, as well as companies such as Coca-
Cola, Mars, Danone, Unilever and Ikea, also had consistently high centralities during 





Archives of, and interviews with, these actors central to the network of 
initiatives during the 2000s reveal that the increasing gridlock and widespread 
dissatisfaction in the progress of the intergovernmental process on climate change 
was a significant indirect driver for voluntary cooperation. The United States’ exit 
from the Kyoto Protocol, the first treaty under the climate convention and which 
required developed countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions, meant that the 
intergovernmental process was seen by many as insufficient and evidently not able to 
deliver robust consensus and results on climate mitigation. Conversely, progress in 
the intergovernmental process, such as the Kyoto Protocol coming into force in 2005 
and activating the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and 
Emissions Trading also created a space for voluntary cooperation, for example in the 
context of standard-setting, around these market mechanisms. However, from the 
perspectives of these actors, the system-wide, purposive efforts made by IGOs during 
this decade to promote voluntary cooperation did not have any appreciable effect on 
the decisions of these actors to make cooperative commitments. The motivations of 
some of these lead actors in the network, including the United States Government, the 
United Kingdom government, and Unilever, as well as others that don’t appear in the 
network but were critical for the network formation, including the World Economic 
Forum, illustrate as follows. 
Voluntary cooperation was a strategic priority for the Bush Administration, 
apparently in stark contrast to its unconstructive intergovernmental stance and 
purported support to climate scepticism. While a strong commitment to climate 





undertaking voluntary cooperation did provide a means to effective expression of the 
Administration’s neoconservative turn away from multilateralism and the 
supranational imposition of authority on domestic jurisdiction that the Kyoto Protocol 
symbolized, and towards market-driven provision of public goods.83 Importantly, it 
was seen as a pathway with lower transaction costs. As a senior State Department 
official from the Bush Administration put it, “In the UN, you have to pay people to 
play. You have to set up funds for countries to come and participate. But when you 
have a coalition of the willing, why bother playing the UN game?”84 In addition, 
however, the pursuit of voluntary cooperation was an intentional strategy to try to 
mitigate the significant international criticism over its decision on the Kyoto Protocol: 
“We were seen as a pariah. Really, what we needed to do was to build credibility 
internationally by undertaking these initiatives.”85 These partnerships, which would 
“leverage resources to achieve tangible results” and also “promote further cooperation 
on climate change with our partners in the Western Hemisphere and beyond”, had the 
significant advantage of being received positively by both sides of the domestic 
political aisle. 
Thus, as early as July 2001, a full year before the intergovernmental push on 
Type II partnerships under the Johannesburg Summit, President Bush announced the 
launch of three international cooperative initiatives, and stated that his 
“Administration's climate change policy will…take advantage of the power of 
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markets. It will encourage global participation and will pursue actions that will help 
ensure continued economic growth and prosperity for our citizens and for citizens 
throughout the world.”86 While the Type II partnerships were being promoted under 
the Johannesburg Summit at the same time, and the State Department was vocal in its 
support to, and promotion of, the concept due to its alignment with domestic 
priorities, according to a senior State Department official at the time, “there was no 
cross pollination whatsoever”87 between the two processes. Rather, the United States 
government became a vocal proponent of partnerships at the Johannesburg summit, as 
it served to advance its own existing national priorities.88 
The government of the United Kingdom, another one of the entities with 
highest centrality measures in the network during these years, had likewise prioritized 
voluntary cooperation as part of its environment strategy during this decade, albeit 
from a philosophical motivation diametrically opposed to that of the United States.  
As one plenipotentiary official of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recalled, 
their environmental aims at the time were “not in making sure Britain could do what 
was possible in the limits of the possible, but in expanding the limits of the possible.” 
The question was how to “use the resources of UK diplomacy, the convening power, 
to nourish the forces in different societies to push up the level of ambition” in the 
climate negotiations. This was explicitly defined as a political project “with two 
faces. One pointing at the world, and another one reaching back into the UK. [They] 
                                               
86 Bush, ‘President’s Statement on Climate Change’. 
87 Interviewee 39 
88 For an example of US government support to the partnerships agenda during the preparatory 
meetings for the Johannesburg summit, see IISD, ‘Partnerships at Prepcom IV - Johannesburg 2002’; 





took the view that none of it made any sense unless [they] were walking the talk. 
[Others] had to be able to look at Britain and see that there was a foment going on.”89 
Cultivating global voluntary cooperative commitments was thus part of a wider 
strategy of the UK government on climate change, which included, for example, 
defining climate change as an issue of global security and bringing it under the 
purview of the UN Security Council, and strong domestic legislation such as the 
Climate Change Act of 2008.90 
In addition to participating in many initiatives during this decade, the UK 
government sought to convince others to embrace this agenda by using its leadership 
and convening roles in the international arena. For example, in 2005, London surged 
its efforts to accelerate voluntary cooperation in the context of its leadership of the G8 
at the Gleneagles Summit, for which the UK government chose to focus discussions 
heavily on climate change, energy and sustainable development. The Gleneagles Plan 
of Action, the outcome document of this summit, reveals a commitment by the G8 
countries to undertake cooperative initiatives in addition to other measures such as 
national legislation and multilateral agreement. For instance, on industry, the G8 
committed to “develop partnerships, including sectoral and cross-border partnerships, 
with industry to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of the major industrial 
sectors of our economies”.91 
At the same time, large businesses within the sectors that contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions were becoming increasingly motivated to make voluntary 
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commitments, and in particular cooperative voluntary commitments.  In keeping with 
expectations on the motivations for companies to engage in voluntary cooperation 
and self-regulation, central actors such as Unilever, a major consumer goods 
company, were seeking to do so for rational, self-interested reasons, for instance to 
protect and enhance their reputations and market shares.92 Rising consumer 
awareness and expectations were re-orienting business calculus on the importance of 
sustainability in the supply chains of many consumer goods companies. For example, 
as is well established, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, environmental groups, in 
concert with Media, had led campaigns against companies in the forest commodities 
supply chain.93 This caused companies to want to act, but presented the dilemma of 
becoming uncompetitive if they were to take significant actions only on their own. As 
a senior executive at one of the companies central in the network during this period 
put it, “Your company is part of a broader sector. You can't move the full sector. And 
if you move yourself, you become uncompetitive.”94 Consumer goods companies 
were also starting to face looming deadlines to their business survival if unsustainable 
practices continued. The need to take risks of losing competitiveness and instigate 
cooperation became paramount. The Marine Stewardship Council, a cooperative 
initiative formed when the leading business producing fish products in the UK started 
facing the issue of rapidly depleting fish stocks, is an instructive example. As a then-
senior executive of Unilever recalled, “We were told that we had ten years of fish 
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stocks left… That kicked off a whole conversation. We needed Science; we needed to 
incentivize fishers not to fish at certain times or in certain waters; we needed to create 
safe zones so governments would agree to protecting those zones; we needed to 
incentivize other buyers of fish to purchase that stock; and we needed to convince 
consumers to buy our products. Who pays for this? For a long time, our company 
bore the cost. Then stakeholders started engaging.”95 Thus, a class of business 
champions or pioneers for voluntary cooperation on sustainable development began 
to emerge, motivated to cooperate in order to protect and eventually expand their own 
market shares. This included companies which already had significant amounts of 
market share, and which were in a position to absorb some of the initial costs 
associated with cooperation.  
Variously motivated governments and businesses were therefore seeking to 
form partnerships with each other during the 2000s. The formation of such 
cooperative initiatives required facilitation and brokering by trusted organizations, to 
enable companies—usually competitors—to cooperate with each other, and to enable 
the public and private sectors to engage in frank dialogue as a prerequisite to such 
partnerships. Business organizations such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and 
WBCSD were ideally positioned to facilitate and lead those discussions, both within 
the business community and between business and the public sector. Many of the 
cooperative initiatives launched during this decade were a result of their facilitation. 
As one senior executive of a WBCSD member company observed, “If Unilever came 
                                               






and said we are going to do all this work, other companies will perceive it as a 
Unilever programme and will assume that Unilever will get the credit. So they will 
not join. The process needs to be facilitated, managed, brokered, negotiated, 
convened and financed. The source of capital needs to be trusted and independent.”96 
Visibility and kudos for the pioneering companies in these endeavours was therefore 
a critical factor for the successful formation of cooperative initiatives. These business 
organizations were especially attuned to this need and the transformative potential of 
commitments by companies with large market share. The high profile that 
organizations such as the WEF, with its annual meeting in Davos, could give these 
companies and initiatives, was a significant enabling factor in the formation of the 
initiatives. A former senior executive of the WEF and WBCSD shared, “We talk 
about the twenty percent rule. If we can get twenty percent of the market to move, 
then the rest will come along. So it's important to get some of the big leaders to move. 
They get the credit. Then the small ones move.”97  
The annual meeting of the WEF in Davos and its workstreams proved a 
particularly useful venue for the initial conversations among governments leaders and 
companies needed to coalesce the initiatives, namely the session known as the 
Informal Gathering of World Economic Leaders (IGWEL), which attracts the highest 
profile participants. “We turned the IGWEL from a cocktail session to a two-day 
programme. There was a real appetite for closed-door, off the record discussions on 
challenging topics. They began to hold discussions that we thought were happening 
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already, but weren't. A trust-building happens here, between the public and private 
sectors.”98 
The comparative advantage of the business organizations in this respect was 
recognized and encouraged by governments and businesses, both, and they partnered 
closely with the organizations to bring about the partnerships they desired. For 
example, to follow-up on the G8 summit in 2005 and the plan of action that emerged 
from it, the UK set in motion the ministerial Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, 
Clean Energy and Sustainable Development.99 In this, it cooperated closely with a 
number of business organizations, intergovernmental organizations and civil society 
organizations, often relying on them to convene and initiate partnerships within 
greenhouse gas-emitting sectors, and to bring the perspectives of business into the 
discussion. Prominent among these organizations were the WEF and WBCSD. For 
example, in 2005, the UK helped the World Economic Forum set up the G8 Climate 
Change Roundtable at their annual meeting in Davos, as a means for business to 
proactively engage on the challenge of climate change and be part of the solution. 
“The idea was to shift the conversation from ‘you are the bad guys, you fix it’ to ‘we 
need to find a way that's going to work for all of us, that will allow businesses to 
continue making a profit’”.100 Using this roundtable, over a period of two years the 
WEF, WBCSD, the Pew Center and others convened a group of CEOs to mobilize 
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viewpoints and prepare a set of recommendations for the Gleneagles Dialogue, which 
were presented to the Japanese Presidency of the G8 in 2008.101 Using the 
intergovernmental meetings (such as the UNFCCC conferences of parties) as touch 
points and convening in their margins “tiny, stupid side events to which nobody 
would come, but to which [they] would be bringing CEOs”,102 these business 
organizations facilitated a number of sectoral cooperative initiatives during this 
period. 
By the end of the decade, then, an ecosystem of stakeholders had emerged and 
formed a network of voluntary cooperative initiatives on climate change. In 2009, this 
network of actors experienced a renewed jolt of motivation to respond to the failure 
of governments in reaching a comprehensive climate change agreement in 
Copenhagen. Those central to the network recall that the failure was a significant 
turning point and that this spurred existing actors to cooperate even more. A typical 
observation among civil society organizations and companies is, “After Copenhagen, 
many non-state actors thought that the intergovernmental process could not get it 
done. So we started to focus on private governance.”103 They were joined by some 
governments as well, particularly several western governments that sought to elevate 
the climate issue to the leaders’ level, including the UK, Germany and the United 
States. For example, Germany launched the Petersburg Climate Dialogue in 2010, 
which has become a mainstay in the climate calendar each year to allow a subset of 
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countries to constructively discuss strategies and approaches for the COP. In the 
margins of this dialogue, Germany, together with other countries and non-state actors, 
has launched a series of cooperative initiatives to maintain momentum. Similarly, 
President Obama launched the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) in 2010 following 
Copenhagen, to broaden the climate portfolio’s ownership to beyond ministers of 
environment. Under the CEM, several initiatives were launched in 2010 and 2011. 
Interestingly, the Obama administration continued aspects of the Bush 
administration’s policy on voluntary cooperation 2009 onwards, albeit in a less 
aggressive manner, and from a desire to re-engage in multilateralism. They chose to 
continue several existing initiatives, even if repackaged. For example, the Methane to 
Markets Partnership launched by President Bush continued as the Global Methane 
Initiative under President Obama. Although they appear as two separate initiatives in 
the network, contributing to the increased quantity of initiatives, this is due to 
political imperatives arising from the change in Administration. As one former 
Obama and Bush Administration official observed, “In some ways, U.S. policy is 
never an abrupt shift from one direction to another. Strands of policy from previous 
administrations are adopted by new administrations.”104  
From the perspectives of the actors most central or “important” within the 
network of cooperation, therefore, the system-wide efforts of IGOs did not play a 
driving role in their efforts to cooperate. What then, did the system-wide efforts 
achieve, and what explains this disconnect? The analysis now turns to this question, 
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considering first the efforts led by UN member states, and then those led by the UN 
Secretary-General. 
3.2.2 The Type II “Non” Partnerships of Johannesburg and the CSD 
The WSSD was mandated as a follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, 
which had yielded intergovernmental legal instruments such as the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Convention to Combat Desertification as well as some non-legally binding 
agreements, notably Agenda 21, which committed governments and “Major Groups” 
of non-state actors to sustainable development and describes roles for each in its 
implementation. 105 Occurring just two years after the Millennium Summit, when the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had been adopted, expectations for any new 
legally binding agreements were low and implementation of Agenda 21 was the focus 
of the Johannesburg summit. Partly as a natural consequence of the focus on 
implementation of an agenda owned by many stakeholders and partly out of 
“desperation” to demonstrate success given the anticipated underwhelming 
intergovernmental outcomes of the summit, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), a 53-member body under the Economic and Social Council and 
the organizer for the summit, declared that “Type II Partnerships” would be an 
official outcome of the summit, to complement the Type I intergovernmental 
agreement that would be the primary outcome.106 Over 200 Type II partnerships were 
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registered with the UN Secretariat at the time of the Johannesburg Summit, with sixty 
announced at the summit.107 In other words, Type II partnerships were seen by the 
WSSD organizers as ‘Plan B’ outcomes that would allow the summit to be seen as a 
success even if the intergovernmental negotiations did not yield significant outcomes. 
This conference has spurred a rich academic discourse on partnerships, one 
that considers, variously, the thematic and geographic scope, effectiveness, 
legitimacy, and institutional implications of the Type II Partnerships.108 In particular, 
their limited implementation, effectiveness and follow-up is a recurring theme.109 
Indeed, few of the partnerships that were featured as official Type II outcomes 
resulting from the Johannesburg summit can be defined as cooperative initiatives as 
understood in this study.110 Many were existing or new programmes of 
intergovernmental organizations or bilateral aid programmes of donor countries, 
which included vertical public-private partnerships, but not horizontal.111 Others 
lacked any partners. Many were internal Corporate Social Responsibility programmes 
of companies. As such, only 16 initiatives overlap in the dataset used in this study and 
the list of Type II partnerships for the period the years 2000 to 2010 inclusive (there 
are 85 initiatives in this study’s database in total for those years).  
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One obvious explanation for this is that some Type II partnerships may not be 
focused on issues related to climate change. Even accounting for this, however, the 
discrepancy is large. A more insightful path is that at the same time, almost unnoticed 
in the literature, partnerships were announced informally at the summit, many of 
which were not featured in the official list of Type II partnerships, but which form 
part of this study’s dataset, and which include the central actors discussed in the 
previous sub-section. Notably, a Business Day was organized by the Business Action 
for Sustainable Development (BASD), a network set up by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) specifically for the Johannesburg Summit, in close coordination 
with and at the behest of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN 
DESA), which acted as the secretariat to the summit.112 The Business Day saw the 
presentation of several major cooperative initiatives on climate change, such as the 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative and Marine Stewardship Council, which were not 
featured as outcomes of the summit.   
The official Type II partnerships of the Johannesburg summit therefore 
obfuscate the picture of voluntary cooperation during this decade in two, opposing 
ways. On the one hand, many are not cooperative initiatives, which inflates the count 
of initiatives. On the other hand, by their absence in the official list, some initiatives 
that were brought about as a result of engagement with the Johannesburg summit are 
not seen as Johannesburg initiatives, which may underestimate the causal impact of 
the summit. Understanding the conditions under which the Johannesburg partnerships 
                                               





arose is key to explaining why the conference was not successful in yielding a 
significant number of cooperative initiatives on sustainable development, even as 
these initiatives were being launched by actors independently as described in the 
previous subsection.  
Archives of the conference, interviews and extant literature reveal three 
structural issues that prevented the Johannesburg summit preparatory and follow-up 
processes from galvanizing a large number of cooperative initiatives. For the summit, 
these include: consensus decision-making; constituency-based organization; and 
limited visibility for showcasing partnerships. For the CSD, consensus decision-
making and constituency-based organization remained challenging, and an additional 
issue was its low convening power.  
Being an event mandated by the UN General Assembly, decision-making at 
the WSSD was fully decentralized among member states, in keeping with the 
prevailing norm. There was little substantive or process autonomy from member 
states on the part of the host or organizer (i.e., government of South Africa, the CSD 
or the Secretary-General of the conference anchored in UN DESA). As a result, by 
virtue of the fact that Type II partnerships were to be an official outcome of the 
summit and therefore under the purview of the membership, the notion was subject to 
debate. There was much disagreement and tension among member states on what 
constitutes such a partnership, and in particular on the appropriateness of involving 
corporations in such partnerships and how they and others might be monitored. For 
while some countries had embraced the concept of cooperation with the private sector 





others—notably developing countries—were deeply uncomfortable with the concept 
and saw it as a potential threat to sovereignty; introducing undue corporate influence 
at the UN; and a means of sidestepping responsibilities by donor governments.113 
Unable to agree on the concept, member states debated the issue and treated 
partnerships the definition of partnerships was extraordinarily vague, and examples 
provided by the CSD during the preparatory process encompassed everything from 
commercial public-private partnerships to Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
programmes of donor governments, to projects of intergovernmental organizations.114 
The dominance of ODA projects and commercial public-private partnerships in the 
resulting list of Type II partnerships is then unsurprising. 
In addition, the discomfort expressed by member states over the notion of 
partnerships and in particular the involvement of the private sector, was echoed and 
amplified by certain constituencies of stakeholders that were invited to engage in 
deliberations on the partnerships during the preparatory process. Major Groups, the 
institutional legacy of the Rio earth summit of 1992, had by 2002 become an 
established principle for organizing non-state actors at the UN. In fact, in recognizing 
these Major Groups, Agenda 21 had ushered in a norm of stakeholder participation at 
the intergovernmental deliberations under the UN and its subsidiary processes, that 
encourages groupings within constituency type (for example, subnational authorities 
vs. environmental organizations vs. youth).115 This constituency-based convening, 
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enshrined by international agreement and therefore ‘sacrosanct’, reinforced existing 
animosity between constituencies, notably between environmental organizations and 
business (NGOs held an anti-partnership stance and Business and Industry held a firm 
pro-partnership stance).116 With environmental organizations taking a hard stance 
against the engagement of business in Type II partnerships, and given the reservations 
of many governments on the issue, the enthusiasm of the private sector to be included 
in the list of Type II partnerships cooled somewhat, as they saw potential reputational 
risk in doing so, and caused business organizations such as the WBCSD, which while 
overall supportive of the Type II partnerships, to declare that the “label is not 
important”.117 Thus, while businesses had self-organized (at the informal 
encouragement of the UN Secretariat118) under the banner of the BASD specifically 
for the purpose of supporting the summit, most of the initiatives featured by BASD 
were not included in the list of Type II partnerships, and by the time of the summit 
itself, the business community had quietly eschewed the official process. Although 
many of these were existing partnerships anyway, and were being presented to 
showcase the cooperation underway, some had specifically been established in time 
for the summit. For example, the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative, which Unilever 
had been seeking to develop as a cooperative endeavour for some years, was launched 
just a few months before Johannesburg, with the participation of Danone and Nestlé, 
in anticipation of the summit.119120 The disconnect between the summit and ongoing 
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activity was reflected in the press release by the BASD at the time: “Thousands of 
practical on-the-ground partnerships already exist. Some new initiatives will end up 
as Type 2, UN approved, but, whether they do or not, business is determined to 
extend the partnership concept as its way of contributing to the Johannesburg and the 
Millennium goals.”121 
Further, for those actors central to the network of cooperative initiatives, even 
if the tension over the notion of partnerships and the role of the private sector were 
not insurmountable, the constituency-based organization meant that the summit did 
not offer any particular incentives to create new cooperative initiatives—whether 
carrots or sticks—in the short time available. Certainly, the summit organizers had 
recognized the importance of sectoral orientation for the development of partnerships. 
By adopting and promoting the five thematic areas proposed by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan (water, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity: “WEHAB”), the 
summit had a clear orientation around specific sectors. In addition, detailed guidance 
on the type of partnerships that could be pursued was provided on some of these 
themes, notably energy. Yet, the preparatory meetings and the summit itself 
continued to be held along constituency lines, consisting of Major Groups and 
member states, rather than the range of actors interested in and influential around 
each of the specific themes, which may have consisted of various subsets of the major 
groups and member states, and which might have enabled discussions around 
concrete partnerships. The strong divisions between Major Groups on the notion of 
partnerships meant that the secretariat also took a risk-averse route in the official 
                                               





proceedings, even as they encouraged businesses to convene under BASD, with the 
summit’s Secretary-General, Nitin Desai (who headed UN DESA) going to far as to 
attend the preparatory meetings of BASD. As one of the senior-most UN officials 
responsible for the conference preparation acknowledges: “We were a little guarded. 
There was still hostility, such as between Greenpeace and corporates, and we could 
not be seen as favouring one side or the other.”122 Neither was the agenda of the 
summit designed in a way to provide high visibility to the partnerships being 
announced. The sessions on partnerships were dialogues with limited participation of 
non-state actors, which prevented any real showcasing of partnerships being 
announced. The lack of emphasis on visibility alongside government leaders during 
the summit itself meant that there was no particular attraction for non-state actors to 
compete to engage in partnerships and participate in the dialogue.  
The follow-up to WSSD was the responsibility of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD), which was tasked by the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation to facilitate the development of new partnerships. Given this specific 
mandate, the CSD placed a premium on high visibility for partnerships, through the 
establishment of a partnerships fair, the purpose of which was to develop and 
showcase partnerships on specific sectors. Yet, due to other structural challenges, the 
CSD was not successful in developing new partnerships. Instead, as Pattberg et al 
have noted, the Partnership Fairs at the CSD attracted stakeholders mainly for the 
                                               





purposes of networking and gaining access to the UN rather than to build 
partnerships.123  
Similar to the WSSD, being a forum mandated by the membership of the UN, 
the CSD faced some of the same structural weaknesses it had in the run-up to the 
summit. Although the virtue of partnerships was less contested under the CSD, since 
its mandate was to specifically develop them, it had little decision-making authority. 
As a review of the commission observed, since the CSD “was a functional 
commission of the Economic and Social Council, and its decisions depended on 
additional deliberations both in the Council and the General Assembly, their authority 
and impact was limited.”  
In addition, the Major Groups continued to be the organizing principle for 
non-state actors at the CSD, even as the commission prioritized specific sectors every 
two years. The sectoral prioritization structured around constituency lines prevented 
across-constituency collaboration and entrenched within-constituency linkages. In 
other words, the organization did not serve to increase bridging political capital 
among stakeholders, which is arguably needed for multi-stakeholder collaboration 
and partnership. 
Furthermore, the CSD also had low convening power, in contrast to the 
WSSD, which had attracted heads of state and government. A 2012 review of the 
CSD found that while it “provided for multi-stakeholder participation and interactive 
dialogue, including at the ministerial level, and through its work the importance and 
value of voluntary, multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development were 
                                               





recognized”, efforts to advance partnerships were stymied by the fact that the CSD 
“attracted, chiefly, members of the environmental community, and it was thus largely 
perceived as an “environmental commission”.124 Without the presence of 
representatives of various economic sectors, efforts to build partnerships could not be 
successful.  
In sum, given the abundance of motivation among governments and non-state 
actors to engage in voluntary cooperation, it was reasonable to expect that the system-
wide efforts of IGOs to promote voluntary cooperation during these years may have 
capitalized on these motivations and served to accelerate their efforts. However, the 
evidence does not support this assumption for those IGO efforts that were led by the 
member states, namely the Johannesburg summit and its associated Commission for 
Sustainable Development. To the contrary, at worst, they served to inject some doubt 
among businesses in particular about the wisdom and viability of engaging with 
governments in the multilateral context to make voluntary commitments. As some 
have observed, the proceedings of the Johannesburg conference lacked in leadership, 
and represented a combination of poorly executed tactics as well as a step in the 
evolution of a well-developed strategic imperative for voluntary cooperation on 
sustainable development.125 As this analysis has shown, the overriding reason for the 
disconnect between the strategic rationale and the tactics of the Johannesburg 
conference was the lack of central decision-making power of the organizers, resulting 
in: a highly political space that contested the value and notion of partnerships; 
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suboptimal organization of the summit to spur additional growth of the network of 
voluntary cooperation, including poor timing; and Type II partnerships that obfuscate 
the level and locus of voluntary cooperation during this decade. Being a member 
state-driven process, the decision-making for the summit was not autonomous from 
the member state configuration that birthed it. The follow-up mechanism under the 
CSD faced the same problem, with the additional challenge of low convening power, 
which further depressed the potential of creating partnerships. While it would be 
incorrect to say that the summit did not cause any new cooperative initiatives, it is 
nevertheless appropriate to conclude that it was not a significant causal driver in the 
formation of the initiatives during this period. At best, the efforts of IGOs succeeded 
in reflecting the cooperation already underway, and their processes and events were 
used as a convenient moment to showcase these efforts, but did not act as propellants 
for the actors already motivated. As one business executive whose company was an 
active participant in the BASD put it, “There were very few people acting because 
they were being asked to by an [intergovernmental organization]”126 
3.2.3 Summits of the UN Secretary-General: Partnership Rhetoric, not 
Reality 
The second stream of purposive system-wide activity by IGOs to drive 
voluntary cooperation in the 2000s was led by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 
in the form of two summits convened in 2007 and 2009. Similar to the member state-
led efforts of the Johannesburg summit and the CSD, however, these efforts were also 
                                               






not effective and did not accelerate the voluntary cooperation already underway 
during the 2000s, as this analysis will show. 
The primary purpose of the 2007 and 2009 summits was for the Secretary-
General to mediate among countries at a leaders’ level and to inject political will 
towards breakthroughs in the climate negotiations. A secondary purpose was the 
promotion of voluntary cooperation. Although not as an explicitly targeted official 
outcome, the 2007 and 2009 summits both highlighted the importance of partnerships 
and sought to promote them as part of their communications during the preparatory 
processes. In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General said, “Addressing these 
shortcomings requires contributions from all countries and all sectors of society, from 
civil society and business, to regional and local governments. That is why I have 
invited their representatives to join us today, and to share their ideas and experiences. 
All sectors will need to be engaged if global emissions are to peak in the next ten to 
fifteen years, and be significantly reduced in the years thereafter, as indicated by the 
IPCC.”127  
While some of the structural challenges that variously dogged the member 
state-led efforts were not present for the secretariat-led efforts, other challenges 
nevertheless posed significant impediments to effective partnership-making. 
Specifically, unlike the Johannesburg summit or the CSD, there were no issues with 
consensus decision making or low convening power, since the summits enjoyed 
centralized decision-making, being under the aegis of the Secretary-General only, and 
very high convening power since the Secretary-General had convened them at 
                                               





leaders’ level. However, challenges included lack of engagement with actors central 
to the network, and poor timing. 
For both summits of the Secretary-General, the biggest impediment to 
galvanizing cooperative initiatives was the lack of engagement with the actors that 
were emerging as leaders in the network of voluntary cooperation. In 2007, only 
twelve representatives of business, subnational governments and civil society were 
invited to speak.128 Moreover, while the list of actors included those holding the 
levers on the climate problem (e.g. DuPont, the Governor of California, the Mayor of 
New Delhi), this list of speakers was missing many of the actors that were influential 
in the network of cooperative action during this time. With the exception of the 
Governor of California, The Climate Group and Swiss Re (each of which had degree 
and/or betweenness centralities in the top 10 percent of entities in the network in 
2007), the invited actors were not yet major influencers in voluntary cooperation 
according to the network data. Indeed, even though UN entities such as UNEP had by 
2007 established themselves as highly central actors within the network of 
cooperative initiatives, the summits did not engage them in any significant way for 
the purpose of promoting the growth of such initiatives. Existing coordination 
mechanisms for the UN system, such as the Chief Executives Board (CEB), were not 
utilized by the Secretary-General (as chair of the CEB) to galvanize support for the 
summits, although they were for conferences mandated by the membership, such as 
COP15.129 In the context of this summit, there was therefore limited engagement with 
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the actors influential in the network of cooperative initiatives at the sectoral level, 
which in turn meant that there were no effective levers available to the summit 
organizers with which to generate new initiatives.  
One could argue that by engaging those actors that are important to the 
climate problem but not yet engaged in the network, the Secretary-General was 
perhaps encouraging an expansion of the network of cooperative initiatives. However, 
there is no evidence that as a result of participating in the 2007 summit, these actors 
began to engage in cooperative initiatives. There was no follow-up engagement by 
the Secretary-General’s team among these actors, nor is there an attendant surge in 
activity by these actors in the network following the summit. Likewise, the 2009 
summit, although on a larger scale, did not specifically target the participation of 
central actors in the network. 
During these years, the UN Secretariat was aware of the specific efforts being 
taken by governments and non-state actors to make voluntary commitments. For 
example, the UNFCCC secretariat specifically tracked the Gleneagles Dialogues and 
reported on the convenings to the Secretary-General.130 However, the ability of the 
Secretary-General’s team to harness this knowledge effectively and use the Secretary-
General’s convening power and autonomy to accelerate it (for example, by giving the 
first-mover companies the credit they craved) was as yet underdeveloped. This 
entailed small budgets and a team that was insufficiently equipped and oriented to 
engage effectively with actors central in the network. A gap therefore remained 
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between the growing network of cooperative initiatives and the system-wide efforts to 
nurture them. As one senior WEF official lamented, “We had no real interaction with 
the UN… things got tangled up in the secretariats, among mid-level bureaucrats. So, 
this was a big learning—that at the time, there was no post box for us in the 
international public process. In the meantime, we had been using our spaces and 
meetings in Davos to develop these models.”131  
Evidently, in retrospect, the organization of these summits should have used a 
a principle of engagement with the central actors in the network, which would have 
drawn on their abilities and capacities to convene stakeholders while maintaining the 
central decision-making authority that the Johannesburg summit and CSD had lacked. 
In other words, the summits should have been organized by the principle of 
subsidiarity, much like the organizing principle of the European Union “What 
individuals can accomplish by their own initiative and efforts should not be taken 
from them by a higher authority. A greater and higher social institution must not take 
over the duties of subordinate organizations and deprive it of its competence. Its 
purpose, rather, is to intervene in a subsidiary fashion (thus offering help) when 
individuals or smaller institutions find that a task is beyond them.”132 In the context of 
national government, federalism is the practical manifestation of this principle. In the 
context of IGO system-wide efforts to promote voluntary cooperation, subsidiarity 
entails the empowerment of already influential and capable actors to convene and 
form initiatives. This principle was in fact at work in the Johannesburg summit and 
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the CSD, through engagement of the Major Groups and encouragement of platforms 
such as the BASD.  
In addition, the timing for both the summits was a challenge. Although the 
organizers of the summits had deliberately timed them to take place just a few months 
before highly consequential intergovernmental events, in the hope of supporting their 
success, in fact the short time between the summits and the COPs, and the even 
shorter preparatory phases for each of the summits undermined the possibility of the 
establishment of cooperative initiatives, whether in time for the summit or in time for 
the COPs a few months later. For the summit in 2007, the announcement was made 
only in June, and invitations to stakeholders other than governments sent in early 
September, just a few short weeks before the summit on 24 September 2007.133 For 
the 2009 summit, the earliest public announcement on record was in early 
September.134 In contrast, the WSSD has a preparatory phase of over one year, during 
which deliberations on the partnerships to be developed took place. Admittedly, the 
Secretary-General did not emphasize the announcement of initiatives for either of 
these two summits, so the preparation was not oriented around them as a matter of 
priority. However, therein lies the problem. In calling for their formation and 
continuation, but by not prioritising them through an adequate preparatory or follow-
up phase, the organization of the summit could not engender the formation of 
initiatives. Further, since the summits were held so close in time to the relevant COPs 
themselves, the attention of governments were entirely on the intergovernmental 
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negotiations, and it was not feasible to develop partnerships in addition. This was 
especially so in 2009 because there was significant hope among developed countries 
that an agreement could be reached in Copenhagen, with the new Obama 
administration significantly more inclined to reach multilateral agreement. 
In summary, for the 2007 and 2009 climate summits hosted by the UN 
Secretary-General, the main impediments to the growth of voluntary cooperation 
were poor timing and lack of engagement with the central actors in the network who 
were convening and forming initiatives. Unlike the member state-led efforts of the 
WSSD and the CSD, the Secretary-General enjoyed both, unparalleled convening 
power and autonomy. This would prove to be essential for successful promotion of 
cooperation in 2014, as the next section will argue.  
Before leaving this decade, however, it is important to ask: how did the UN 
Secretary-General, an agent of 193 principals, obtain the autonomy necessary to 
convene the principals of the organization on his terms? An examination of this 
development follows.  
3.2.4  “Good Offices” for Climate Change: A Subversive Seed for Success 
Although the system-wide efforts by IGOs during the 2000s were not 
significant drivers of the growth of the network seen during this decade, the efforts by 
the Secretary-General caused and represented one major development that would 
prove determinant in the growth of the network in the 2011-2015 period: the 
establishment of the norm of a ‘good offices’ role for the Secretary-General on 





The 2007 and 2009 summit meetings on climate change was convened and 
hosted by the secretary general in the margins of the UN General Assembly. In an 
unprecedented move, these summits were not mandated by the UN membership and 
marked only the first two times in the history of the United Nations that a Secretary-
General had invited the full membership at a leaders’ level on any issue without being 
explicitly asked to do so by the membership.135 
A key rationale for Secretary-General Ban to engage on climate change, even 
when the framework convention clearly had the mandate to do so, was to help extract 
the issue from ministerial silos in countries, and among negotiators at the 
international level—something that was beyond the capacity of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, as it was bound to support the negotiators. As one Indian government 
official put it, “The people who come for [climate] negotiations are a breed unto 
themselves. They have nothing do with implementation or the real economy. They 
come from ministries of foreign affairs, environment or the MET department.”136 
Although flippant, this observation is not inaccurate. The participation records of the 
UNFCCC COPs show that until 2009, national delegations were almost entirely 
composed of civil servants from ministries of foreign affairs and environment. Ban 
believed that by elevating the issue to the leaders’ level, wider swaths of government, 
such as sectoral ministries that were responsible for the decisions affecting their 
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economies and GHG emissions, as well as the private sector would be forced to get 
engaged, thereby leading to more constructive discussions, which he took upon 
himself to facilitate.  
In other words, Secretary-General Ban extended the traditional ‘good offices’ 
role from the peace and security arena to sustainable development and climate change 
was a conscious strategy deployed by his strategic planning unit.137 It was a 
perspective shared by many government officials engaged in the process. A former 
lead climate negotiator from Mexico observed, “If you do not have a high-level 
meeting or opportunity to get leaders in the room, you may not be able to go far.”138 
To this end, in a stark departure from secretaries-general before him, Ban started 
attending COPs and began to raise the issue in his meetings with Heads of State and 
Government.139 
In 2007, while several states had suggested that mandating a world summit, 
special meeting or session under the General Assembly or Economic and Social 
Council might be advisable given the difficulties in the COP, the membership had 
reached no such agreement, although some states had also welcomed the Secretary-
General’s active involvement and leadership on the climate change issue and even 
encouraged the Secretary-General to convene leaders himself.140 Using these 
openings, the Secretary-General took the initiative to invite heads of state or 
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governments of all member states to a meeting he would host, with no accompanying 
resolution of the membership authorizing or requesting him to do so. The elevation of 
the issue to heads of state and governments was appreciated as an important move in 
the ability of Parties to reach agreement on the Bali Action Plan a few months later.141 
In repeating the move in 2009, two months before the ill-fated COP in Copenhagen, 
Ban firmly established the autonomous good offices role of the Secretary-General in 
the climate change arena.  
The decisions to convene these summits were not without risk. A classic 
tension prevails in whether the Secretary-General should offer Good Offices or 
should wait until asked to do so, that is, whether he should seek to enlarge or 
minimize his role in world affairs.142 A similar tension seems to have applied in this 
case. A former lead climate negotiator noted, “If the Secretary-General jumps in 
without being asked, the result may be chaotic. But we have also had passive 
secretaries-general who have done nothing in the face of a crisis because nobody 
asked them. The capacity to take some risk is very important in a Secretary-
General.”143 Both summits demonstrated this capacity to take risk. Though notion of 
such an event led by the Secretary-General had not been easily accepted, both were 
well-attended by leaders (the 2007 summit attracted over eighty heads of state and 
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government, while the 2009 summit attracted over 100).144 The Secretary-General 
had to earn the participation of leaders in the 2007 summit in particular, through open 
engagement in the planning of the summit and by providing frequent briefings to 
member states on all aspects of the summit, thereby building trust with member states 
in order to secure his autonomy. In the end, “Acquiescence was earned through 
transparency”.145  
On the one hand, the 2007 and 2009 summits were unprecedented, 
unmandated convenings by the Secretary-General. On the other hand, they had 
antecedents in previous summits as well as initiatives of Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, Ban’s predecessor, all of which were deliberate institutional efforts to 
increase the relevance and influence of the Secretary-General and contribute to UN 
reform.  
Several scholars have observed that Annan’s reform efforts included the 
creation of a Strategic Planning Unit within his office.146 As a former senior official 
responsible for the functioning of this unit observed, “member states were not pleased 
with this. They felt they were the strategic planners of the UN. My job was to not 
only help the Secretary-General strategize about the issues, but also on how to 
approach them and get better results.”147 Efforts to expand the Secretary-General’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis the membership were evidently a key element of the strategy to 
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get better results, including by convening summits and spearheading initiatives such 
as the Global Compact and the UN Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP); first 
through “reverse institutionalization” and later, under Secretary-General Ban, by 
bypassing the need for any explicit mandate from the membership altogether. 
Annan’s focus on reforming the United Nations and making it fit for purpose 
entailed a strong emphasis on UN partnerships with the private sector and civil 
society. Thus, scholars have noted that at the start of the decade Annan launched the 
Global Compact as the UN's office to engage with the private sector and also 
established the UN Fund for International Partnerships (UN FIP) in his office.148 The 
former created a system-wide platform for the UN to collaborate with the private 
sector, while the latter created a mechanism for the UN secretariat to accept funding 
from non-governmental sources—an innovation born out of necessity to channel Ted 
Turner’s unprecedented $1 billion gift to the UN when the dues owed by the United 
States were in severe arrears. These innovations within the UN, while raising 
awareness on and support for collaborative governance, in addition to creating an 
enabling environment and enhancing the UN’s capacity to partner with the private 
sector, did not lead to a significant number of cooperative initiatives on climate 
change during this decade. The focus of UNFIP was explicitly to channel funds to 
UN entities for projects, many of which were traditional (vertical) public private 
partnerships. The Global Compact focused largely on the promotion of corporate 
social responsibility and individual commitments by companies. Although the Global 
Compact did convene companies, during these years it largely avoided brokering 
                                               





partnerships. Indeed, this was a lack felt by companies, which were looking for 
neutral parties to fill convening roles.149 The greater pertinence of these efforts lies in 
the incremental increase in the autonomy of the Secretary-General vis-à-vis member 
states. When Annan launched the Global Compact, it was over the objections and 
criticism of many member states as well as civil society observers.150 Eventually, 
however, by demonstrating project implementation in developing countries through 
UNFIP, and by propagating local networks of the Global Compact in developing 
countries, the Global Compact was accepted and institutionalized by the membership 
through General Assembly resolutions, in what Liliana Andonova describes as a 
process of “reverse institutionalization”.151  
This reverse institutionalization approach was also adopted for two summits 
during Annan’s tenure: the 2000 Millennium Summit and the 2005 follow-up. But 
more than simply suggesting the idea of these summits to the membership, Annan 
played a strong steering role in determining their outcomes.  For the Millennium 
Summit, it is well established that Annan poured significant resources into the 
conference secretariat function and maintained a close-hold approach in the 
development of the content of the outcome, the Millennium Declaration and the eight 
goals therein.152 This unconventional approach was successful, with the summit 
seeing the largest gathering of world leaders in history; the unanimous adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals; and with many governments recognizing the 
importance of the discipline imposed by the Secretary-General. As a former 
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ambassador of Mexico observed, “The most useless summit I remember was the 50th 
anniversary of the UN in 1995. The outcome was a long document that nobody read. 
In 2000, we had the Millennium Summit. The whole process was different, because 
we recognized the failure of the 1995 summit. In 2000, it was not an 
intergovernmental process. The Secretary-General prepared a draft of the MDGs 
using academia and people outside the system. The first proposal was not given to 
member states for input; we were told, ‘take it or leave it’…The 2005 summit was a 
similar process.”153  
In trying to repeat the process for the 2005 summit, however, Annan’s efforts 
were contested. Although Annan had proposed major substantive outcomes for the 
summit via his report In Larger Freedom, the outcome document of the summit 
reflected watered-down versions of these proposals due to strong resistance by the 
United States, which, under the Bush Administration, held an avowedly anti-
multilateralism stance. This had the effect of making member states appreciate an 
autonomous role for the Secretary-General and made them more amenable to the 
autonomy-seeking initiatives of Secretary-General Ban on climate change in 
subsequent years. A senior UN official and advisor to Ban shared, “I think all 
member states learned from that experience that if there was a high-profile agenda 
item that needed consideration at the leaders’ level, then using standard 
methodologies would lead to standard results.”154  
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These developments represented significant movements towards autonomy by 
the Secretary-General, and positioned Ban well to be able to convene the 2007 and 
2009 summits without an explicit mandate from the membership—that is, by 
bypassing the need for reverse institutionalization. The continuity of a strategic 
planning unit in the Secretary-General’s office enabled this autonomy to be 
developed over successive administrations. As a senior advisor to both secretaries-
general observed, bypassing the mandate by the membership was a deliberate 
manoeuvre: “We overtly sought to avoid the deal-making, ‘lowest common 
denominator’ dynamic of full legislative modalities. It was to avoid the stasis of those 
procedures that the secretaries-general created this space.”155  
Building on the autonomy-enhancing efforts of his predecessor, the 2007 and 
2009 climate summits were therefore used by the Secretary-General to ascertain and 
exercise his autonomy from member states in convening and raising an issue at the 
leaders’ level—a significant move in itself—but were not effectively used to steer and 
galvanize the network of voluntary cooperation, even though rhetoric by the 
Secretary-General emphasized the importance of such cooperation. In other words, 
the Secretary-General had sought a Good Offices role on climate change at the 
leaders’ level and been granted it, but had not yet expanded the role to include the 
litany of leaders outside national governments.  
This expansion would occur during the next phase. The failure of 
governments to reach a comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen caused the groups 
of central actors in the network of voluntary cooperation to come to the realization 
                                               





that there was a need for a coherent strategy and alignment of efforts if there was to 
be a better outcome in 2015. “After Copenhagen there was a lot of reflection on what 
went wrong, with many conversations happening among different constituencies. A 
common thread in these conversations was that there had been no strategic alignment 
among different constituencies. There was a lack of cohesion. So there was a 
realization that we need a single coherent strategy to reach an outcome.”156  
As the next section argues, building on the autonomy and ‘good offices’ norm 
established during the 2000s, intergovernmental organizations would prove to be 
central in forging this strategic alignment among all stakeholders, by creating that 
“post box” to build on the ecosystem that had developed over the previous decade, 
and resulting in a massive acceleration in the growth of cooperative initiatives in the 
run-up to the Paris Agreement.  
3.3 Acceleration in the 2010s: (Some) IGOs Learn to Choreograph  
This section focuses on the years 2011-2015, the growth of voluntary 
cooperation on climate change, and the system-wide efforts of IGOs to promote 
voluntary cooperation. Five streams of system-wide activity by IGOs are discernible 
for this period: the Rio+20 conference; work stream two of the negotiations for the 
Paris Agreement (ADP2); efforts by the UNFCCC Secretariat; the 2014 Climate 
Summit; and the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) culminating in the Fourth Pillar 
of COP21. These years are marked by massive increases in the number of initiatives, 
which are concentrated in 2014 and 2015 and closely associated with the 2014 
                                               





Climate Summit and COP21. This section argues that while many of the same 
motivations that had caused actors to cooperate in the previous decade continued to 
shape their actions, and while many of the same actors remained “central” in the 
network (per figure 3.3), in 2014 and 2015 system-wide efforts by intergovernmental 
organizations arguably played a highly influential role in the growth trajectory of 
cooperative initiatives. In other words, two of the streams of activity were successful 
in spurring the formation of new cooperative initiatives in a significant way, while the 
others were not. These two are the 2014 Climate Summit and the LPAA.  
What enabled these two efforts to succeed? Building on the challenges 
identified for efforts in the previous decade, this section considers the organization of 
each of the efforts made in this phase, and identifies six organizational attributes that 
must be present if the system-wide efforts of an IGO to spur voluntary cooperation 
are to be successful. Together these organizational attributes act on existing 
motivations of stakeholders to lower barriers to cooperation and spur a surge in the 
growth of cooperation. These attributes are: strategic timing, high visibility, sectoral 
orientation, emphasis on ambitious cooperative cooperative commitments, 
subsidiarity, and leadership with central decision-making. Furthermore, this section 
argues that the presence of these six organizational attributes depends on the IGO’s 
ability to convene at a leaders’ level and act with a high degree of autonomy. As such, 
only the 2014 Climate Summit and LPAA (culminating in COP21) had all six of 
these attributes as well as the convening power and autonomy of the organizers. The 





phase as well as in the 2000s explains their inability to accelerate the growth of 
voluntary cooperation. This finding is summarized in Table 3.1.  
The following subsections examine each of the five system-wide activities, 










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































   


















































































































































































Organizational Attributes of System-Wide Effort (Event and/or or Process)
Strategic 
Timing
Mixed ? adequate 
preparatory period, 
but occurred on the 
heels of the 
Millennium Summit
No ? Partnership 
Fair pursued over 
a decade
Mixed ? in the 




and too close to 
the COPs
Yes ? Following 
Copenhagen and in 




Yes ? in the run-up 
to the Paris 
Agreement; lengthy 
deliberation period
Yes - Following 
Copenhagen and in 
the run-up to the 
Paris Agreement
Yes ? in the run-up to 
the Paris Agreement; 
long preparatory period
Yes ? in the run-up to 
the Paris Agreement; 
long preparatory period
High Visibility
Yes ? Media 
interest and 
participation of 
Heads of State and 
Government, 
although a limited 
number
No ? delegates at 
sub-Minister level; 
confined to specific 
ministries; no 
media interest
Yes ? media 
interest and 
participation of 
Heads of State and 
Government
Yes ?  intense media 
interest and 
participation of Heads 
of State and 
Government
No ? very limited 
media interest and 
participation at 
negotiator level; 
confined to specific 
ministries







Yes ? Intense media 
interest and participation 
of Heads of State and 
Government; Leaders 
among non-state actors
Yes ? Very intense 
media interest and 
participation of Heads of 
State and Government; 
Leaders among 
non-state actors





Mixed -- sectors or 
thematic issues 





Mixed -- Thematic 
dialogues on 
sectors, but limited 
participation of 
stakeholders
No -- Conference 
oriented by 
constituencies
Yes -- some 




Major Groups as well 
as sector-relevant 
actors
Yes -- sessions and 
preparatory work 
streams focused on 
sectors, but also some 
based on constituencies
Yes -- sessions and 
preparatory work 
streams focused on 






Yes ? partnerships 
prioritized as official 
outcome of the 
summit
Mixed? raison 
d?etre was to 
develop 
partnerships but 







No ? Commitments 




official outcome of 
conference
Mixed ? consensus 
reached after 
contentious debate
Mixed - Ambitious 
commitments 
encouraged, but not 
specifically 
cooperative
Yes ? Speech Acts of 
voluntary cooperation 
set as price for 
participation
Yes - Speech Acts of 
voluntary cooperation 
set as price for 
participation in Action 
Day
Subsidiarity
Mixed ? Major 














No ? limited 
engagement with 
actors central to 
the network
Yes ? Major Groups 




Yes ? Central actors 
in the network 
invited to contribute 
inputs
Yes - Engagement 
with actors central in 
the network as well 
as other influencers
Yes ? Central actors   in 
the network tasked with 
developing initiatives
Yes - Central actors in 







No - diffuse, 
consensus-based 
process among UN 
member states
No - diffuse, 
consensus-based 
process among UN 
member states
Yes - UN 
Secretary-General 
as leader and 
decision maker
No ? diffuse, 
consensus-based 
process among UN 
mmberstates




No - High degree of 
oversight and 
ownership by Parties 
to the Convention 
Yes ? UN 
Secretary-General as 
leader and decision 
maker
Yes ? France as  leader 
and decision-maker, but 
with high influence of 
the UN 
secretary-general,    
Peru and UNFCCC 
secretariat











3.3.1 Voluntary Commitments but not Cooperation at Rio+20  
The World Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), a continuation 
of the UN General Assembly activity on sustainable development and the work under 
the WSSD and the CSD, took place in 2012 and prioritized and welcomed voluntary 
commitments by all stakeholders. The negotiated outcome document of Rio+20, the 
Future We Want, makes twenty-five references to partnerships, acknowledging their 
importance for achieving the aims of sustainable development and encouraging their 
promotion by all stakeholders. Indeed, this negotiated language was the result of the 
preparatory process, in which many governments strongly emphasized the importance 
of partnerships in ensuring the implementation of the Rio+20 outcome.157 Rio+20 was 
noteworthy for being “the most participatory conference in history”, with over 44,000 
participants (that is, badge-holders, both governments and non-governmental), the 
attendance of 79 heads of state and governments, and over 500 side events held in the 
margins of the conference, organized by the full range of stakeholders, including civil 
society groups and businesses.158 Arguably, the most visible outcome of Rio+20 was 
the show of strength by the private sector and civil society in making voluntary 
commitments and demanding governments to create enabling environments for an 
effective partnership for sustainable development, with 700 commitments made and 
registered in an online depository by the close of the conference.159 In addition to the 
emphasis on voluntary commitments, several factors were in favour of Rio+20 being 
able to spur a large number of cooperative initiatives. The conference had a strong 
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focus on the low-carbon transition160 and enjoyed high convening power as well as 
extremely high media attention and visibility. It had a long lead-up preparatory phase, 
starting over two years prior to the conference, in May 2010. And its preparation, 
including the voluntary commitments, had taken inputs from a wide range of 
stakeholders including governments, all Major Groups and intergovernmental 
organizations. Yet, the vast majority of these commitments were individual, not 
cooperative. Existing initiatives or entities, such the Sustainability for All, or the 
Global Compact, encouraged their own partners to make individual commitments 
under their banners. 74% of the commitments made were obtained in this way.161 
Two key limitations in the organization of the conference resulted in the relatively 
few cooperative initiatives announced at Rio+20: inattention to cooperative 
commitments, and constituency-based organization.  
 Despite appearances to the contrary, the Rio+20 organizers did not place 
emphasis on voluntary cooperative initiatives. In contrast with the WSSD, the 
organizing committee of Rio+20 chose to encourage all types of voluntary 
commitments, including commitments by individual entities, rather than focusing on 
partnerships among entities. Ensuring a high number of commitments that would be 
seen as impressive by media was a priority for the Secretary-General of the 
conference. In discussions with entities such as the Global Compact, it became clear 
that the way to ensure such a high number was to welcome individual commitments. 
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Little resources were put into promoting or partnerships. In fact, in the outcome 
document of Rio+20, the article recognizing the value of the voluntary commitments, 
does not mention the word “partnership” or “coalition” at all.162 Indeed, the 
distinction between individual commitments and cooperative initiatives was not one 
to which the organizers or the UN Secretariat –UN DESA -- paid much attention at 
the time. Indeed, DESA frequently referred to the two types of commitments 
interchangeably. Just a year after the conference, DESA reported that “The number of 
voluntary commitments and partnerships in the ‘Sustainable Development (SD) in 
Action Registry’ has grown to over 1,400 valued at around US$ 636 billion. These 
multi-stakeholder initiatives voluntarily undertaken by Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, major groups and other stakeholders are important 
contributions to the implementation of sustainable development goals and 
commitments agreed at the intergovernmental level.”163 In addition, unlike the WSSD 
ten years prior, Rio+20 was anticipated to produce some intergovernmental outcomes, 
including on the institutional framework for sustainable development and the future 
of UNEP, so while the voluntary commitments were still deemed important by the 
UN Secretariat as a “Plan B” in case the intergovernmental process did not deliver 
any agreement, governments were less “desperate” to include them as an official 
outcome. Thus, the voluntary commitments were not promoted or prioritized as 
official outcomes of the conference, but were instead only strongly encouraged by the 
conference organizers, as a useful device that would help in the implementation of the 
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conference outcomes. The conference Secretary-General (a senior UN official and 
head of UN DESA) noted that “the voluntary commitments are a major part of the 
legacy of this Conference. They complement the official outcome of the 
Conference.”164  
Even if cooperation had been emphasized, the traditional, constituency-based 
organization of the conference remained a challenge to sectoral cooperation. The 
conference was organized along the format of statements by governments in plenary 
and parallel high-level roundtables to discuss the way forward for the implementation 
of the outcomes agreed upon in Rio. Statements were made by Major Groups for two 
minutes each on the first day, per the norm by then established. Neither the plenary 
nor the roundtables were organized sectorally, thereby providing no particular 
incentives for different stakeholders to make cooperative commitments on particular 
sectors as part of the official conference. The bulk of the activity by non-state actors 
was therefore outside of the official conference, which created a significant 
disconnect between the national government leaders and the real economy leaders. 
While many side events did feature both types of leaders and had a sectoral 
organization, they were on the whole not designed to proactively produce cooperative 
commitments (as opposed to the easier individual commitments), but rather to 
maximize visibility and prestige. The organization of the conference and its 
preparatory process therefore did not actively drive cooperation among actors within 
a sector by creating corrals of actors and did not introduce significant competitive 
fears within businesses.  
                                               





The non-sectoral organization combined with diffuse emphasis on all types of 
commitments meant that cooperative initiatives launched at the conference (or rather, 
at side events in its margins) were largely a result of the combined motivations of the 
governments, NGOs, businesses and others in the post-Copenhagen context. The high 
profile and visibility of the conference and it timing made it an attractive venue for 
these actors to participate and be seen, thus bringing together many of the actors in 
the network, but not significantly galvanizing them to cooperate in new ways. As one 
business leader put it, “At Rio+20 everyone saw that the side events really mattered. 
This is where the real stuff was happening. Suddenly we no longer cared as much 
what was happening in the negotiations.” 
Nevertheless, the very large presence of business and civil society at Rio+20 
did serve to create an appreciation in the office of the UN Secretary-general and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat for the potential to tap into and steer this motivation ahead of 
COP21. For example, the WEF had created the Friends of Rio+20 group, consisting 
of Nestlé, ICRC and others, explicitly calling on governments to “enable multi-
country and multi-stakeholder coalitions of willing and able actors (including 
interested national and sub-national governments) to undertake explicit sets of actions 
now and in the near term to help achieve these goals.”165 They provided a list of thirty 
existing coalitions that were working and proving to be effective, as models for how 
this could be done. This group attracted significant interest in the media as well in 
governments.166 It also caught the attention of those UN entities working on climate 
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change, including the UNFCCC Secretariat and the office of the Secretary-General. 
They would build a strong relationship with the WEF to continue the coalition-
building work through to Paris. 
3.3.2 Partnerships Lost in Consensus: Ad-Hoc Working Group Two 
The Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) was mandated by COP decisions in 2011 to drive the process of realizing a 
new global agreement on climate change by 2015. While non-state actors had been 
actively engaged in the COPs since 1994 and a veritable festival of side events and 
meetings has been taking place in the margins of the COP each year, it wasn't until 
after COP15 in Copenhagen that Parties began to consider the value of voluntary 
cooperation among “non-Party stakeholders”.167 The ADP was organized into two 
workstreams, with workstream one (“ADP1”) focused on the content of the 2015 
agreement, while workstream two (“ADP2”) focused on pre-2020 ambition. The 
creation of two workstreams was the result of a breakdown in negotiations in Durban, 
between the Durban alliance led by the Most Vulnerable Group, and the major 
emitters including BASIC, the United States and the Umbrella Group. The settlement 
between them was that the new agreement would not come into effect until 2020. 
Island nations felt they were losing a decade because of this, which led, in part, to the 
establishment of ADP2,168 which took up the question of voluntary cooperation as a 
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means of enhancing pre-2020 ambition and the ambition of the Paris Agreement to be 
reached in 2015. 
In this context, the ADP2 workshops and roundtables were an opportunity for 
governments as well as academics, civil society actors and private sector to provide 
inputs for options on pre-2020 ambition, as Parties maintained an open process in 
which they recognized the expertise of actors already engaged in voluntary 
cooperation, and welcomed their inputs. The UNFCCC Secretariat proactively 
channeled these inputs to the Parties, often highlighting the value of cooperative 
initiatives.169 Actors and sectoral conveners that were central in the existing network 
of initiatives, such as the Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport, UNEP, 
the World Bank, and others participated in these sessions to build awareness and 
understanding among negotiators on the experiences, opportunities and challenges on 
the ground.170 During 2013, submissions by Parties under the ADP workstream two 
began to increasingly reference “international cooperative initiatives” and Parties 
elevated the issue by mandating two ministerial level events and Technical 
Examination Meetings (TEMs) in 2014 to identify concrete opportunities for 
enhancing cooperative initiatives. With the support of the UNFCCC Secretariat, these 
events were organized sectorally, rather than by constituency, with emphasis on the 
mitigation potential of action within sectors or thematic areas, such as energy, 
transport and short-lived climate pollutants. Yet, no new initiatives were created via 
this negotiating workstream—a state of affairs that can be traced to two limiting 
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factors in the organization of the ADP2 process: decentralized decision-making and 
low convening power. 
First, being a pre-eminently member state-driven forum, there was little 
authority on the part of the co-chairs to make decisions such as to rely on or partner 
with influencers in the network of cooperative initiatives to ask them to develop new 
initiatives. While the co-chairs could and did certainly steer and shape the 
discussions, they were beholden to the Parties for ultimate decision-making, and the 
Parties were not of one mind on whether and how to proceed on incentivizing 
cooperative initiatives, especially given the fast pace of evolution of ADP1. To the 
contrary, there was a strong division among Parties on whether they should encourage 
cooperative initiatives. Although the Durban Decision that birthed the ADP clearly 
mandated two workstreams, it transpired during 2012 that Parties did not have a clear 
understanding of the scope of ADP2 or indeed what they hoped to achieve out of it. 
One the one hand, the workstream was supposed to consider options for increasing 
pre-2020 ambition. On the other hand, it wasn't clear to Parties whether it was 
supposed to enhance pre-2020 ambition during its tenure. Over the course of 2012 
and 2013, Parties began to increasingly vocalize a theory of change that increased 
pre-2020 ambition would be important for securing high post-2020 ambition, and 
therefore it was necessary for ADP2 to enhance pre-2020 ambition to the extent 
possible.171 However, even though Parties increasingly recognized the importance of 
cooperative initiatives for post-2020 ambition, they did not reach a joint position to 
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ask partners to make commitments at the workshops or even at the ministerial level 
meetings. Rather, the meetings were designed as traditional dialogues. Discussions 
did not reach a point where new initiatives could be designed.  
Second, similar to the CSD in the previous decade, the ADP2 had low 
visibility, a direct result of its low convening power. The participants attending the 
meetings were members of the negotiating delegations of parties, mostly from 
ministries of foreign affairs or ministries of environment. Whereas the necessary 
governmental actors that would be able to help develop initiatives in specific sectors 
were not present, namely representatives of sectoral ministries such as those on 
transport, agriculture, power and so on. This was a direct consequence of the limited 
convening power and mandate of the COP. Over the course of 2014 and 2015, the 
ADP2 process began to increasingly recognize the need to engage political leaders, 
but the thinking remained confined to the contours of the UNFCCC process, and no 
strategy emerged to actively engage political and non-political leaders to raise 
visibility and accelerate the pre-2020 ambition at the level needed. Added to that, one 
unfortunate logistical circumstance was that the workstream two discussions often 
happened at the same time as workstream one, forcing many delegations to pick.  As 
one senior official from the Government of India observed, “A lot of private 
companies realized that their future is tied to the negotiations. Workstream two 
provided them with a platform where they could engage. But it didn't improve the 
negotiations very much. A cynical view would be that some countries wanted to have 
workstream two and others let them have it without expecting it would change 





rapid pace that it was very difficult to triangulate and have one workstream feed the 
other. Also, Parties don't really have large enough delegations to service both 
workstreams.”172  
In summary, while both streams of member state-led activity to promote 
voluntary cooperation had some positive enabling factors, each also had significant 
drawbacks, which were seen in processes during the 2000s, and which mitigated their 
ability to galvanize new initiatives at scale. Overcoming these challenges would 
require a participatory choreography, which was pioneered at the 2014 Climate 
Summit and adopted by the Government of France for the LPAA and COP21. 
3.3.3 UNFCCC Secretariat: A Valiant Paper Tiger 
While the discussions under the ADP2 were underway, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat itself was also making efforts to advance cooperative action. Following 
Copenhagen and a change in leadership of the UNFCCC Secretariat, a new dynamism 
was injected into the work of the secretariat, and the intention to use non-state actors 
to lobby outcomes became an explicit strategy in 2013. An “implementation 
coordination committee” was established in the secretariat with the purpose of using 
NSAs to drive ambition among governments. As one senior officer at the UNFCCC 
Secretariat put it, “The strict focus on national governments started to become less 
and less useful.”173 
The Secretariat implemented this strategy on two fronts. Directing efforts 
internally, the secretariat sought to influence the negotiations, in particular ADP 
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workstream two. As a senior member of the UNFCCC Secretariat observed, “If you're 
a government official in Capital, all you know is what the media is saying and what 
your person on the ground is reporting to you. There is an incentive for the person on 
the ground to blame everything else. We were trying to change the psychology 
around the negotiations by pumping out good news and changing the mindsets of 
those receiving the vibes in capitals. From this perspective, the ADP workstream two 
was about changing the perception of the UNFCCC process.”174 
Externally, the Secretariat sought to engage directly with non-state actors and 
encourage them to undertake cooperative initiatives. This was a rallying cry taken up 
forcefully by the Executive Secretary. A large number of her speeches since 2011, for 
example, are peppered with appeals to stakeholders to take action: “Whether you 
represent government, business or civil society, take the unambiguous low-carbon 
policy signals from Durban, and help us increase action through new partnerships… 
Help us make the revolution real. Help us achieve the change we need.”175 In 
addition, a dedicated team within the secretariat was set up in 2014 to engage with 
“non-Party stakeholders”. The secretariat itself also became a partner in several 
initiatives during this time, instigating two.  
However, these efforts did not directly result in a large number of initiatives 
being launched, primarily for three reasons: they did not provide high visibility; they 
did not benefit from centralized decision-making authority; and they were 
overshadowed by the efforts for the 2014 Climate Summit and the LPAA. These 
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limitations are rooted in the low convening power and low autonomy of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat.  
Efforts of the secretariat to launch new initiatives necessarily took place in the 
context and margins of the negotiations under the climate convention. Since these 
negotiations are the purview of specific sections of national governments—largely 
ministries of foreign affairs and environment—the level of government participation 
is generally no higher than ambassador or director, with only the “high level 
segments” at the annual COPs attracting ministers and sometimes heads of state. The 
breadth of governmental participation is usually limited to one or two specific 
ministries. Thus, other than during highly consequential COPs when major 
agreements are due to be reached, government participation is not at leaders’ level, 
which in turn lowers the overall visibility of the process compared to events such as 
summits under the General Assembly. The visibility of initiatives being launched in 
the margins of the negotiations in 2012 and 2013 was therefore quite low compared to 
that available in high-profile events such as Rio+20 happening concurrently. 
Further, as a treaty secretariat, the UNFCCC has a very specific role oriented 
around supporting Parties to the convention. As such, engaging in any significant way 
outside of the strictly prescribed role of facilitating the negotiations through 
conference services faced significant institutional challenges. The new focus on non-
Party stakeholders by the executive-secretary faced obstacles even within the 
secretariat, with the idea of non-state actors being integrated into the process being 





be among sovereign nation-states only.176 The ability of the secretariat to even hire 
staff members to attend to the non-Party stakeholder agenda depended entirely on the 
leadership and charisma of the Executive Secretary, and was severely limited by the 
executive secretary’s official role.177 Unlike the Secretary-General, who could draw 
on decades of Good Offices precedent as well as his high convening power, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat has extremely limited potential to generate autonomy, and as 
such lacked the central decision-making necessary to aggressively and openly pursue 
the formation of many new initiatives using its institutional authority. Rather, these 
efforts remained largely under the radar.   
Recognizing the structural institutional challenges it faced and the limits to its 
ability to advance voluntary cooperation on its own, support to the 2014 Climate 
Summit followed by a partnership in the Lima-Paris Action Agenda was the natural 
progression for the UNFCCC Secretariat. Although it is difficult to conjecture on its 
role had there been no such attempt by the French and Peruvian presidencies, it is 
reasonable to assume that based on the experience of the member state-led processes 
of the sustainable development conferences in 2002 and 2012, in which the UN 
Secretariats faced significant challenges due to limited autonomy and/or convening 
power, the UNFCCC Secretariat may have faced similar constraints.  
3.3.4 The 2014 Climate Summit: Dancing Together 
 Following the inability of governments to “seal the deal” in Copenhagen, and 
their subsequent agreement two years later to reach a new universal agreement in 
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2015, the decision by the Secretary-General to host a summit meeting in 2014 was 
motivated by a desire to support and overcome the limitations of the 
intergovernmental negotiations—a tactic with which he had experimented in 2007 
and 2009. As a former negotiator in the UNFCCC and senior advisor to the Secretary-
General recalled, “We needed a new pathway. We needed to do something over and 
beyond what had been done in the previous twenty years.”178 This new pathway 
would be to “broaden the responsibility, and use the convening power of the 
Secretary-General's office to make the case for this co-responsibility of all 
stakeholders.”179 An alternative, complementary view was that this was an attempt to 
right an existing wrong: “One could argue that the premise of the UNFCCC 
negotiations was wrong from the beginning. Climate change is an economy-wide 
issue. Only by bringing in the wider community that holds the economic levers are 
we able to find the right solutions.”180  
Grounded in this rationale, it is clear that significant efforts were undertaken 
by the Secretary-General to enable the formation of many new initiatives. For 
example, as scholars have observed, a dedicated team in the executive office of the 
Secretary-General was created in order to shepherd initiatives into existence.181 This 
team was supported through funds provided by a core group of governments and 
philanthropic foundations.182 Communications about the summit articulated a clear 
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theory of change: to showcase demand and willingness from various parts of the 
economy to make the transition to low carbon. This, it was argued, would encourage 
governments to reach an ambitious agreement by December 2015. In other words, the 
“plan B” mentality of the Type II outcomes pursued in the previous decade was 
replaced with the hypothesis that demonstrating such real-world action could 
encourage governments to make progress in the intergovernmental sphere. 
A theory of change armed with financial and human resources were 
insufficient on their own to spur the additional voluntary cooperation desired, 
however. Building upon the autonomy generated by the Secretary-General and the 
lessons learned in the previous decade, careful organization of the summit made the 
2014 Climate Summit particularly effective at accelerating the formation and launch 
of cooperative initiatives on climate change. This was the result of six organizational 
attributes of the summit: its strategic timing; high visibility; sectoral orientation; 
emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments; subsidiarity; and leadership with 
centralized decision-making.  
3.3.4.1 Strategic Timing 
With a deadline imposed by the intergovernmental process, there was a strong 
incentive for many stakeholders who were already motivated to make voluntary 
commitments, to be and be seen as leaders in the low-carbon transition. The timing of 
the summit, occurring in the lead up to 2015, took advantage of this, and lent greater 
motivation to both, states and non-state actors. As an executive of the WBCSD 
observed, “There was a feeling that there was a countdown. Everyone wanted to 





not going to be able to influence policies. You need to be a first mover for that.”183 
Moreover, unlike the summits in 2007 and 2009, which occurred just two months 
before the climate negotiations they were meant to impact, the 2014 summit was held 
a full fourteen months before the negotiations in Paris. The aim was to convene 
leaders and demonstrate will with enough lead time for negotiators to act on it 
constructively before the deadline. Not only that, the preparation for the 2014 summit 
itself occurred over a long period. Unlike the hasty convening that characterized the 
summits in 2007 and 2009, the 2014 summit was announced by the Secretary-General 
in November 2012, and preparations begun in early 2013. This long preparatory 
period of eighteen months allowed for extensive engagement with stakeholders and 
adequate preparatory meetings in relevant fora, as well as course-correction when 
needed. This was particularly appreciated by businesses and business organizations: 
“There was a long build up period to the summit. That was a good thing. We knew 
there was a possibility of our sector to come around a single core issue and tell the 
world what it is doing and what it intends to do in the future. So, we were able to 
engage CEOs in the lead-up time.”184 
3.3.4.2 High Visibility 
In keeping with his previous efforts in 2007 and 2009, the Secretary-General 
targeted leaders level participation in this summit, for both, the private and public 
sectors. Attuned to the fact that “businesses want a lot of visibility on the initiatives 
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they launch”185 and “it means a lot to be acknowledged by the UN—it still has a 
status”,186 access to this leaders’ level pulpit and public recognition via official press 
releases, press conferences and media attention were sold as an incentive for actors to 
make commitments. The team of the Secretary-General worked with the explicit 
understanding that the convening power of their leader was one of their strongest 
cards in trying to generate commitments, as it enabled them to capitalize on the 
desires of various actors to enhance their own reputations among their stakeholders. 
As a senior staffer observed, “The basic question was, how do we move the needle? 
We knew we couldn't control the private sector. We were bargaining with them and 
asking them if they could commit to the specific deadline of 2015 to do something 
that they wouldn't otherwise do. In return, we gave them the world's biggest platform 
and showed them that the mileage they can get with their shareholders is something 
they can't get anywhere else. In essence, we created a race to the top. This only 
worked because we were the office of the Secretary-General. Had the invitation gone 
from the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
or the World Bank, nobody would have been interested.”187  
3.3.4.3  Sectoral Orientation 
Summit sessions were explicitly structured around eight greenhouse gas-
emitting sectors, based on the UNEP Emissions Gap report and the academic 
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literature on “wedging the gap” that had arisen in prior years.188 The sectoral 
orientation meant that stakeholders within a sector were grouped together rather than 
split by constituency type. Thus, for example, within the forests sector, indigenous 
peoples and business were able to, and encouraged to, interact together to develop 
common initiatives to be presented together in one session (see chapter four for a 
detailed exposition on this process). Their preparatory meetings therefore required 
them to engage together, in contrast with the closed door strategizing of Major 
Groups, which prevents inter-group collaboration. Since businesses, civil society and 
governments had been organizing themselves within these sectors in the previous 
decade in developing cooperative initiatives, the user-friendly design of the summit 
fostered both, competition between them to be included in the summit, and 
cooperation among them to develop new initiatives. The simple effectiveness of this 
approach was underlined by one leading business executive, who observed, “The last 
thing you need is a press release that says you're not in.”189 While the “WEHAB”190 
focus of the Johannesburg summit and the thematic sessions of the 2007 and 2009 
climate summits provided some antecedents for this approach, the organizers of the 
2014 Climate Summit explicitly identified the sectors under which commitments 
were most needed to provide a political signal as well as practical benefits for climate 
mitigation and adaptation. Importantly, the identification of these select sectors was 
informed also by lead conveners in those sectors, at times causing the organizers to 
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revise plans. For example, Transport, Forests and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants 
were all included at the behest of the entities that were central in these respective 
networks.191  
Departing from the constituency-based organization in the UN General 
Assembly, whereby member states have an elevated status over other actors, and the 
Major Groups are largely isolated from each, was not a move that all member states 
were comfortable with at the time. Similar to the 2007 and 2009 summits, providing 
regular briefings to member states remained an important and necessary condition for 
the Secretary-General to claim this space (four separate briefings were given in 
plenary in addition to information notes and bilateral meetings with delegations). 
Nevertheless, not all member states were convinced. As an advisor to the Secretary-
General noted, “President Paul Kagame walked out of the finance session. He was 
surprised that the floor was given to CEOs before him, and didn't accept it. But now 
such a practice has become so established that heads of state and government don't 
question it. We wanted to break this taboo. We wanted to show that everyone is 
engaged, and on this issue, everyone is equal; everyone has to contribute. It was hard 
for many to swallow at that time.”192 
3.3.4.4 Emphasis on Cooperative Commitments 
The summit was designed to elicit not just speeches, but speech acts. That is, 
rather than welcoming dialogue and deliberation as had been the case in the past 
summits in 2007 and 2009, and as was the norm in summits of the General Assembly, 
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the Secretary-General demanded promises and commitments by participants as a 
price for admission to the sectoral sessions. This applied to both governments and 
non-governmental actors. In 2007, the Secretary-General's invitation had informed 
leaders that the summit was “an opportunity to exchange views”.193 In contrast, the 
2014 invitation asks leaders to “bring bold commitments and announcements”, with 
no reference to exchanging views or engaging in dialogue.194 This emphasis on 
commitments was publicized widely in the run-up to the summit, with briefings to 
member states, the press and civil society organizations making clear that the purpose 
of the summit was to foster bold action, and that speaking slots would be determined 
by the strength of commitments being made. This, combined with the prominence of 
the sectoral sessions—comprising over half of the summit—meant that pressure was 
high on would-be participants to make commitments. 
This approach represented a significant difference from the standard format of 
a multilateral conference, which is oriented around dialogue and debate, such as the 
Johannesburg Summit. While it is now common to see such action summits (for 
example, the format was taken up by Governor Brown for the Global Climate Action 
Summit in 2018 and by President Macron for his One Planet summits, among others), 
this was a new concept in 2014. It drew on learning from the experiments of the 
Secretary-General in convening summits in 2007 and 2009, as well as from the 
action-oriented aspirations of the Johannesburg Summit and Rio+20. 
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Providing an efficient way to steer actors incentivized by the timing and 
convening level was the principle of subsidiarity. In a major departure from the 2007 
and 2009 summits, the organizing team selectively partnered with those entities that 
were already influential in the growing network of initiatives and who could use their 
influence to generate additional cooperation. Thus, rather than trying to develop 
capacities to convene and organize actors within sectors themselves, the team 
depended on those that had the comparative advantage and were already influential in 
the network. In essence, this created an efficient pipeline for initiatives. The 
Secretary-General's team entered into partnership with these sectoral conveners and 
depended on them to ramp up their efforts in time for the summit. This entailed 
significant changes to “business as usual” for these partners. 
For example, the World Economic Forum has an undisputed comparative 
advantage in convening CEOs in a variety of sectors; a fact even acknowledged by a 
representative of its competitor, the WBCSD: “The Forum has a lot of ability to bring 
businesses to the table that others don't have. So it made sense for them to drive and 
be part of this action.”195 In an unprecedented move that allowed an external actor to 
shape their agenda, the WEF planned a Climate Day in their 2014 annual meeting in 
Davos, the purpose of which was to start galvanizing the initiatives that would be 
featured at the climate summit later in the year.196 This Climate Day was planned 
together with the summit organizers as well as the UNFCCC Secretariat, and was 
entirely structured for the benefit of the summit and COP21. A senior WEF executive 
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underlined, “Davos is not a tent full of people talking about climate action. This was 
very different to how we had used Davos before. The purpose of it was to create a 
movement; to give confidence to the CEOs.”197  
In addition to the WEF, other strategic partners were asked to play convening 
roles within the sectors of their mandates, to develop cooperative initiatives 
specifically for the summit. These included transnational organizations such as 
WBCSD, but also intergovernmental organizations that had evidently been playing 
highly central roles in the network by participating in initiatives, for instance UNEP, 
the World Bank, and UNDP. This created for the first time a strategic link between 
intergovernmental organizations working at multiple levels of the network—system-
wide, sectoral and initiative—in the purposive development of the network of 
initiatives (the implications of this link are discussed in detail in chapters four, five 
and six). In addition, intergovernmental organizations with appropriate mandates, 
such as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) were also given roles 
to act as conveners within their sectors. 
The decision to partner so closely with sectoral influencers by the principle of 
subsidiarity was not uncontroversial. For example, while the WEF and the UN signed 
an MOU in 2019 to engage collaboratively and putting each other’s platforms to 
effective use, there was no MOU in place in 2014 and this kind of engagement was 
experimental and innovative, with the expected attendant discomfort. This close 
collaboration was contested in the WEF's board.198 It was also greeted with 
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scepticism within the Secretary-General’s team among those concerned about 
working with corporations driven by a profit motive and the optics around that.199 
Nevertheless, this approach was fruitful. As a senior operative within the Secretary-
General’s team for the planning of the summit shared, “In the end, quite a few of the 
initiatives announced at the summit came from the WEF process. Others from 
different parts of the system, such as IRENA. We ended up taking the lead on finance 
ourselves. Each initiative had a different textuality.”200 This subsidiarity approach 
was also appreciated and encouraged by several of the governments that funded the 
summit. As one senior official from the Government of Norway put it, “If the UN is 
unwilling to empower coalitions that in turn have the ability to bring about progress 
and valuable commitments, nothing happens. If the UN system sees their role as an 
effective facilitator, then a lot gets done.”201 
Beyond developing specific initiatives, strategic partners were also essential 
for a broader purpose, such as designing the summit and its impact. For example, the 
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) and the 
Global Commission for the Economy and Climate (GCEC), together with the 
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) were early collaborators with the 
office of the Secretary-General and were instrumental in the design of the summit, 
including the sectoral focus, seeing it as an important step in steering global discourse 
in the right direction for securing an agreement in Paris.202 The influential report on 
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the New Climate Economy produced by the GCEC in 2014, which made the case for 
climate change as an opportunity for economic growth, was developed in close 
alignment with the summit.203 This was to maximize the impact of both and to ensure 
that the report and the outcomes of the summit echoed each other to argue that 
economic growth and climate action are mutually reaffirming goals. As one senior 
advisor to the Secretary-General observed, “they gave us early drafts of the report and 
based a significant part of it on the summit action areas. We were scouring the world 
for what are the best actions for impact. We eventually placed them in touch with the 
various action areas.”204 A senior GCEC advisor and principal architect of the report 
underlined, “the timing was important. We decided to launch the report at the summit, 
but wanted it to be ready by the summer of 2014. We wanted to influence the 
speeches at the summit.”205 
3.3.4.6 Leadership with centralized decision-making 
Critically, counterbalancing and complementing the principle of subsidiarity, 
was leadership with centralized decision-making by the Secretary-General over all 
aspects of the summit. This meant that the Secretary-General and his team could and 
did intervene in the development of initiatives if the sectoral leads assigned needed 
assistance. For example, in the case of the finance sector, limited progress was being 
made by the World Bank in convening private sector financiers and obtaining new 
commitments from them. This required the Secretary-General's team to step in and 
use their neutral convening authority. “On Finance, we asked the investors to think of 
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themselves as friends of the Secretary-General. In that frame of mind, we asked them 
for the best possible advice from their sector on what they could deliver for the 
summit. We modelled this as a theoretical exercise with them and wrote out the 
announcements in theory. Then we spent two months on the phone with each of the 
investors and groups hammering out what exactly they could deliver and how.”206 
Indeed, to ensure that the various partners were progressing sufficiently in delivering 
on their responsibilities, and different levels of interventions were being made as 
necessary, a continuous dialogue was necessary between the office of the Secretary-
General and the various strategic partners core to the preparatory effort. To this end, 
the office of the Secretary-General expanded by thirty individuals to ensure that a 
technical team existed to work hand in glove with the lead conveners and organizers 
of each sectoral session and initiative. Notably, the organizing team became deeply 
involved in assessing and improving proposed initiatives. Yet, the balance between 
the principle of subsidiarity and leadership with centralized decision-making was a 
learning process. Partners have observed that at times the office of the Secretary-
General took a heavy-handed approach, with too much bureaucracy and emphasis on 
process.  
 The leadership with centralized decision-making was only possible because 
of the autonomy from member states that the Secretary-General had created and 
wielded in convening a summit without a General Assembly mandate. In fact, this 
autonomy was a necessary tool in the deployment of all other enabling factors 
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identified above. For example, the Secretary-General could choose the timing of the 
summit as needed; had the liberty to organize summit sessions by sectors without 
needing to reach consensus among member states; could enter into partnership with 
any stakeholders without undue pressure from member states; and could withhold 
speaking slots in the sectoral sessions from member states and non-state actors if their 
commitments were not robust. As described in the previous section, this autonomy 
was hard-won in a series of incremental steps since the late 1990s, with the 2007 and 
2009 summits setting the precedents in a summit setting.  
The combination of these elements proved a compelling causal mechanism for 
a variety of actors to engage in cooperative initiatives within their respective and 
pertinent greenhouse gas-emitting sectors. Klaus Schwab, Director of the WEF, said 
that this experience demonstrated that with “well-structured global public-private 
cooperation, change can happen relatively fast and at a meaningful scale. Seemingly 
intractable agendas can be reshaped.”207 It also proved an especially effective way to 
attract the attention and commitments of businesses that had not been deeply engaged 
in voluntary cooperation up until then, but whose participation would be 
consequential. Two examples are Cargill and Saudi Aramco.  
The CEO of Cargill, David McLennan, was invited to participate in a press 
conference with the Secretary-General on the day of the summit. According to the 
network dataset of cooperative initiatives, Cargill had not been a particularly 
influential actor in voluntary cooperation up until then, with a low degree and 
betweenness centralities. Yet, the company, as a global behemoth in agriculture 
                                               





commodity trading, had been specifically targeted for the impact that its 
announcement could cause in the sector. As one of the summit team members put it, 
“We ideally wanted to get the four big grain traders—Archer Daniels Midland, 
Bunge, Cargill and Dryfus—to agree together on sustainability benchmarks. We 
weren’t able to make that happen but we got some commitments from Cargill.”208 
The nature of the commitment being made by Cargill had been carefully negotiated in 
the preceding months, and the senior executives at Cargill had approved a 
commitment to ensuring deforestation-free palm oil in their supply chains. On the day 
of the summit, however, Mr. McLennan chose to go beyond what his own staff had 
advised him, and in the press conference said that Cargill will undertake efforts to 
ensure all its commodities will be free of deforestation. The powerful motivation 
provided by the summit is perhaps best encapsulated in the following observation 
made by Mr. McLennan: “When they write the history book about Cargill in another 
150 years, this day will be in it. It’s a special moment in our long history to say that 
we're not just going to be in the middle of the pack on this issue, we want to be a 
leader.”209  
The intervention made by the then-CEO of Saudi Aramco, Khalid Al-Falih is 
another example. Over the course of 2014, the summit organizers and partners, 
notably the WEF and the UNFCCC Secretariat, had worked with Saudi Aramco in 
order to secure the participation of Saudi Aramco in initiatives of the oil and gas 
industry to signal that the biggest oil and gas company in the world recognizes the 
                                               
208 Interviewee 60 (senior officer at the FAO), in discussion with author, 4 April 2018. 





challenge of climate change and is committed to help make the transition to a low-
carbon economy. Until 2014, Saudi Aramco had not been an active entity in 
voluntary cooperation on climate change, participating only in industry associations 
and not in any initiatives that caused it to make commitments in favour of climate 
mitigation. By 2014, however, Saudi Aramco was significantly increasing its 
investment in renewable energy, which was Saudi Arabia beginning to consider as a 
potential national interest. Securing the participation of Mr. Al-Falih in the summit 
and that of Saudi Aramco in at least one initiative was seen as paramount by the 
summit organizers and partners. Following discussions under the WEF banner for a 
year, and engagement by the UNFCCC Secretariat, the participation of Saudi Aramco 
in the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative had been secured, but not yet the participation of 
Al Falih in the summit. A higher level of shuttle diplomacy was needed; one provided 
by Secretary-General Ban, who dispatched his assistant Secretary-General for 
strategic planning to personally convince Mr. Al Falih to attend the summit. This 
shuttle diplomacy was successful, and resulting in Saudi Aramco not only agreed to 
engage as part of the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, but also acting as the 
spokesperson for the initiative, delivering two speeches in the summit and arguing 
that the company’s future lay in ensuring that the goals of providing cheap and 
reliable energy for economic development and low-carbon economy “are not 
mutually exclusive”.210 
                                               






In summary: six design elements in the organization of the 2014 summit had 
an accelerating effect on the number of cooperative initiatives launched: strategic 
timing, high visibility, sectoral orientation, emphasis on cooperative commitments, 
subsidiarity and leadership with centralized decision-making.  These elements were 
made possible due to the high convening power and autonomy of the summit host.   
3.3.5 The Lima-Paris Action Agenda: A Second Performance 
The launch of cooperative initiatives at COP21 was the stated aim of the 
Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), a partnership between the French Presidency 
with the Government of Peru (the President of COP20), the office of the Secretary-
General and the UNFCCC Secretariat.211 The French Presidency incorporated the 
“action agenda” (i.e. voluntary cooperation) as a core part of its strategy for COP21, 
designating it the fourth pillar of the COP, in addition to the three pillars focused 
directly on the intergovernmental negotiations. The communications strategy for the 
LPAA defined the action agenda as “a counter narrative to insufficiency of Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions or lack of progress in the negotiations… climate 
action before 2020 can help ensure the success of the Paris Agreement and catalyse 
ever higher ambition post 2020.”212 Thus, the integration of the action agenda into the 
strategy of the COP Presidency internalized both the “plan B” approach of Type II 
partnerships in the previous decade, and the “race to the top” theory of change used 
by the 2014 Climate Summit: “The LPAA was a strategy to put pressure on 
governments to get an agreement. This was explicit. It was also a back-up strategy--in 
                                               
211 UNFCCC, ‘The Lima-Paris Action Agenda: Promoting Transformational Climate Action’. 





case there was no agreement in Paris, we could still show the world that something 
came up for sure. This was more implicit.”213  
Both the Peruvian and French presidencies of the COPs had their own internal 
motivations to promote voluntary cooperation. In the case of Peru, the Minister of 
Environment, who responsible for the COP, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, had roots in civil 
society organizations and instinctively felt the need to include the voices and actions 
of non-state actors as part of the solution to climate change. In the case of France, 
President Hollande had been convinced to take up the task of hosting COP21 partly 
on the basis of a domestic argument, that contrary to the doomsday view that was 
presented at Copenhagen in 2009, the French presidency of COP21 could be oriented 
around an agenda positif, which could be presented to the French public as well as the 
world, thus earning much political capital for President Hollande. In addition, 
however, the French bureaucracy, famously pro-multilateralism, was aware of the 
history of stakeholder engagement at the UN. As one senior advisor to the COP 
Presidency put it, “This was Kofi Annan's legacy.”214 The positive political narrative 
and the bureaucracy's sympathies with the UN's history of stakeholder engagement 
merged well.  
In addition to these motivations, the decision to establish the LPAA and the 
design of the Fourth Pillar at COP21 was strongly influenced by previous efforts 
undertaken by intergovernmental organizations. While the importance of voluntary 
cooperation was being recognized in several venues of intergovernmental activity on 
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climate change, including the ADP2 deliberations of the COP and purposive efforts 
being made by the UNFCCC Secretariat through initiatives such as Momentum for 
Change, it was the organization and success of the 2014 summit in galvanizing 
cooperative initiatives that opened the imagination for the Peruvians and French COP 
presidencies on what might be possible at COP21. Indeed, the Governments of Peru 
and France were partly motived to launch the LPAA because of the success of the 
Secretary-General's summit. As a cabinet minister from the Government of Peru 
noted, “Three things helped us realize that we need to do the Lima-Paris Action 
Agenda. First, after Copenhagen, it was clear that we should have a bottom-up 
process. It was also clear that the world was pushing towards an agreement in 2015… 
Second, at the COP in Warsaw in 2013, many NGOs left the room because it was 
seen as the ‘coal’ summit. Many businesses organized meetings outside the venue. 
So, we thought, what if we were able to bring non-state actors into the venue? Third, 
the Secretary-General's climate summit. It really demonstrated the importance of the 
non-state actors in pushing to an agreement in 2015.”215 This last motivation was 
strongly underlined by a senior advisor to the President of COP21: “[the 2014 
Climate Summit] became a template of how it could be done. The idea was not to 
reproduce everything exactly, but the template gave us a lot of ideas. Even the French 
Action Day followed this template. It was also a first filter of the coalitions, so we 
were grateful for that because the difficulty was in how to choose the right actors. So, 
having that first filter was extremely important. Plus, it gave us the political cover to 
                                               






do it. Once you have a summit organized by the Secretary-General, it immediately 
gives the political legitimacy to have such an event. Once the Secretary-General does 
that, it automatically becomes legitimate for a country to do something similar.”216 
COP21 took place over two weeks, with many different events in support of 
the Fourth Pillar taking place over the first week. This included an Action Day at the 
beginning of the COP, which featured the most high-profile commitments and 
announcements of cooperative action, as well as focus events on specific thematic 
issues held throughout the first week of the COP and on day one of the second week. 
While this distributed approach to the action agenda appears in stark contrast to the 
one-day summit held by the Secretary-General, the LPAA drew on many of the 
organizational design elements identified as conditions of success in the 2014 Climate 
Summit, to similar effect. These included, as before, high visibility; strategic timing; 
using cooperative commitments as the price of admission; sectoral organization; 
subsidiarity; and leadership with centralized decision-making.  
3.3.5.1 High Visibility 
The French government decided from the outset that COP21 would be a 
leaders-level summit, similar to Copenhagen, but with a twist: rather than inviting 
leaders at the end of the conference, the French asked leaders to attend at the 
beginning. This was in response to a long-held criticism of UN conferences and COPs 
(particularly COP15 in Copenhagen), which traditionally see leaders attend at the 
end, which limits the positive influence they have on the proceedings of the 
conference. As Greenpeace had argued in the context of the Johannesburg summit, 
                                               





“inviting Heads of State and Government to speak first and negotiators to act in 
conformity with what their bosses said would make a lot of sense. After all, aren’t 
they our leaders?”217 This decision meant that the Action Day of the COP, when the 
most ambitious voluntary commitments would be featured, coincided with the 
presence of the national leaders, and could benefit from their participation, resulting 
in high visibility. Even without this coincidence of national leaders and the Action 
Day, the anticipation and media momentum around COP21 also meant that the 
assurance of high visibility was clear to all stakeholders. As high visibility and 
positive media coverage was a key prize for many of the stakeholders attending, 
ensuring that the agenda positif was toted during the first week was a strategic, win-
win manoeuvre by the French government, which was able to reap positive stories 
about the COP during the first negotiating week.  
In addition, similar to the 2014 Summit, the LPAA work was conducted with 
a long lead time—a full year of planning and engagement with the sectoral conveners 
to design the commitments and announcements to be made. The timing of the LPAA 
events therefore took good advantage of the motivation felt by many of the central 
actors in the network, particularly businesses and civil society: “in Paris, there was a 
clear milestone. Everybody was aligned to that and wanted to show their best face 
and positioning. Having important milestones generates voluntary initiatives.”218  
3.3.5.2 Emphasis on Cooperative Commitments 
Further, the French Presidency also prioritized commitments rather than the 
traditional speeches made by the “Major Groups” at COPs, and the LPAA team 
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worked together with sectoral conveners to identify and secure promising and 
credible pledges, with the working principle that speaking slots should only be 
offered in exchange for commitments. The invitation letters to speakers for the 
sectoral sessions thus referred to the LPAA as an effort that built on the 2014 Climate 
Summit, to “incentivize promising, innovative and collaborative climate action 
initiatives”219 This was made clear to all partners, from technical to political levels. 
For instance, in a briefing to member states just a month before COP21, the LPAA 
team emphasized that speakers were being “invited to present cooperative initiatives 
and their role/ motivation in participating.”220 At the political level, COP President 
Fabius and French President Hollande regularly raised the importance of the LPAA. 
The talking points for Minister Fabius for each of his meetings with ministers and 
leaders from various Parties always included particular notes on the Action Agenda 
and the LPAA and the Minister invariably requested his counterparts to engage on the 
LPAA and to bring commitments to COP21 to be featured at the Action Day. This 
personal level of involvement by the minister gave the LPAA significant profile 
among political leadership of Parties, contributing to, for example, the launches of 
several initiatives with the participation of heads of state and governments. This 
included Mission Innovation, an initiative led by the United States and for which 
much legwork had been conducted by the Philanthropist Bill Gates, and the 
International Solar Alliance, the first major international climate initiative led by 
India.  
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3.3.5.3 Sectoral Orientation 
The LPAA expanded on the list of sectors that the 2014 Summit had 
prioritized by adding buildings, business, innovation, and water, for a total of twelve 
sectors featured under the Action Agenda at COP21. The Action Day was designed to 
feature the best announcements from each sector, while additional announcements 
were made and discussions on future steps held at focus events for each sector over 
the course of one week. This sectoral approach was a departure from the official norm 
of engaging non-state actors via Major Groups at COPs, but a continuation of the 
approach developed for the 2014 Climate Summit, as well as somewhat a 
continuation of the culture that had developed in the ecosystem of side events at the 
COPs. For example, “Sector Days” such as Forests Day and Transport Day had 
become staples among COP side events, and due to limited space and time for side 
events, many of these central actors had gotten used to having to cooperate with each 
other to hold joint side events at the behest of the UNFCCC Secretariat.221 
Importantly, the split organization of the Action Day and focused sector days served 
the purpose of fostering competition between actors in a sector to be granted a 
speaking slot at the Action Day, while also enabling them to cooperate across 
constituency lines. Draft agendas of the Action Day indicate that the speaking slots 
were highly sought after by stakeholders, with much bargaining on the commitments 
that could be made.222  
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Critically, the LPAA attempted to maintain the principle of subsidiarity in the 
organization of the fourth pillar. For instance, similar to the 2014 Summit, the WEF 
partnered with the Government of France to engage in planning for the COP during 
the WEF's annual meeting in Davos, in January 2015.223 Indeed, from the WEF’s 
perspective, this was simply one long engagement with different parts of the 
intergovernmental system, in the run-up to COP21.224 Many of the same actors that 
had been central to the network up until then were asked to continue their roles in 
obtaining additional commitments within their sectors. This included, for example, 
UNDP, WEF, the governments of Norway, UK and Germany, and Climate Advisors, 
as the central conveners in the Forests sector, which had led the work for the launch 
of the New York Declaration on Forests in the run-up to the 2014 Climate Summit. 
The government of Peru took on the overall responsibility for the Forests sector under 
the LPAA, but depended on these actors for much of the legwork. Likewise, the 
secretariat to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition was asked to lead the work on 
obtaining commitments on Short Lived Climate Pollutants. This continuity—in big 
part a result of close collaboration and institutional memory-sharing between the team 
of the Secretary-General and the entire LPAA—meant that new commitments could 
build on existing networks of actors.  
Subsidiarity also applied to the LPAA organizers themselves. The LPAA 
quartet divided up sectoral responsibilities among themselves to shepherd the 
different sectors and help develop the coalitions that would be announced in Paris. In 
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addition, different members of the Quartet were called upon to respond to different 
political needs. For example, the government of Peru, as a developing country, 
enabled France to secure the support of G77 countries more easily. A senior staff 
member of the LPAA from the government of Peru noted, “The French needed a 
partnership with a developing country to make their legitimacy more robust. The 
relationship between France and Peru was probably the most honest and open you can 
imagine.”225 The office of the Secretary-General provided know-how on the 
organization of the sectors and the development of coalitions, as well as lending 
political legitimacy through the voice of the Secretary-General.  
3.3.5.5 Leadership with centralized decision-making 
Balancing this subsidiarity, and similar to the 2014 Summit, the LPAA 
quartet, led by France, maintained a firm hold on centralized decision making and 
leadership even while empowering the sectoral conveners. This was in part enabled 
by the existing degree of autonomy that COP Presidents enjoy. Unlike the sustainable 
development conferences under the General Assembly, the COPs of the climate 
convention in effect combine the roles of the Secretary-General of the conference and 
the host of the conference in the role of the Presidency, and minimize the role of the 
bureau to questions of process, resulting in a relative concentration of authority in the 
Presidency. In the negotiations, this is particularly evident towards the end of the 
COP as the President proposes negotiating texts in order to move past gridlock that 
often occurs. Indeed, the need to have an authoritative and diplomatically skilled 
President able to manage the complexities of the negotiations and bring about a 
                                               





solution is a necessity recognized by Parties, based on the culture of negotiations that 
had evolved over the previous two decades.226 The COP Presidency therefore enjoys 
some degree of autonomy, which had enabled the Peruvian COP Presidency to take 
the initiative to hold an Action Day in Lima, outside the remit of the negotiations, 
building on the goodwill arising from the 2014 Climate Summit just a few months 
prior. Nevertheless, while the Action Day in Lima had been organized without much 
comment by Parties, the large-scale effort that the Peru and France COP Presidents 
were planning for the LPAA meant that they felt more comfortable with obtaining 
some form of “blessing” from Parties to engage in the action agenda (that is, 
engineering a “reverse institutionalization” and expanding the autonomy they had). In 
contrast to the Type II partnerships, which were conceived as an official outcome of 
the Johannesburg summit and therefore attracted intense scrutiny by the membership, 
the LPAA was presented to Parties as an additional element of work that the French 
Presidency was undertaking to feature at the high-level event mandated by the 
Parties, but that did not impinge on the negotiations and therefore a stream of activity 
that Parties could choose to ignore if they so wished. Thus presented, Parties gave 
their “blessing” in the form of carefully-worded, inoffensive language in the Decision 
at COP20, which states that the COP “welcomes the Lima Climate Action High-level 
Meeting convened by the President of the Conference of the Parties on 11 December 
2014 and encourages the Executive Secretary and the President of the Conference of 
the Parties to convene an annual high level event on enhancing implementation of 
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climate action”.227 The LPAA therefore gained the acquiescence of the Parties 
without being beholden to the Parties in any of the particulars of the action agenda 
and while maintaining a firewall between the LPAA and the negotiations. In other 
words, the French presidency struck a delicate balance of “formal but informal”228 
and secured a political space in which it enjoyed autonomy from the Parties as well as 
centralized decision-making as President of the COP, to develop the work of the 
LPAA and launch initiatives at COP21. Also helpful was the fact that with the 
overwhelming attention of Parties on the negotiations and content of the agreement 
itself, there was little, if any, resistance to the fourth pillar and France's efforts to 
advance the action agenda at the same time.  
The combination of the timing, high level convening, emphasis on 
commitments, sectoral organization, subsidiarity and leadership with centralized 
decision-making meant that the LPAA and the fourth Pillar of COP21 succeeded in 
maintaining the high-pressure on a pipeline of initiatives. A senior advisor to the 
Minister Fabius recalled, “Businesses were very welcoming of this approach. They 
wanted to be in the big room with the leaders.”229 A former executive at WBCSD, 
which facilitated the launch of half a dozen initiatives at COP21 agreed with this 
effect: “The summits make us collaborate. Consider ‘We Mean Business’. The fact 
that we had fifteen companies cooperating, that would normally compete, is 
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significant. The UNFCCC Secretariat told us exactly what was needed in the run-up 
to Paris.”230 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter sought to understand the causal links, if any, between system-
wide IGO efforts to promote voluntary cooperation on climate change, and the 
growth of such cooperation between 2000 and 2015. As such, this chapter was 
designed to fill the empirical gap in the literature on whether and how (that is, under 
what conditions) IGOs have spurred the formation of new voluntary initiatives on 
climate change. It did so by identifying the relevant IGO efforts and the most 
influential actors in the network of initiatives during these years, and tracing their 
motivations, processes and actions to establish whether a causal mechanism can be 
said to exist. 
This chapter found that two streams of IGO activity, the 2014 Climate 
Summit and the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, have been causally determinant in the 
acceleration of the launch of initiatives in 2014 and 2015, and have lowered barriers 
to compel actors with existing motivations to make new commitments and form new 
initiatives. The presence of six attributes in the organization of the two activities were 
necessary for this: strategic timing, high visibility, sectoral orientation, emphasis on 
cooperative commitments, subsidiarity, and leadership with central decision making. 
The absence of one or more of these enabling factors in the other streams of activity 
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explains their inability to accelerate the growth of the network. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the state of each of the six organizational attributes in the various activity streams.  
When all six of these attributes are present, a pipeline for new commitments is 
in effect ‘turned on’. The high visibility and strategic timing capitalize on the existing 
motivations of actors, and promise a reputational reward. The emphasis on ambitious 
cooperative commitments serves to focus the efforts of the motivated actors and 
encourage them to cooperate with each other rather than making individual 
commitments, which are easier, and also injects a competitive dynamic among actors 
to raise their ambition levels. The sectoral orientation encourages multi-stakeholder 
engagement over within-constituency cooperation, in effect corralling actors together 
rather than apart. Critically, subsidiarity ensures that the actors best able to convene 
and galvanize stakeholders at the sectoral level are empowered to do so, while 
leadership with central decision-making by the organizer maintains the control and 
agility to choreograph the organization and actors to maximum effect. Thus, while 
known drivers of cooperation remain necessary, these findings show that they alone 
do not account for the surge in growth seen in 2014 and 2015.   
This analysis further found that each of the organizational attributes depend 
on the IGO in question having two characteristics: high convening power and 
autonomy. High convening power means the IGO should be able to convene at 
leaders’ level, and across sectors. Thus, for example, the UN General Assembly has 
higher convening power than the UNFCCC, which convenes ministries of 
environment and foreign affairs, but largely not sectoral line ministries. Autonomy 





General Assembly and the UNFCCC have low autonomy. Surprisingly, the UN 
Secretary-General was found to have high autonomy on climate change, and is in fact 
the only UN office to have both, the convening power and the autonomy to ensure the 
six organizational attributes needed to catalyze high growth in voluntary cooperation. 
This chapter has shown that this autonomy of the Secretary-General was 
incrementally developed by the UN secretaries-general over the 2000s, in effect 
expanding the range of their “good offices” from the issue of peace and security to 
sustainable development and climate change in particular, and the breadth of their 
good offices on climate change from member states to member states and non-state 
actors. 
This chapter’s findings also have several implications for the subsequent case 
studies. Three of the six organizational attributes necessary for the acceleration in the 
growth of voluntary cooperation relate directly to the research design of the case 
studies of this dissertation. The importance of sectoral orientation underlines the 
relevance of the sector-wide analysis that is one of the aims of the case studies. In 
addition, the combined requirements of subsidiarity and leadership with central 
decision-making imply that the interaction between central actors in the network (the 
‘subsidiary’) and external IGOs (the ‘leader’ with central decision-making) is 
extremely important for the success of growth in voluntary cooperation, which 
underlines the importance of multilevel analysis that is also one of the aims of the 
case studies. The following chapters will therefore serve as illuminating cases or tests 
for these findings, in three diverse contexts of forests, short-lived climate pollutants 






This chapter considers the cooperative initiatives that address greenhouse gas 
emissions arising from the forests sector, and the roles of IGOs therein. In doing so, 
this chapter seeks to fill two gaps in knowledge on how IGOs may have contributed 
to the growth of the network of cooperative initiatives on forests. First, an exploratory 
sector-wide analysis examines whether, by participating in initiatives, IGOs had any 
significant influence on the growth of cooperation at the sectoral level. By 
participating in initiatives, how much of the network of voluntary cooperation are 
IGOs influencing? What influence have IGOs had on the variety of actors seeking to 
cooperate on this issue? How has this influence been significant for the growth 
trajectory of the network over time? Second, this chapter conducts a multi-level 
analysis of IGOs engaged in one initiative, the New York Declaration on Forests 
(NYDF), to understand the interactive effects of different IGOs working at the 
system-wide and initiative-levels, on the formation and quality of the initiative. This 
multilevel analysis serves to test the findings of chapter three. 
The forest sector is highly pertinent for this study, given its importance to the 
climate problem, as well as its governance structure and challenges. Being carbon 
sinks as well as sources of direct emissions through land degradation and 
deforestation (for commodities such as palm oil, soy, cocoa, coffee, timber, and pulp 
and paper), the potential of forests to limit global GHG emissions is extremely high. 





emissions by up to 4.2 GtCO2e/y by 2030,231 or about 12% of total emissions. A 
given forest also falls under many different jurisdictions, such as national 
government, subnational government, forest-dwelling and indigenous peoples, and 
private ownership, among others, which means the functional need for cooperation is 
high. Precisely because of their economic value and competing interests over them, 
forests have long been an under-served and contested issue area in the 
intergovernmental arena. Following the failure of governments to reach a legally 
binding treaty on forests in 1992, and given increasing awareness and demands for 
accountability by consumers of forests commodities, the governance of forests has 
been characterized by significant informal arrangements with high dominance of non-
state actors in addition to a mix of non-legally binding intergovernmental agreements 
and measures.232 The network of cooperative initiatives on forests therefore forms a 
large part of the global forest governance architecture.233  
This chapter is organized in four sections. The first section uses the network 
dataset to understand the influence of IGOs in the network at the sector level. Using 
techniques of visualization, community detection and centrality measurement, this 
section places IGOs in the context of the evolution of the network on forests, and 
assesses their influence in its growth, in particular comparing their influence to other 
actors in the network to identify the value-added of IGOs, if any, in the growth of the 
network. The second section turns to the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) 
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and presents an assessment of the quality of this initiative within the categories of 
“actor” and “process” and their respective sub-categories, as identified in chapter one. 
This forms the ‘set-up’ for the third section, which examines the interactive effects of 
the system-wide efforts by the UN Secretary-General and the initiative-level efforts 
by UNDP on the formation and quality of the NYDF. This multilevel analysis forms a 
test case for the findings from chapter three (that is, the six organizational attributes 
needed for IGOs to spur the growth of cooperation and their two enabling conditions). 
Some insights from this section also complement the sector-wide analysis conducted 
with the network dataset. The final section concludes, presenting the key findings of 
this chapter.  
4.1 IGOs and the Network of Cooperative Initiatives on Forests 
This section relies on network analysis to understand salient characteristics of 
the evolution of voluntary cooperative initiatives on climate change and the influence 
of IGOs in this evolution. Three techniques are used. Visualizations of the network in 
five-year increments illustrate its growth over time, including the diversity of actors 
and their linkages to each other. The application of a community detection algorithm 
for the network in 2015 shows the presence of sub-communities in the network—that 
is, actors that are linked much more densely to each other than to others in the 
network. Centrality measures of out-degree, betweenness and eigenvector are used to 
then probe the influence of different types of actors in the network over time. Out-
degree centrality provides a measure of how prolific an entity is. The higher the score, 
the more initiatives of which it is a member. Betweenness centrality measures the 





higher this score, the more an entity is depended upon by others to connect them to 
other parts of the network and/or to share information. Eigenvector centrality 
measures how many sought-after entities a given entity is connected to. In other 
words, it’s a measure of prestige. The higher this score, the more an entity sought-
after or connected to others who are also highly-sought after. 
4.1.1 The Evolution of a Fragmented Network 
The network of cooperative initiatives on forests, as a subset of this study’s 
network dataset, consists of 35 initiatives, which vary significantly in terms of size 
and type of actors as members (annex 3 provides a list of the initiatives in the forests 
network, their acronyms and date of launch). Most initiatives have fewer than a 
hundred members, and there is no correlation between the year of the initiative’s 
launch and the number of members. In other words, new initiatives have not 
necessarily attracted more members than previous initiatives. As figure 4.2 A-D 
illustrates, the network began with isolated initiatives involving businesses, civil 
society actors, philanthropic organizations and some governments before 2000, but 
the initiatives became interconnected over time as new initiatives resulted in co-
membership of actors. The network has seen most significant growth in numbers of 
initiatives as well as members since the mid 2000s. While the interconnectedness of 
the network has grown over time, there are clear pockets of higher and lower 
connectivity.  
As well, many initiatives appear to have low diversity of entity types as 
members, and are dominated by one or two particular entity types. In particular, the 





and national governments, respectively, which may reflect a level of fragmentation 
and insularity in the development of various parts of the forests network of 
cooperative initiatives and possibly the wider governance architecture on forests. By 
contrast, a few initiatives including Climate-KIC, Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 
(TFA2020), Initiative 20x20 (I 20x20) and the New York Declaration on Forests 
(NYDF) have a more multi-stakeholder constitution.  
The apparent fragmentation of the network of initiatives by entity type is 
given credence by figure 4.2E, which shows the communities detected in the network, 
which are defined as groups of nodes, or entities, that have more dense connections 
among each other (i.e. among nodes within the community) than with nodes outside 
the community. Several of the communities detected in the forests network occur 
with high dominance of particular types of actors. In other words, constituency-based 
initiatives are clustered together to form communities. This is especially evident in 
communities with business and private finance actors (see communities 3 and 4 in 
figure 4.2E); and subnational authorities such as cities and states (see community 1 in 
figure 4.2E). Notably, most of the national governments in the network are found 
within one community in the network, albeit not always within one initiative (see 
community 2 in figure 4.2E).  
What does this visualization and clustering of communities tell us about how 
IGOs have engaged in the network on forests, and their relative influence? IGOs are 
not among the members of the earliest initiatives formed, which suggests that at the 
initiative level, did not play an influential or driving role in the formation of the 





influential system-wide efforts by IGOs in the 1990s, such as under the Rio Summit 
in 1992, however that is beyond the scope of this study). By mid 2005, a figure 4.2B 
illustrates, IGOs had begun to participate in the network, primarily engaging with 
national governments—an unsurprising finding, given the principal-agent 
relationship.  As the network grew in the 2000s, many more IGOs began to 
participate in new initiatives, however, there is a remarkable lack of engagement in 
those communities that are dominated by subnational authorities and businesses. This 
suggests that during the growth of the network, IGOs did not particularly position 
themselves to connect different constituencies within the network. By 2015, IGOs are 
mainly found in the most densely connected parts of the network, rather than the 
peripheries, which indicates a high level of centrality of IGOs to the network. One 
significant exception is the UN Global Compact, which forms a community on its 
own at the edge of the network with the Caring for (C4C) Climate initiative—an 







Figure 4.1 Growth of the network of cooperative initiatives on forests from 2000 to 2015. The 
network has grown more interconnected over time (Figure 4.1A-D), but is characterized by 
fragmentation—distinct communities dominated by specific entity types (Figure 4.1E) 
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An alternative visualization of the growth of the network is presented in figure 
4.2, which categorizes entities by the roles played in the initiatives—those of 
participant, secretariat and funder. In the forests network, the majority of entities have 
taken on general participant roles, followed by funders, and the secretariat role has 
been taken on by very few entities. In this network, businesses have dominated the 
role of participants, while national governments, NGOs, research institutions, 
financial institutions and cities make up the bulk of the remaining participants. 
Although a small percentage of participants are made up of intergovernmental 
organizations (both, financial and otherwise), they comprise an outsize ratio of 
entities taking up secretariat roles and, to a lesser extent, funding roles, in the network 
of cooperative initiatives on forests. Consistently taking up about twenty percent of 
secretariat roles in the network, IGOs are second to cooperative initiatives themselves 
in this role, closely followed by NGOs and then transnational organizations and 
research institutions. In terms of funding, while the current data suggests that 
philanthropic foundations provided all the funding before 2001 and that IGOs 
dominated the funding role in 2001, the limited funding data available prior to 2002 
means this should be treated with caution. Instead, the information presented 2002 
onwards is more appropriate for surmising divisions of labour in funding. National 
governments have clearly taken a lead role as funders in this arena, comprising 30 to 
35 percent of all funders over the years. Coming second to national governments in 
this role, IGOs have comprised around fifteen to twenty percent of funders to 
cooperative initiatives on forests. Notably, philanthropic foundations, NGOs and 






Figure 4.2 Distribution of entity types by their function in the network on forests over time. The 
count distribution of entity types, left, according to the roles they play in initiatives shows no particular 
dominance of intergovernmental organizations. The percentage distribution of the same data, right, 
shows that intergovernmental organizations take up a large ratio of the secretariat roles and also 
significant funding roles. Source: This study’s dataset. 
4.1.2 IGOs: Among the Most “Important” Entities in the Network Over Time 
As figure 4.3 shows, sixty-three distinct actors have been highly central in the 
network at various points in its evolution, according to the three different measures of 
centrality. The high diversity of actors in this group is in keeping with the 
constituency- or entity type-based fragmented view of the network presented in figure 
4.1, whereby communities of actors dominated by particular entity types have 
formed. The centrality measures provide some important insights into the influence 
wielded by different groups of actors over time, as follows.  
Governments, both developed and developing, are among the most prolific 















































































wield significant influence in the governance decisions of a large portion of the 
network. These governments include the United States, Norway and Germany among 
developed countries, and Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico and Nigeria 
among developing countries. A few governments have also become important 
‘connectors’ in the network, given their high betweenness centrality scores, which 
indicates their ability and likely propensity to connect disparate parts of the 
fragmented network. Germany alone scores highly on all three measures—the 
eigenvector score indicating it is engaged the most discerningly in partnerships while 
also engaging prolifically. Further, as a funder as well as secretariat, it wields 
uncommon influence in decision-making in the network. Given its long presence as 
central in the network, it has likely shaped the membership and topology of the 
network (that is, its community formation). 
Businesses dominate the high scores in eigenvector centrality, and most as 
participants only (except Ikea and AkzoNobel, who have also been funders). This, 
combined with the large number of businesses in this group, and given that most of 
them are consumer goods companies, indicates that businesses, more than any other 
entity in the network, have prioritized engaging in the network with each other. This 
is suggestive of risk-averse behavior and supports existing knowledge that businesses 
choose to commit together with their competitors in order to avoid losing their 
competitiveness in the market. Yet, some businesses also show high betweenness 
centrality, notably EDF Renewables, General Mills, Nestlé, EON SE, Veolia, Engie, 
Suez, Danone, EcoAct, Mars, Unilever and Ikea (again, mainly as participants, except 





(since they don’t have high degree centrality) but high betweenness nonetheless, and 
high preference for co-participating with other companies, these businesses are likely 
to have been the leaders among their peers, playing some convening or recruiting 
roles with the other companies in the network and engaging with other entity types in 
pioneering or pilot schemes. 
Civil society and/or research institutions are a minority in this group of 
influential actors, with the World Wildlife Fund alone showing high centrality in all 
three measure. Notably, it does so in the early years of the network, which indicates a 
highly influential role in the formation of the network. Its appearance in the top 
eigenvector centrality scores along with the businesses indicates it has been 
prioritized as a partner of choice by these businesses, and has therefore likely 
influenced the formation of the business community within the network. 
Cooperative initiatives themselves score highly in centrality measures in this 
network. Unsurprisingly, as there are relatively few initiatives that participate in other 
initiatives, this entity type does not feature in the high scores of out-degree centrality. 
That is, they are not known as prolific participants of initiatives. In addition, their 
high scores on betweenness centrality as secretariats simply reflects the large sizes of 
their membership, and the fact that a given initiative connects its members to each 
other, which does not provide much insight. However, their high scores on 
betweenness and eigenvector centralities as funders and participants is surprising and 
highly revealing of the nature of the network: If initiatives are funding and 
participating in other initiatives and over time, then there is an evolutionary logic to 





participate in other initiatives) is driven by a desire to fulfil their own goals, then new 
initiatives can be seen as a purposeful attempt to build on existing initiatives, perhaps 
overcome their limitations and improve the strength of cooperation in the sector over 
time. The locus of activity may therefore be shifting among initiatives over time. It 
may then become reasonable to view the task of assessing the quality of cooperation 
at the sectoral level, rather than just at the initiative level.  
Intergovernmental organizations, by their inclusion in this group of highly 
central actors, have evidently been important to the growth trajectory of the network 
of cooperation on forests and have not been simply engaged in the peripheries. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the UNFCCC, UNEP and the World Bank are all among this group. As the 
most prolific IGOs, FAO, UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank have acted as funders 
and participants as well as secretariats, which indicates they have played highly 
influential roles in decision-making around the allocation of funds and governance of 
cooperative initiatives on forests since the mid-2000s. Their high betweenness 
centrality as well is indicative of these agencies having played at least a strong 
information-sharing, if not convening and bridge-building role among the 
communities in the network. Finally, the high eigenvector scores of UNEP and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat during the same years that a large number of businesses have 
high eigenvector scores is highly indicative that these IGOs were prioritized as the 
partner of choice by these businesses (and vice versa). In keeping with knowledge on 
the legitimacy that IGOs lend to actors engaged in partnerships, it is understandable 





their relationships with reputable IGOs. This then positions these IGOs with very 
high influence on the engagement of businesses in the network. With their high 
betweenness centrality, they have been shapers in the community formation of the 
network over time as well, by acting as good connectors.  
This analysis therefore makes clear that a core group of IGOs wields and has 
wielded significant influence over the growth of the network of voluntary cooperation 
in the forests sector. This does not indicate that all IGOs have this influence. To the 
contrary, out of the forty-one IGOs that are part of the network of cooperative 
initiatives on forests, only six score in the 95th percentile of any of the centrality 
scores. This does not indicate that the other thirty-five IGOs are not influential at all, 
but points to much more localized effects of their engagement. If IGOs are to be 
deployed as accelerators of the growth of voluntary cooperation on forests, then the 






Figure 4.3 Entities with the top 5% of centrality measures in the forest network from 2000 to 2015. 
63 actors have been highly central in the growth of the network, but only five show high centrality scores 
across the three measures, including UNEP and the World Bank. Source: This study’s dataset. 
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4.2 The New York Declaration on Forests: One Tree, Many Roots 
This section considers the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF), which 
was launched at the 2014 Climate Summit hosted by the UN Secretary-General. 
Following its launch, the NYDF was heavily featured in the media and among 
governments and civil society. A self-described “non-legally binding political 
declaration that grew out of dialogue among governments, companies and civil 
society, spurred by the Secretary-General's Climate Summit”,234 the NYDF, among 
the initiatives launched in 2014, was on the one hand regarded as a partnership with 
perhaps the highest potential to bend the emissions trajectory, if fully implemented.235 
On the other hand, critics doubted its ability to deliver, decrying it “a smokescreen for 
Norway’s oil industry”.236 
Taking the high ambition of the NYDF as a given, this section assesses the 
overall quality of the NYDF, using the categories of “actor” and “process” as 
highlighted in the literature. This section provides a basis for the multilevel analysis 
that is performed in the next section.  
4.2.1 A Highly Multi-Stakeholder Initiative with Strong Leadership 
In terms of partner mix, the initiative counted thirty-six national governments, 
twenty subnational governments, fifty companies, and sixty-eight non-governmental 
organizations including sixteen indigenous peoples’ organizations among its members 
at the time of its launch in 2014.  At the time of writing in 2020, the initiative's 
membership had grown to forty-one national governments, twenty-one subnational 
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governments, sixty-one companies, and eighty-eight non-governmental organizations 
including twenty-two indigenous peoples’ organizations. The diversity of actors 
combined with their number sets the NYDF apart from most other initiatives in the 
forests network prior to 2014. Few initiatives in the forest network combine a high 
number of partners with high diversity, particularly with national governments, 
subnational authorities, businesses and civil society organizations together. 
In addition, the actors in the NYDF include those that are highly relevant and 
influential to the forest governance equation, such as forest-rich nations, donor 
countries that are committed to the forests agenda (as evidenced, for example, by the 
list of funders with high centrality in the network of cooperative initiatives per figure 
4.3), companies that deal with forest-based commodities and have large market 
shares; indigenous peoples across the world who have stakes in their forests; and 
subnational governments under whose jurisdictions forests lie. Yet, this is not quite an 
optimal mix of partners. Key countries, such as Brazil and the United States (both 
highly important as forest-rich nations and funders of cooperative initiatives on 
forests themselves), were not part of the NYDF at its launch. Although the United 
States has joined since then, Brazil has not. In addition, the NYDF has very little 
participation by private finance actors—a problem for an initiative that needs to 
leverage or steer significant amounts of funding for successful implementation. 
Not only are the partners influential to the forests governance agenda, but 
among them were those already highly influential in the network of cooperative 
initiatives on forests before the launch of the NYDF. Indeed, 17 of the founding 





years preceding the launch of the NYDF (per figure 4.3). The NYDF thus builds upon 
the ecosystem of actors that were already leading in informal forests governance and 
had been influencing the development of the network of cooperative initiatives on 
forests. As a senior official of the Government of Norway put it, “The whole agenda 
had been building up over many years. We had the Tropical Forest Alliance. 
Countries like Norway, Germany and the UK had been really committed donors. 
There was company leadership by Unilever and others like Wilmar. There was a long 
history by then of pushing the issue of indigenous rights. And of course, the various 
pay-for-performance partnerships.”237  
If the majority of actors in NYDF were already active in the network of 
initiatives, what added value does the NYDF provide? Interviews with actors engaged 
in forests governance reveal that, in fact, the mix of partners represents a major and 
much-needed development of breaking the siloes of within-constituency initiatives 
that had formed in the network. While many of these actors had been active and 
influential in the network, they had not worked together in a cooperative initiative. 
The NYDF therefore represents a thickening of the network of cooperative initiatives 
of forests. This responds to a growing belief among actors in forest governance since 
the late 2000s that in order to fulfil commitments within their respective 
constituencies (for example, among governments or companies or indigenous peoples' 
organizations), they would need to rely on action by other constituencies. This had 
become clear to companies in the Consumer Goods Forum in particular. In 2010, 
                                               






these companies had made promises to achieve zero-net deforestation by 2020 in the 
five commodity sectors that contribute to 40% of deforestation: soy, palm oil, pulp 
and paper, beef and timber. Focusing on their own supply chains and relying on the 
theory that the use of certification schemes would enable these commitments to come 
to fruition, these companies had not recognized the importance of other levers of 
influence, anchored at jurisdictional levels, such as governments and indigenous 
peoples. These constituencies proved necessary to address problems such as leakage, 
whereby the locus of deforestation shifts to other areas when specific areas are 
brought under certification schemes or regulatory measures. This had stilted their 
ability to progress in a measurable and impactful way. The current website of the 
Consumer Goods Forum traces this evolution in their theory of change: “Ten years 
ago, our strategy was rooted in remediating our individual company supply chains, 
often through certification… we have learned that certification plays a critical role, 
but it is not the only answer… we should have moved faster in broadening our work 
beyond narrow supply chain interventions. We are doing so now...”238 Other actors 
such as governments and civil society organizations were also reaching the same 
realization and beginning to emphasize “jurisdictional approaches” in forests 
governance. It was therefore necessary, by design, that the NYDF comprises those 
actors that were influential in the network of cooperative initiative, within their own 
constituency-based initiatives, prior to the formation of the NYDF. 
Notably, the NYDF was preceded by the formation of one major global multi-
stakeholder coalition. In 2012, at the Rio+20 conference, the United States 
                                               





government partnered with the World Economic Forum and the Consumer Goods 
Forum to form the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020, which aimed to bring different 
stakeholders together and support the companies of the Consumer Goods Forum in 
reaching the target of net zero deforestation in tropical forests by 2020. However, the 
NYDF significantly exceeds the Tropical Forests Alliance 2020 in its range of 
partners, particularly with regard to civil society organizations and subnational and 
national governments, as well as in its ambition. 
The leadership of the NYDF during its formation stage was both a centralized 
and a shared arrangement, to strong effect. The roles of broker and convener among 
different constituencies were played by UNDP, the WEF, Unilever, Climate 
Advisors, and the governments of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom 
according to their respective comparative advantages. 
For example, the governments of Germany, Norway and the UK—already 
close collaborators in the funding of forest governance—led the process of obtaining 
buy-in from forest nations. The Mission of the United Kingdom to the United 
Nations, for instance, undertook the task of sharing draft versions of the declaration 
with other missions to obtain their approval. Norway engaged with developing 
countries that it was already funding on REDD+, to form an initial group of countries 
that were ready to sign up to the partnership, and that would then be relied upon to 
convince others to join. Among businesses, Unilever undertook the task of 
onboarding consumer goods companies, given its existing leadership on the issue 
through the Consumer Goods Forum. At the same time, among businesses, there was 





of the founding companies of NYDF shared, “This is a competitive environment. If 
Nestlé doesn't want to sign up to the Mars initiative, then the only way to get critical 
mass is for the convener to not be one of the companies.”239 Thus, although Unilever 
played an important rallying role among businesses, the WEF acted as a neutral 
convening platform to attract the range of businesses and build trust, in keeping with 
the role that it had played in previous years to facilitate cooperative initiatives, such 
as the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020. The WEF and Unilever therefore took on the 
task of onboarding businesses, as did some NGOs that been active in this sector. 
UNDP led the engagement with civil society and indigenous peoples’ organizations. 
This distributed leadership arrangement was a direct contributor to the diversity of 
partners in the NYDF.  
In addition to this distributed brokering and convening system, UNDP 
maintained a central role as the authority responsible for convening the different types 
of actors together, in an exercise of trust-building. This proved important for ensuring 
the multi-stakeholder nature of the partnership, as will be elaborated in the following 
section. As one UNDP staffer put it, “ours was a task of trusted coordination. This is 
what we do best--putting aside corporate agendas and being trusted to being 
committed to the common agenda. Anybody orchestrating such an effort needs to 
have that trust. If you can get the issue of trust off the table, then real collaboration 
can happen.”240 
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Interestingly, while these actors played convening and brokering roles in the 
formation of the NYDF, not all of them appear as highly central in the network of 
forest initiatives before 2014, and some of them are surpassed by other actors that 
may have been better positioned to convene, according to the network data. In some 
cases, this is explained because the high centrality scores in figure 4.3 arbitrarily use 
the 95th percentile as the cut-off mark. The United Kingdom has betweenness and 
degree centrality scores as a funder in the 90th percentile throughout the late 2000s 
and up to 2015. As well, as discussed in chapter three, the WEF officially participates 
in few cooperative initiatives, hence does not feature in the network dataset as an 
influential actor despite being so (as chapter three showed, the neutral convening role 
of the WEF among businesses was well appreciated and necessary). In the case of 
UNDP, however, while this agency does appear in the top 90th percentile of the 
degree centrality scores, it is superseded by UNEP and FAO in the network of 
initiatives on forests. The choice of UNDP as opposed to, for example, UNEP to play 
the central convening role in the NYDF had both positive and negative effects on the 
quality of the initiative, as discussed in the next section.  
The reliance on influential actors in the network to play a leadership role in 
the formation of the initiative supports the findings in chapter three for the need for 
subsidiarity (that is, the empowerment of capable actors in the network) if the system-
wide efforts of IGOs to promote the growth of voluntary cooperation are to be 
successful (in this case, the IGO making system-wide efforts was the UN Secretary-





4.2.2 Stringent and Ambitious Goal-Setting 
The NYDF places high emphasis on goal-setting, with ten clear goals that are 
specific, measurable and ambitious. For goal one, which can be considered the 
primary, overarching goal, the partnership aims to “cut natural forest loss in half by 
2020, and strive to end it by 2030”.241 In addition, the partnership has articulated 
disaggregated goals that can be considered supportive of goal one. Their typology has 
been defined as consisting of: quantitative or qualitative output goals, which together 
contribute to the overarching goal; support goals that can be considered as inputs to 
achieving the outputs; policy goals that aim to ensure that forests are adequately 
addressed in international agreements; and reward goals that aim to ensure 
jurisdictions get payment for achievements in reducing deforestation and land 
degradation.242  
Notably, the primary goal (that is, goal one) of the NYDF was not 
conceptually new, but based on existing research and recommendations that defined 
high ambition in the sector. It was called for, almost verbatim, in a review 
commissioned by the UK Prime Minister in 2008: “This Review believes that an 
ambitious international climate change deal should aim to halve deforestation 
emissions by 2020 and make the forest sector carbon neutral by 2030--with emissions 
from forest loss balanced by new forest growth.”243 Several of the subsidiary output 
goals are based on existing constituency-based goals that had been articulated in this 
network in prior years. For example, as noted earlier, the Consumer Goods Forum 
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had made a commitment to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains of 
commodities including soy, beef, palm oil and paper by 2020.244 The NYDF goal two 
draws explicit attention to this existing goal and aims to achieve it.245 Likewise, the 
Bonn Challenge of 2011 seeks to “bring 150 million hectares of the world’s 
deforested and degraded land into restoration by 2020, and 350 million hectares by 
2030”.246 This goal is integrated into goal three of the NYDF.247 In addition, however, 
the other secondary goals that aim to draw in greater finance, political support and 
governance improvements that would enable the quantitative targets to cohere and be 
achievable, are not explicit goals of existing initiatives. The overall ambition level of 
the NYDF is therefore made possible by amalgamating existing, disparate targets that 
were not achievable by the constituencies on their own, as well as additional 
measures and targets to improve the political and financial enabling environment to 
realize the ambition. This supports the finding in section 4.1, that initiatives build on 
each other and follow an evolutionary logic.  
4.2.3 Variable Process Management 
The professionalism of the process management of the NYDF has varied 
significantly over the years. During the formation stage there was a high degree of 
professionalism, with Climate Advisers and the Meridien Institute hired and tasked 
with doing the daily work of consulting with all stakeholders to draft and fine-tune 
the language in the declaration. The professionals in this drafting team included a 
                                               
244 Consumer Goods Forum, ‘Forest Positive Coalition’. 
245 NYDF, ‘New York Declaration on Forests - Declaration and Action Agenda’. 
246 Government of Germany and IUCN, ‘The Bonn Challenge’. 





former treaty negotiator with the experience, knowledge and ability to understand the 
varied interests and concerns of the range of actors engaged in the process, and craft 
the document at a sophisticated enough level to obtain consensus.248 The close 
coordination among the core conveners, the engagement of Climate Advisers and the 
Meridien Institute, and the personal leadership of the UNDP Administrator meant that 
there was a de-facto secretariat operating before the launch of the NYDF. However, 
after the launch of the initiative, this changed significantly, with UNDP taking a 
hands-off approach, and maintaining only an informal secretariat arrangement with a 
passive role for “managing new endorsements of the NYDF and convening the broad 
multi-stakeholder coalition of forest actors that are working towards achieving the 
NYDF goals.”249 It was only in 2017 that an official secretariat was created for the 
NYDF, hosted at UNDP, with the active responsibility to “fill an important gap in the 
multi-stakeholder engagement and collaboration necessary to achieve the goals of the 
NYDF.”250  
The variable process management is directly related to the funding for the 
partnership, which has been provided primarily by three governments, namely the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Norway. The government of Norway, in particular, 
provided funding for the technical work of drafting the declaration and obtaining 
agreement among partners on its content. A Norwegian government official reasoned, 
“Without financing it's not going to go far. If you were going to trace the moment, the 
most important tactical one was when we decided to put a lot of money into staffing 
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the process. Plus, the staffing by UNDP—they didn't get money from us, but the time 
spent on it by them mustn't be underestimated.”251 The government of Germany funds 
the secretariat for the NYDF, hosted within UNDP, but notably, the secretariat was 
unfunded in 2015 and 2016. 
The monitoring and evaluation of the NYDF is the responsibility of a group 
of fifteen assessment partners, which are independent from the partners of the NYDF, 
and include respected research institutions, NGOs and think tanks in the forest 
sector.252 The assessment partners have produced an assessment framework for the 
initiative and also produced annual reports focusing on particular goals on the 
initiative in addition to a five-year comprehensive assessment produce annual reports 
of the initiative, focusing on progress made on all goals since 2014 to 2019. All 
reports are available freely online. Notably, the assessment partners are funded by the 
government of Germany, the Climate and Land Use Alliance (a cooperative initiative 
in itself), and the Good Energies Foundation, and this arrangement was developed 
independently of the formation process of the NYDF.  
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4.3 The Interactive Influence of IGOs in Driving the Formation and 
Quality of the NYDF 
Two intergovernmental organizations—UNDP and the Executive Office of 
the Secretary-General (EOSG)—were engaged in the formation of the NYDF. The 
efforts of the EOSG have been conducted mainly at the system-wide level, while 
those of UNDP have been at the sectoral and initiative levels. This section considers 
their combined efforts and their effects on the formation and quality of the NYDF as 
described in the previous section. In other words, given the findings of chapter three, 
this section considers the relationship between subsidiary (UNDP) and central 
decision-maker (EOSG) in detail, to understand the mechanism at work. In doing so, 
this section also tests the veracity and relevance of the four remaining organizational 
attributes highlighted in chapter three for the success of system-wide IGO efforts 
(strategic timing, high visibility, emphasis on cooperative commitments and sectoral 
orientation).  
This section finds that the interactive, combined efforts of EOSG and UNDP 
were essential for the formation and quality of the NYDF, while their individual and 
combined lack of efforts or failures have also limited the quality of the initiative over 
the years. This evidence provides strong support for the findings of chapter three.  
4.3.1 Efficiently Breaking Down the Silos 
The distributed yet centrally controlled system of leadership for the formation 
of the NYDF was a deliberate decision made by the EOSG and UNDP as part of the 
organization of the 2014 Climate Summit. The ability of the Secretary-General to 





central decision-making was the result of the autonomy enjoyed by the Secretary-
General in this regard. A Government of Norway representative noted the value of 
this decision: “Both, [the UNDP Administrator] and the Secretary-General's office 
gave the coalition itself space to do the work. But we should not underestimate the 
importance of getting clarity and a mandate from the UN system.”253 At the same 
time, the central role played by UNDP was the result of a decision by the EOSG to 
ask UNDP and in particular UNDP’s Administrator, Helen Clark, to steer the process 
of developing initiatives and commitments on forests in time for the summit.  
This leadership arrangement, combined with the high-level convening of the 
summit, its sectoral organization and emphasis on commitments created a strong 
incentive structure for companies, governments and civil society actors that were 
already motivated and engaged in the network, to make an ambitious, joint 
commitment. The Norwegian official further observes, “The moment we realized 
there was going to be a climate summit, actors decided to have conversations on how 
we could leverage that moment.”254 The system-wide, high-level convening meant 
that a space was created with the greatest possible visibility and potential for 
recognition, thereby creating competition within constituencies to secure speaking 
slots and be seen as leaders. The high credibility of being in the summit was 
especially attractive for companies, which were guarded in the initiatives in which 
they would participate and the actors with which they would partner. As a senior 
executive of one of the founding companies of the NYDF remarked, “The driver was 
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that there is going to be a summit. Our competitors might do something. We want to 
get there first and stay in front. It's pure corporate ego.”255 This incentive to be part of 
the summit was channeled into one to make voluntary commitments, by the strong 
emphasis on commitments as the price for entry in the summit. This emphasis was 
determined by the Secretary-General by using his autonomy in hosting this summit 
without a GA mandate. Further, by organizing the summit in sectoral action tracks to 
feature high ambition by all types of stakeholders in a given greenhouse gas-emitting 
sector, the silos that traditionally prevailed among actor types in the network (e.g. 
cities, businesses) were deliberately broken. This provided pressure among the actors 
to work together rather than separately to get visibility in the summit—a development 
that representatives of governments, UNDP, businesses and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations agreed was positive and essential for the forests sector, given the 
existing constituency-based communities (figure 4.3). As one senior UNDP official 
observed, “The key feature of the [NYDF] was… it started to make connections 
between systems that don't normally talk to each other.”256  
To be clear, the pressure to create a multi-stakeholder initiative was not 
antithetical to existing incentives. To the contrary, as noted in the previous section, 
the rationale for a multi-stakeholder initiative on forests had been building for some 
time especially among companies and governments. The Tropical Forest Alliance 
2020 launched by the United States and the WEF in 2012 was a step in this direction, 
but it had limited buy-in from subnational authorities and indigenous peoples, and it 
                                               
255 Interviewee 25 (senior executive of a Fortune Global 500 company), in discussion with author, 10 
May 2019. 





didn’t have ambitious goals. There was a need for a neutral convener with sufficient 
authority and ability to generate trust among all countries, civil society and 
companies alike, for a large-scale multi-stakeholder effort to form. This is what the 
convening and organization of the summit provided—a strong push and pull in the 
right direction. Indeed, this was a strategy deliberately co-designed by the 
stakeholders with the recognition that the convening power of the Secretary-General 
and UNDP allowed the stakeholders to overcome prevailing obstacles to making an 
ambitious, multi-stakeholder commitment. In 2013, when the office of the Secretary-
General began discussions with partners on the planning and organization of the 
summit, they had not yet considered having a separate session on forests, and the 
preliminary thinking was to have a joint session on land use, which would combine 
forests and agriculture. The suggestion was put forward by the WEF, Unilever and 
Climate Advisors to have a dedicated session on forests, which would enable a 
leapfrogging movement in this sector. This was agreed upon by the office of the 
Secretary-General. As one of these core instigators explained the rationale, “Sure, 
there could have been a Unilever Declaration on Forests, but it wouldn't have had all 
the actors needed.”257 
 The convening level, commitment-focus and sectoral orientation of the 
summit provided a major incentive for the stakeholders to make a multi-stakeholder 
commitment, but as described in the previous section, the legwork of engaging with 
potential partners and convincing them to join the initiative was done under a 
                                               






combined centralized-distributed leadership model. UNDP played two key roles at 
the initiative level in this, as follows.  
First, UNDP was the entity responsible for engaging indigenous peoples’ 
organizations and obtaining their buy-in for the initiative. Playing the role of a neutral 
arbiter in the forests sector vis-à-vis indigenous peoples was one that UNDP had 
honed and developed expertise on over the previous decade. In particular, as the 
annual reports of UNDP indicate, through the UN-REDD programme with UNEP and 
FAO, UNDP has been a strong advocate for including the voices of indigenous 
peoples in the governance of REDD+. An independent evaluation of UN-REDD 
found, “For [civil society organizations] and [indigenous peoples’ organizations], the 
relevance of UN-REDD primarily rests on the convening authority of the Programme, 
and the unique platform it has given them to voice the equal rights and interests of 
their respective constituencies, in local or global decision-making arenas. The 
implementation of safeguards (including free, prior and informed consent) and related 
veto rights are regarded as significant contributions to the democratization of the 
REDD+ regime.”258 While there are numerous on-the-ground challenges with 
effectively implementing REDD+ in favour of indigenous peoples and UNDP has not 
consistently advanced participatory governance practices for indigenous peoples’ 
groups in REDD+, these governance efforts by UNDP had at least ensured that a 
degree of trust had been built by UNDP with indigenous peoples’ groups in many 
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developing countries over the years.259 UNDP used this political capital to help create 
a comfort zone among indigenous peoples, subnational authorities and companies in 
the development of this initiative. Thus, even though UNDP did not have the high 
centrality scores as UNEP or FAO in the evolution of the network of initiatives, its 
deep and broad existing relationships with indigenous peoples’ groups situated it 
extremely well to contribute to coalition-building for the NYDF. Second, UNDP 
played the role of the central authoritative convener among the distributed leadership 
actors in brokering an agreement, and acted as the bridge between the technical work 
of the NYDF formation and the political considerations of the Secretary-General’s 
summit, to ensure recognition and speakers’ slots for the appropriate actors from the 
NYDF were secured. Representatives of government, business and the WEF all 
concurred that these roles made UNDP a driving force for the formation of the 
NYDF. One government official summarized, “UNDP played a crucial role. It's not 
just about the institutions; it's about the people involved. The UNDP team had 30-40 
years of experience operating in this space and was well respected by a lot of the 
actors. And we also needed someone on the inside of the Climate Summit.”260 
The distributed leadership for onboarding partners did not mean, however, 
that obtaining the maximum number of participants was always the aim. Political 
considerations tempered the extent of partnership pursued, and UNDP took actions to 
initially manage and limit the partners, out of need to ensure a partnership was 
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formed in time for the summit. For example, UNDP, together with the governments 
of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom, made a deliberate decision to not 
pursue the participation of Brazil and the United States in an aggressive manner in 
time for the launch of the NYDF at the summit, recognizing that the domestic politics 
of both countries might prevent these countries from signing on, and their 
international clout on this issue may cause them to sink the partnership even before it 
was launched. In the case of the United States, the possibility of the initiative drawing 
the attention of Congress due to possible budget implications in the commitment 
meant that it would be preferable to agree to the language of the declaration and 
launch the initiative first and then have the United States join later when there would 
not be an opening to revise the language. This decision to absorb potential political 
fallout and to circumvent particular countries in the formation phase was only 
possible due to central decision-making authority retained by UNDP in the leadership 
of the NYDF and the autonomy afforded EOSG and, by extension, UNDP, by the 
summit not being a UN General Assembly-mandated event. “We needed quasi-UN 
ownership, but not full UN ownership. So, we used the UN convening power and 
moral authority when it was useful, but were careful to say it was not a formal UN 
space.”261 
At the same time, the combined distributed-central leadership arrangement 
wasn’t successful in attracting some necessary partners. Notably, there are very few 
(four) private finance institutions in the NYDF. Arguably, this was partly a failing of 
the organization of the summit. Although the sectoral orientation was the overarching 
                                               





principle, the summit did have two constituency-based sessions—private finance (as 
part of the wider finance session) and cities. These constituency-based sessions had 
been deemed important for sending a political signal to national governments in the 
run-up to the Paris Agreement that subnational governments and leaders in financial 
markets were committed to and demanding ambitious climate policy. The focus of 
EOSG in engaging with private financiers for the summit was to secure commitments 
from them to make changes to their investment portfolios writ large. These actors 
were therefore corralled separately from those targeted for the forests session. They 
were not asked to engage on specific initiatives or portfolios in specific sectors. As 
well, there was a hope and expectation among those leading the formation of the 
NYDF that there would be significant public finance committed under the Paris 
Agreement, in particular the $100 billion a year that has been the holy grail of climate 
finance since 2009. As one of the members of the NYDF distributed leadership team 
observed, “the $100 billion did not materialize. We were expecting that finance will 
start flowing with Paris Agreement, but this has not happened, to the detriment of the 
New York Declaration [on Forests]”262 As a result, during the formation phase in 
2014, no entities had been designated as responsible for on-boarding private financial 
institutions in the NYDF and no attempts were made to integrate private financiers 
into the membership of the NYDF. Admittedly, this may also have been a function of 
lack of existing private finance influencers in the forests network. Prior to 2014, the 
network of initiatives on forests had no private finance entity with high scores in any 
of the three centrality measures considered in this study.  
                                               





Yet, after 2015, it became clear that private finance would be essential for the 
effective implementation of the NYDF and for achieving goal 8 in particular. The 
2017 annual report of the NYDF provided an analysis of the finance flows in the 
forests sector and in particular underlined the potential of private finance.263 
However, this did not translate into efforts by EOSG at the system-wide level, nor by 
UNDP at the initiative level to steer private finance in support to NYDF goals. 
Indeed, there was almost no system-wide engagement on cooperative initiatives at all 
by EOSG in the years 2016-2018. In 2019, Secretary-General Guterres hosted a 
climate summit with a similar aim as his predecessor did in 2014, to mobilize 
political will and to catalyze action. However, this was a lost opportunity with regard 
to steering private finance actors towards the NYDF. An EOSG team member for the 
2019 summit stated that there was little to no institutional memory from the 2014 
summit during the planning for the 2019 summit, and no attempts were made to build 
on the initiatives that had been launched in 2014: “There was zero evidence of a 
handover from 2014 to 2019.”264 The lack of institutional continuity combined with a 
repeat of organizing private finance by constituency type rather than corralling these 
actors into sessions for greenhouse gas-emitting sectors meant that the EOSG’s 
system-wide efforts did not serve to advance the range of partners in the NYDF after 
its launch. 
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4.3.2 Creating Pressure for Maximum Ambition 
 To spur the actors in reaching agreement on the highly specific, ambitious and 
time-bound goals of the NYDF, the timing, convening level and commitment-focused 
organization of the summit was significant and necessary. Participants in the 
formation of the declaration agree that these elements served to create an upward 
trajectory for the formulation of the goal—something that was lacking in the 
formation of the Tropical Rainforest Alliance 2020, which is also a multi-stakeholder 
initiative, but one that does not commit its participants to ambitious, time-bound goals 
as the NYDF does. The autonomy of the Secretary-General and the desire to 
maximise the ambition of the commitment meant that several commitment proposals 
were re-negotiated between the EOSG, UNDP and the distributed leadership team. 
An EOSG team member recalls, “At first they delivered 30-40 pages of 
commitments, some of which were just commitments to commit in the future. It took 
many conversations to whittle them down and get to the concrete ones.”265 This 
mechanism of raising collective ambition through a vetting process enabled by the 
convening power, demand for commitments as a price for entry, and full decision-
making authority by the Secretary-General (and by extension UNDP through its 
leadership team), was necessary for the high level of ambition in the NYDF. A 
representative of one of the founding companies observed, “It was a very business-
friendly set-up. We were invited to think in terms of stretch goals. Could we deliver 
by September? By 2020? It's an attractive process. Companies were saying we could 
bring our efforts forward and it would cost this much. Without that summit, nobody 
                                               





would have accelerated their efforts.”266 Even as the content of the declaration was 
the responsibility of the distributed leadership, the enabling space and pressure placed 
by UNDP and EOSG working hand-in-glove was seen as essential by many. A 
representative of the Government of Norway shared, “The declaration would not have 
happened without the leadership of UNDP getting involved, in particular on the 
ambition level. They gave us room to develop an agenda and align it early. They 
made us a key part of the programme early on. This gave us time and energy and 
enabled us to have a high level of ambition in the declaration.”267 
4.3.3 Dropping the Ball on Process Management 
 On the other hand, neither UNDP nor the EOSG exerted much influence on 
the funding for the initiative, whether for the formation phase or for its 
implementation. Norway’s decision to make flexible funding available for the 
formation phase was in keeping with and a continuation of its existing funding 
strategy on forests via the Norway International Climate and Finance Initiative 
(NICFI).268 Although UNDP provided essential human resources during the 
formation, this mode of working with an unfunded mandate in the run-up to the 
summit was one adopted by all members of the distributed leadership team. It is also 
not unreasonable to believe that funding for this may have been provided by one of 
the governments or by a philanthropic foundation if needed. In the implementation 
phase, the funding provided by the government of Germany was a decision made 
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after Germany made the suggestion to UNDP, not the other way around.269 Neither is 
there any evidence that attention to funding for the NYDF (or any of the initiatives 
launched) was a priority for the EOSG during the preparation for the summit. To the 
contrary, the office of the Secretary-General downplayed the importance of funding 
up front, in stark contrast to the stance of the Rio+20 organizers, in a deliberate move 
to avoid time spent fundraising and to avoid the perception among donor countries 
that the purpose of the summit was to extract money from them. It was assumed that 
if strong partnerships were developed, funding would follow.270 However, during the 
efforts under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, the government of Peru, as the LPAA 
Quartet member responsible for the forests session at COP21, did emphasize the need 
to unlock adequate funding for the implementation.271 The existing intention of the 
governments of Germany, Norway and the UK to make a commitment in time for 
COP21 dovetailed with this priority, and no private finance commitments were 
explicitly pursued. 
The necessity for the government of Germany to suggest the creation of a 
formal secretariat to UNDP reflects the low attention that UNDP gave to the process 
management of the initiative after its launch. This was in contrast to the formation 
phase, when a high degree of professionalism prevailed, since the NYDF formation 
was being led by the office of the UNDP Administrator and in the distributed 
leadership team by the foreign offices of the respective governments, the leadership 
team of the WEF and the C-Suite executives of companies such as Unilever. In the 
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case of UNDP, the Administrator herself personally did some of the legwork by 
engaging in dialogue with governments and civil society organizations as needed to 
remove bottlenecks and to shepherd the process.272 Thus, while UNDP was not alone 
in maintaining professionalism in the process during the formation, it certainly 
contributed to it, albeit perhaps not as much as Norway, which funded the hiring of 
Climate Advisors and the Meridien Institute. After the launch, however, UNDP did 
not “dock” the NYDF within its existing bureaucratic machinery. In fact, this was a 
direct consequence of UNDP taking on a lead convening role for this partnership: it 
was treated as a special initiative that the Administrator herself was leading with a 
select group of staff members. Consequently, the usual UNDP machinery that exists 
for programmes and projects, with adequate staffing, programme managers, 
monitoring and evaluation arrangements, reporting, etc. was not activated. Ironically, 
the very organizational structure that ensured the leadership necessary for the 
formation of the initiative undermined its effective sustainment. A senior advisor to 
the then-UNDP Administrator explains, “the NYDF had been orphaned within the 
UNDP machinery while being embraced by its leadership. Perversely, had it been 
embraced by the institution, it might not have happened at all. UN staff members are 
incentivized to not make mistakes more than they are to make a difference. If this 
were UNDP proper, it would have been seen as too politically risky.”273  
Interestingly, the EOSG’s decision to allocate leadership on the forests session 
for the summit to UNDP, which had developed trust among forests actors, in 
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particular indigenous peoples, meant foregoing the experience of intergovernmental 
organizations such as FAO, UNEP or the World Bank, each of which had 
considerably more experience in developing and supporting such partnerships, 
including in forests. FAO, UNEP and the World Bank both score highly on the degree 
centrality from 2007, whereas UNDP scored highly only in one year, and not as a 
secretariat. As others have observed, UNEP’s entrepreneurial bureaucratic culture and 
the Bank’s top-down policy on pursuing multi-stakeholder partnerships had made 
both entities highly experienced in this mode of working.274 Thus, in stark contrast to 
the UNEP approach for the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (see Chapter 5), during 
the formation of which UNEP provided detailed suggestions to the founding 
governments on what it would take to get the partnership running effectively (based 
on their experiences with other multi-stakeholder partnerships), UNDP did not have 
this experience to draw upon and was not proactive in ensuring attention to the 
process management of the initiative for its implementation.  
Nor was there any pressure from the EOSG after the launch of the initiative to 
set up an adequate secretariat. Betraying the primarily political rationale for pursuing 
the development of cooperative initiatives at the 2014 Climate Summit and under the 
LPAA, the EOSG put in place no follow-up mechanism after 2015 to maintain high-
level support for the sustainment of the initiatives it had helped birth. This meant 
UNDP was under no pressure to put in place effective process management for the 
NYDF until the government of Germany raised this issue as a matter of priority and 
                                               





offered to fund a robust secretariat housed in UNDP and supported by Climate 
Advisors and the Meridien Institute. 
Due to the same reasons, UNDP did not champion the establishment of 
monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the initiative either. Rather, the 
assessment framework and independent group of assessment partners were formed 
with the support of the government of Germany following the launch of the NYDF. 
While UNDP senior administration lent their support to this project, they cannot be 
said to have led it. 
The experience on process management for the NYDF strongly points to the 
continued interactive engagement of the relevant IGOs, at their respective system-
wide and initiative levels. 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter considered the network of cooperative initiatives on forests, and 
the roles of IGOs therein. Specifically, this chapter investigated: (1) whether and how 
IGOs influence the growth of cooperation in the wider sector by participating in 
initiatives (sector-wide analysis); and (2) the interactive effects of system-wide and 
initiative-level efforts of IGOs on the formation and quality of the New York 
Declaration on Forests (multilevel analysis). In conducting the multilevel analysis, 
this chapter also tested the robustness of the findings from chapter three, namely the 
six organizational attributes necessary for the success of IGO system-wide efforts to 
promote voluntary cooperation, along with their two enabling conditions (convening 





For the sector-wide analysis, this chapter found that by participating in 
initiatives, IGOs have strongly influenced the growth of cooperation in the forests 
sector. In particular, UNEP, UNDP, FAO UNFCCC and the World Bank are among 
the most prolific, most relied-upon connectors and highly valued partners in the 
network. Notably, businesses engaged in the network have prioritized partnerships 
with IGOs. The qualitative evidence in the multilevel analysis supported this finding, 
pointing to the legitimacy attraction for businesses as well as the strong desire for 
businesses to avoid being convened by a competitor. IGOs were therefore found to 
have played some uniquely valuable roles in the growth of cooperation in the wider 
sector. 
For the multilevel analysis, this chapter found that the formation and quality 
of the NYDF depended on the joint efforts of a range of governments, businesses and 
civil society organizations that were already influential in the network of initiatives 
on forests, but that the combined system-wide and initiative-level efforts by EOSG 
and UNDP in enabling these efforts were determinant in the formation and several 
aspects of quality of the NYDF, particularly in its range of partners, its leadership and 
its ambition level. When aspects of the quality dipped, the lack of interaction between 
EOSG and UNDP were found to be responsible. In other words, the subsidiarity and 
leadership with centralized decision-making conditions highlighted in chapter three 
were found to be necessary. But this chapter also found strong support for the 
importance of the other organizational attributes, including strategic timing, high 
visibility, sectoral orientation and emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments—





chapter highlighted the importance of the autonomy of the Secretary-General in 
regard to these attributes, and especially the value of being able to ‘bypass’ particular 
member states in order to advance more quickly.  
Importantly, the stakeholders engaged encouraged UNDP and EOSG to 
deploy these functions as they saw them to be uniquely placed to enable the 
stakeholders to achieve an ambitious, joint commitment. This mutually fruitful 
choreography is perhaps best described by one of the business actors central to the 
formation of the initiative: “If the Secretary-General hadn't done the summit, none of 
this would have happened. But it's not a simple cause and effect. It takes two to 
tango—for forty different types of actors. We are getting better at understanding the 
system. There is an emerging leadership community which includes people from 
different types of actors, which is starting to understand how this choreography 
works. You don't need to explain it to everyone. You can drive most companies by 
capitalizing on their fear of missing out, rather than making them think more deeply 
on governance.”275  
Finally, this chapter found that it may be useful to consider quality of 
cooperation at the sectoral level, rather than only at the initiative level. At least three 
elements of quality of the NYDF—the optimality of partner mix, the leadership, and 
the stringency and ambition of the goals—build upon the actors and goals that were 
present in the network prior to the formation of the NYDF. These elements of the 
quality of the NYDF can appropriately be understood as steps, or mutations, in the 
                                               






evolution of the partner mix and goal-setting within the wider sector. This is 
supported by the finding that cooperative initiatives themselves have promoted the 
formation of new initiatives and become highly central actors in the network by doing 
so. In other words, initiatives have steered the sector around the formation of newer 
initiatives in order to achieve their goals. The establishment of the NYDF itself is 
appropriately understood as an attempt to thicken the existing partnerships and as a 
result increase the ambition level of actors within the sector. The quantity of the 
initiatives in the forests sector was therefore increased in an attempt to increase the 
quality of voluntary cooperation within the forest network that existed before the 
NYDF. In other words, the notion of quality of voluntary cooperation may be aptly 
applied at the sectoral level, and particular instances of cooperation—i.e. individual 
initiatives—may aptly be considered attempts to improve quality of cooperation 





5 Short-Lived Climate Pollutants 
This chapter focuses on the network of cooperative initiatives on Short-Lived 
Climate Pollutants (SLCPs) and pays particular attention to the Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition (CCAC), which was launched in 2012. This chapter seeks to fill two gaps in 
knowledge about the roles of IGOs in the growth of this network. The first is whether 
and how, by participating in initiatives, IGOs have shaped and influenced the growth 
trajectory of the wider sector-wide network of voluntary cooperation on SLCPs (that 
is, a sector-wide analysis). Second, this chapter seeks to understand the interactive 
effect of initiative-level and system-wide efforts of IGOs on the quality of the CCAC 
(that is, a multilevel analysis). The multilevel analysis also serves to test the findings 
of chapter three, namely the six organizational attributes required for successful 
system-wide efforts to spur growth in cooperation, and their two enabling conditions 
of convening power and autonomy.  
The SLCPs sector is apt for this analysis for several reasons. SLCPs are a 
category of greenhouse gases and particulate matter that, while lasting a relatively 
small period of time in the atmosphere compared to carbon dioxide (from a few days 
to about a decade), are mostly of high Global Warming Potential (GWP), which 
makes them particularly potent contributors to climate change.276 SLCPs include 
methane, black carbon (soot), tropospheric ozone and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
                                               





and are the result of a range of economic activities and industries, such as agriculture, 
(in particular, livestock and rice cultivation), the oil and gas industry (gas flaring 
practices), wastewater management, coal mines, and diesel engines, among others. In 
addition to the climate benefits of curbing SLCPs, there are also short-term co-
benefits, such as in the case of black carbon, which causes respiratory disease. There 
is therefore a high functional rationale for cooperation on SLCPs. At the same time, 
the governance of one SLCPs—HFCs—has been a contested issue, with two pertinent 
conventions governing HFCs. Attempts by developed countries to promote HFC 
governance under the Montreal Protocol, which governs Ozone-depleting substances, 
were seen by many developing countries as attempts to subvert the negotiations under 
the climate convention. While this has now been resolved with the 2016 Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, the tension during the past few decades has 
contributed to actors undertaking voluntary cooperation. The combination of these 
factors has therefore made SLCPs a priority area for voluntary cooperation, which 
provides a rich and pertinent case study for this dissertation. 
Similar to the case study on forests, this chapter is organized in four sections. 
The first section relies on the network dataset to visualize the evolution of the 
network of initiatives on SLCPs, identify the formation of communities in the 
network and identify the most “important” actors in the network. This section 
assesses the influence of IGOs in the network over time. The second section turns to 
the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, and presents an overview of several aspects of 
its quality, in effect forming the foundation for the analysis in the following section. 





system wide efforts of IGOs including Rio+20, the 2014 Climate Summit and the 
LPAA are considered, to assess their impact on the quality of the CCAC over time. 
The fourth section summarizes the key findings of this chapter and concludes.   
5.1 IGOs and the Network of Cooperative Initiatives on Short-
Lived Climate Pollutants 
This section uses tools and techniques of network analysis to illuminate the 
growth of the SLCPs network of voluntary cooperation over time and to identify the 
most influential actors, including the potential paths of influence they may have 
wielded. Visualization of the network in five-year increments shows its evolution, 
including the diversity of its actors, their interconnectedness and variation in the 
density of connections across the network. Community detection is used to identify 
the clustering of entities into sub-communities within the network—essentially 
indicating which entities are more closely linked to each other than to others, which 
points to greater strength of cooperation within those clusters than between them. 
Finally, three centrality measures are used to identify the most “important” actors in 
the network over time: out-degree, betweenness and eigenvector. Out-degree 
centrality provides a measure of how prolific an entity is. The higher the score, the 
more initiatives of which it is a member. Betweenness centrality measures the 
information-sharing, bridge-building or convening roles played by an entity. The 
higher this score, the more an entity is depended upon by others to connect them to 
other parts of the network and/or to share information. Eigenvector centrality 
measures how many sought-after entities a given entity is connected to. In other 





after by or connected to others who are also highly-sought after. For this relatively 
small network, the actors scoring in the 90th percentile of centrality scores are 
presented, rather than the 95th, as was done for the forests network, in order to yield 
sufficient data points for inference. 
5.1.1 The growth of a diverse network 
The network dataset used in this study reflects eighteen known voluntary 
cooperative initiatives that aim to curb Short-Lived Climate-Pollutants as of 2015 
(annex 4 provides a list of these initiatives, their acronyms and their launch dates). 
The majority of initiatives (eleven) have fewer than fifty members, with the largest 
membership size being 161. Many initiatives show a multi-stakeholder nature, with 
nine initiatives consisting of at least eight different types of entities. The participation 
of subnational authorities and private financial institutions in the network is relatively 
low compared to other entity types on the network, with membership in two and three 
initiatives respectively. By contrast, businesses, national governments and 
intergovernmental organizations are found in twelve, twelve and thirteen initiatives 
respectively. Ten initiatives count other initiatives in their membership. 
As figure 5.2A-D illustrates, the network has not grown evenly, whether over 
time or among entities. From a few, disconnected initiatives in the early 2000s, a 
more densely connected and larger network emerged by 2015. The network consisted 
primarily of businesses in the late 20th century. Notably, this is in connection with the 
Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, an initiative that originally was not 
fully committed to climate action but rather represented the interests of the business 





initiative has evolved to being an important advocate for curbing SLCPs. In the late 
1990s, transnational organizations, intergovernmental financial organizations and 
NGOs began to engage as participants in SLCP initiatives. This preceded a steady 
growth period starting in 2002, when intergovernmental organizations, governments, 
philanthropic foundations and research institutions began to engage as members of 
initiatives, and when the number of initiatives began to rise as well. The period of 
most significant growth appears to have occurred during 2011-2015, when ten of the 
eighteen initiatives were launched, and the interconnectivity grew the most. This is 
associated with increasing engagement of national governments, cities, NGOs, 
philanthropic foundations and research institutions.  
There are clear pockets of comparatively low connectivity to the rest of the 
network, such as, for example, the Consumer Good Forum’s HFCs initiative, or the 
Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, both of which occupy peripheral 
positions in the network as they share only two or three members with other 
initiatives. By contrast, there are also regions of high connectivity, notably the group 
of CCAC sub-initiatives, which, unsurprisingly, share a large number of members.  
Figure 5.2E demonstrates the communities in the 2015 network that are 
detectible on the basis of the strength of connections between actors. Actors that have 
much greater density of connections among themselves than with the rest of the 
network are defined as forming a community. Out of nine communities detected, five 
consist of single initiatives, suggesting that there is a high amount of isolation in the 
network at the initiative level (those initiatives that form their own communities are at 





moderate basis in constituency or entity type: three communities are dominated by a 
single entity type (businesses and subnational authorities—see communities 1, 2 and 
3 in figure 5.1E). this suggests that businesses and subnational authorities are forming 
within-constituency partnerships in preference multi-stakeholder partnerships. 
Notably, many national governments are found in the remaining two communities 
that are more multi-stakeholder, together with intergovernmental organizations.  
What does this visualization tell us about the influence of IGOs in this network 
over time? Several IGOs began to engage in the network in the early 2000s, and have 
evidently played bridge-building roles, connecting subnational- and business-
dominated initiatives to more multi-stakeholder initiatives via their joint participation 
(for example, see figure 5.1C), but this visual observation needs to be verified by the 
centrality scores. Since the main growth spurt of the SLCPs network appears to have 
taken place in the 2011-2015 period, this relatively engagement of IGOs suggests a 
potential driving role in the formation of the network. Unsurprisingly, IGOs 
participate in many initiatives together with governments. The majority of IGOs in 
this network appear to have prioritized participation in the various CCAC sub-
initiatives, and are densely connected to other entities in the core of the network. 
Some IGOs are found in more peripheral areas of the network however, notably 
participating in only one initiative each (see membership of PCFV and CCAC: MSW 






Figure 5.1 Growth of the network of cooperative initiatives on SLCPs from 2000 to 2015. The 
network has grown more interconnected over time (Figure 5.1A-D), but shows some constituency-based 
community formation (Figure 5.1E). Source: This study’s dataset. 
Growth of the network of cooperat ive init iat ives on SLCPs from  2000 to 2015
Node size correlated to degree centrality - cooperative 
initiatives with larger membership size have larger nodes




















The dominance of the CCAC—an IGO-supported initiative—is noteworthy. It 
forms the core of the network, together with its sub-initiatives (whose memberships 
do not overlap fully with the wider coalition), and has evidently been responsible for 
or at least central in the growth spurt of the network in the 2011-2015 period, 
accounting for seven of the ten initiatives launched during this period. This points to a 
very strong sector-shaping role played by CCAC, and potentially by the IGOs that 
support it, including its secretariat, UNEP.  
In sum, the communities detected suggests some fragmentation, particularly 
with some businesses and subnational authorities tending to form less heterogenous 
communities than other entity types, but not always. Likewise, there is strong 
clustering among some governments and IGOs in the most interconnected 
communities of the network, but other governments and IGOs are also found in less 
connected regions. The dominance of the CCAC in the network suggests a highly 
influential role played by the CCAC and some IGOs in the growth of this network. 
Figure 5.2 provides a different perspective on the growth of this network, 
focusing on the roles taken up by various entity types over time, including those of 
participant, secretariat and funder. illustrates the distribution of roles taken up by 
entity types as the network has grown over time, both as a raw count of the number of 
entities per entity type per role, and as a percentage entity type per role. Several 
patterns are discernible, as follows. 
In keeping with expectations, the majority of the entities in the SLCP network 
are participants, followed by funders and then secretariats. Limitations of data 





full picture of the donors to SLCP initiatives in the late twentieth century, but since 
2002, philanthropic foundations, national governments, intergovernmental 
organizations and businesses have all been funding initiatives. While 
intergovernmental organizations dominated the funding roles in the early to mid 
2000s, in recent years, national governments have become the dominant donor type of 
SLCP initiatives. The secretariat function for SLCP initiatives was predominantly 
carried out by the initiatives themselves in the 1980s and 1990s, but as the number of 
initiatives grew, intergovernmental organizations have taken up this role most 
frequently, followed by the initiatives and businesses, and to a lesser extent, 
philanthropic foundations, NGOs and intergovernmental financial organizations. 
 
Figure 5.2  Distribution of entity types by their function in the network on SLCPs over time. The 
count distribution of entity types, left, no particular functional dominance of intergovernmental 
organizations. The percentage distribution of the same data, right, shows that intergovernmental 
organizations take up a large ratio of the secretariat roles and also significant funding roles in the 2000s. 


















































































There is therefore a clear division of labour in roles undertaken by entity types 
in the network over time. While intergovernmental organizations account for a very 
small fraction of the total number of entities in the network, they have consistently 
taken up a large fraction of the secretariat roles in the network, suggesting potentially 
important convening, brokering or information-sharing roles that may have driven the 
growth of the network. While IGOs also took up funding roles in the early 2000s, this 
function was adopted to a large extent by national governments since the mid-2000s, 
when the network of SLCPs began to grow significantly. This suggests that IGOs 
may have played an instigating role in the network. 
5.1.2 IGOs are Among the Most “Important” Actors in the Network over 
Time 
The centrality measures of entities in the network give further insight into the 
relative importance of different actors in the SLCP network of initiatives over time. In 
particular, entities with high centrality scores are likely to have been important actors 
in the network and played potential driving roles, depending on the centrality in 
question as well as the particular functions played by the entity in the network 
(secretariat, funder or participant).  
Figure 5.4 presents the entities with annual top 10 percent of out-degree, 
eigenvector and betweenness centrality for the years 2000-2015 in the network of 
cooperative initiatives on SLCPs. These centrality measures indicate that fifty-three 
actors, primarily of four entity types—national governments, businesses, cooperative 
initiatives themselves, and intergovernmental organizations—have been “important” 





entities are highly central in this narrow group of central actors, which is in contrast 
to the overall diversity of the network, which suggests it is not a very fragmented 
network, in contrast to the network on forests considered in chapter four. A 
consideration of each of the entity types reveals the particular ways in which their 
most central actors have wielded influence in the network over time, as follows.  
Governments evidently dominate the group as the most prolific entities in the 
network, engaging in the highest number of initiatives and most consistently over 
time since 2010 (only UNEP and the European Union join them in this category). 
This includes developed countries (Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and the United States) and developing (Nigeria, Colombia and Mexico), 
with the former as funders as well as participants, but the latter as participants only. 
This pointing to very influential roles played by these governments in shaping the 
governance, funding flows and partner inclusion in the overall network. As well, with 
high betweenness centrality, governments are strong connectors or conveners in this 
network over time, as funders and as participants. Thus, whether through funding 
relationships or as supportive participants or implementers in initiatives, governments 
have played significant roles in connecting entities in the network. The high scores of 
many governments in eigenvector centrality reveals the development of “in-club” in 
the network in the period 2009-2015, consisting primarily of governments. This is in 
keeping with the insights from the network visualization in figure 5.1, which shows 
the proliferation of the CCAC and its sub-initiatives, which count many of the same 
governments in their membership. Given the clear dominance of these governments 





participant roles, this core group of governments has shaped the growth trajectory of 
this network in a deep way—determining the flow of funds, the inclusion of members 
and the rate of change of the network over time.  
Businesses are a small minority in the group of influential actors in the 
network over time. Only Johnson&Johnson and Coca Cola enjoy this distinction, 
scoring highly on betweenness centrality, with the former as a funder and the latter as 
a participant. This indicates a potentially leadership or pioneering role played by 
these two companies in the network, as they would have to take risks and engage with 
disparate actors more than the norm among their competitors, to score highly in this 
centrality. This then suggests an influential role in shaping the engagement of the 
business community in the network.  
Cooperative initiatives themselves are highly central in this network over 
time. Similar to the forests network, several initiatives are featured in this group of 
highly central due to trivial solutions in the calculations of centralities: The near 
solitary existence of the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy (ARAP) for 
two decades in the SLCP network accounts for its high eigenvector centrality during 
these years. Likewise, high betweenness scores of initiatives when they are 
secretariats reflects their large membership sizes and does not provide much insight. 
However, the fact that several initiatives are highly central as funders and participants 
in other initiatives indicates that these partnerships are promoting others like them in 
furtherance of their own goals. In the case of CCAC having high eigenvector 
centrality as a funder, this is clearly a function of the CCAC supporting its own sub-





Cookstoves and the Global Methane Initiative are not only participating in (albeit not 
funding) other initiatives, they are being sought-after as partners by governments 
while doing so (high eigenvector centrality), which strongly suggests an ecosystem-
building and evolutionary logic to the formation of initiatives and quality of 
cooperation in the sector over time. Several initiatives also show high betweenness 
centrality as participants mainly, which strongly suggests an ecosystem-building 
happening. When an initiative participates in another, it brings along its members to 
some extent at least. If such a ‘participant initiative’ is highly central as a ‘connector’, 
it means it has connected its membership to the membership of another initiative 
when they were largely disconnected before. In short, actors are growing the strength 
of the network over time; individual initiatives are merely the expedient, temporary 
vehicles to take some steps in this process. 
Intergovernmental organizations are a lonely category in the group of highly 
central actors in the SLCPs network. UNEP is the only intergovernmental 
organization that scores in the 90th percentile. It also is the only entity in the entire 
network to score consistently highly as a prolific member from the early 2000s—most 
other members begin to scores highly in the late 2000s. Further, UNEP scores highly 
across all three measures, and does so as a funder and a secretariat. Indeed, of the 10 
entities that have high scores across all three centrality measures (Canada, Colombia, 
Germany, Mexico, Nigeria, The Netherlands, Norway, the United States, the 
European Commission and UNEP), UNEP has high centrality for the longest period 
of time, in funding and secretariat capacities. While the funding from UNEP reflects 





to channel the funds through UNEP indicates that this agency may be playing a 
significant role in the network.  
These combined high scores mean that UNEP is unique among IGOs in the 
SLCPs network. Among IGOs, it is the most important connector, convener and 
bridge-builder. It is the partner of choice for the most influential governments in the 
network. It is among the most prolific members of the whole network. In short, 
UNEP has shaped the growth of this network in a fundamental way. The multilevel 
analysis complements these insights and serves to reveal the ways in which UNEP 






Figure 5.3 Entities with the top 10% of centrality measures in the SLCPs network from 2000 to 
2015. Governments dominate influence in the network consistently over time. UNEP is the only IGO 
to show high influence. Source: This study’s dataset. 
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5.2 The Climate and Clean Air Coalition: A Confluence of Political 
Will 
The CCAC was launched at the U.S. State Department on 16 February 2012. 
Attended by ministers from Bangladesh, Canada, Mexico and Sweden, the event was 
presided over by Hillary Clinton, the then U.S. Secretary of State. Since its launch, 
the initiative has grown significantly, adding partners, sub-initiatives and new goals, 
attracting funding and so on. As the previous section illustrated, the CCAC, which 
aims to reduce the incidence of SLCPs across the world, is a dominant SLCP 
initiative within the network of voluntary cooperation on SLCPs in terms of 
membership size and diversity.  
This section assesses the quality of the CCAC based on the categories of 
“actor (optimality of partner mix and leadership) and “process” (goal-setting, 
professionalism of process management, monitoring and evaluation arrangements, 
and funding). This assessment forms the basis of the multilevel analysis in the next 
section. 
5.2.1 Diverse but Suboptimal Partners 
The CCAC has a diverse partner mix, but it is not optimal. The initiative has 
significant breadth of partners, including developed and developing national 
governments pertinent to curbing SLCPs, NGOs and research institutes whose work 
focuses on SLCPs and which have been influential in raising the profile of SLCPs, 
and businesses and subnational authorities which have jurisdiction over the 
production of SLCPs. As of May 2020, the coalition includes 289 partners, of which 





ECOWAS; 58 are NGOs; 144 are subnational governments or private sector actors; 
and 18 are intergovernmental organizations.277  
Notably, however, while this current partner mix includes entities that are 
influential in curbing SLCPs, this is a result of significant growth since the initiative’s 
launch, and it is not yet optimal. Large, rapidly industrializing countries are among 
those with greatest potential to influence the trajectory of the growth of SLCPs, as are 
oil and gas producing countries. While CCAC has always had a mix of developing 
and developed countries, some of the most pertinent and influential developing 
countries only joined recently (e.g., 2019 for India), while others such as Brazil, 
China and most OPEC countries are not yet members, seeing the CCAC as an attempt 
by developed countries to undermine or distract from the climate negotiations.278 
Recognizing their limitations in attracting the more powerful and pertinent 
developing countries, the founding governments chose to maximize the numbers of 
other countries in the CCAC. “If you don't have the most powerful states of the world 
that can do something on climate, such as Brazil, India, China, UAE, Russia, Japan, 
which we don’t, then maybe it’s good to grow in numbers so we become more 
politically relevant. If we are 100, that's better than 10.”279  
As well, few businesses are defined as full partners in the CCAC, but rather 
are defined as “actors” in implementation, with reduced influence in the initiative’s 
governance, which limits the fully multi-stakeholder nature of this initiative.  
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At the time of its launch, the CCAC also included actors that were already 
highly central within the network of SLCP, including the United States, Canada and 
UNEP, all of which played determinant roles in the formation of the initiative. As 
noted in the previous section, with the universe of SLCP initiatives being relatively 
small, the partners of the CCAC and its sub-initiatives form the bulk of partners in the 
SLCP network 2012 onwards. Thus, the CCAC built upon existing central actors 
promoting voluntary cooperation, and in turn, membership of CCAC and its sub-
initiatives caused actors to become central in the network from 2012 onwards. 
5.2.2 Strong US Leadership, with Supporting Cast 
The leadership of the CCAC is a distributed formal arrangement, with a high-
level assembly that includes ministerial level representation from the member 
countries as well as the heads of various IGOs. In addition, two co-chairs of the 
working group, elected from the membership for staggered two-year terms, shepherd 
the process of decision-making among the membership.  
While this is the now-formal leadership arrangement of the initiative, the 
formation of the CCAC arguably depended on a catalytic leadership role by the 
United States government, which began pursuing a two-pronged political strategy on 
SLCPs and HFCs after the failure of governments to reach a climate agreement in 
Copenhagen in 2009. First, the Obama Administration was keen to demonstrate 
practical, on-the-ground action, which would help advance solutions beyond the 
UNFCCC demands and build some trust between developed and developing 
countries. “This was a time when the US was under a lot of flak and pressure to 





was always one of a bottom-up climate regime rather than top-down. CCAC and 
other initiatives allowed them to say, ‘guess what guys, while you are fighting, there 
are coalitions on the ground doing the work.’”280 This would also open the door to the 
second part of the strategy, which was to secure an HFC amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol, thereby boosting global climate ambition significantly and also helping 
rebuild the reputation of the United States as a supporter of multilateralism. Such was 
the priority accorded this strategy that during President Xi’s first visit as Head of 
Government to the United States in June 2013, the two leaders reached agreement on 
cooperation on two issues: North Korea and HFCs phaseout under the Montreal 
Protocol.281 “We absolutely saw the CCAC as a vehicle to advance the Montreal 
Protocol. It was a hands-on effort to do it.”282 This approach was appreciated by 
several other governments. A former cabinet minister of the government of Argentina 
notes, “The CCAC was not a negotiating forum. So, one of the objectives on HFCs 
was to use this more relaxed forum in order to unlock the negotiations. This is a 
sophisticated approach. You create an environment where countries can come and put 
some money behind these projects, then countries begin moving and answering 
questions like, what are the benefits of acting and how much will it cost?”283 
Purposive efforts by the United States such as hosting working-level meetings in the 
margins of the UNFCCC COPs to discuss the potential of a CCAC initiative, to 
engaging private sector actors in the US to obtain interest, to drafting the articles of 
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constitution, and to funding the initiative, were determinant in the formation of 
CCAC. In short, the United States showed leadership with central decision-making. 
Yet, despite the obvious leadership position of the United States, the critical 
roles of other countries must not be underestimated. Indeed, the ability of the US to 
convene a large group of actors with little resistance reflects the prioritization that this 
issue had received in many governments. Several governments including Sweden, 
Canada, the Netherlands and Norway, already highly central to the network (per 
figure 5.3) were also leaders during the formation of the initiative (for example, 
Canada hosted the seminal preparatory meeting for the CCAC in Montreal in 2011) 
and remained highly influential once the initiative was launched, funding the CCAC 
and undertaking lead roles in the implementation of specific initiatives.  
Nor did these governments develop these priorities on their own. Indeed, the 
prioritization of the issue in a number of governments including the United States can 
be attributed in significant part to sustained advocacy work by NGOs and research 
institutes over a period of decades. The understanding that SLCPs form a threat and 
an opportunity on climate change was forged among policy-makers by a tenacious 
group of civil society scientists and advocates on either side of the Atlantic, as well as 
by business leaders. In the United States, the Institute for Global Sustainable 
Development (IGSD) worked closely with the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
Administrations to make the case, often taking advantage of the turnover of staff 
between administrations, which created a revolving cast of characters between the 
government and the think tanks and NGOs in the Washington, D.C. area, to gain 





articles to consistently maintain the issue in the policy ether. Similarly, across the 
Atlantic, the Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum of the Stockholm Environment 
Institute was an active influencer on the issue, as was the International Union of Air 
Pollution Prevention Associations. Interestingly, these entities do not feature as 
highly central in the network dataset as since the significance of their work lies in 
preparing the ground for the formation of cooperative initiatives, which is not 
captured in the network data as it does not entail high strength of formal relationships 
within initiatives. Demonstration projects were likewise important in influencing 
governments, including the United States. In the 1990s, Greenpeace spearheaded a 
campaign on refrigerants by developing an alternative to HFCs and bringing it to 
market. By targeting companies that rely heavily on HFC-emitting refrigerants for the 
sale of their products, such as Coca Cola and Ben & Jerry’s, Greenpeace enabled the 
formation of a cooperative initiative called Refrigerants, Naturally!, which brought 
HFC-free cooling technologies to the market and created confidence in their safety 
and viability.  
These actors—NGOs, think tanks, businesses—formed a close-knit 
community that would meet in the margins of the UNFCCC negotiations to plan and 
coordinate their advocacy efforts in order to maximize their impact and spur 
leadership among national governments. “So it was a conscious strategy to build this 
high-level political will.”284 As a result, while the leadership of the United States was 
essential, the confluence of actors from the NGO community, national governments, 
                                               






philanthropic foundations and intergovernmental organizations was necessary to the 
conceptualization and development of this initiative. “This was a real meeting of the 
minds and it was a path of very little resistance. The idea was born in many places”285 
5.2.3 A Professional, Well-Monitored and Well-Funded Process 
The process management of the CCAC shows a high degree of 
professionalism. Decision-making is conducted via a governance structure consisting 
of a high-level assembly, a working group, two co-chairs of the working group, a 
steering committee, a scientific advisory panel, and a secretariat. Each of these 
substructures has specific roles in decision-making, as specified in the framework 
document of the initiative.286 The high-level assembly is a ministerial-level body that 
meets annually to review progress and give advice to the working group on the scope 
and direction of future work, and as such, functions at the political level. By contrast, 
the steering committee meets every two months (reduced from every month in the 
early years of the CCAC) to review the details of the activities carried out by the 
CCAC, and makes recommendations on actions to the working group. In addition, a 
group of geographically diverse and eminent scientists, which make up the scientific 
advisory panel, make recommendations to the working group on course corrections or 
new activities based on the latest scientific developments related to SLCPs. By 
meeting twice a year, the working group considers these sets of recommendations to 
make decisions on activities, including the allocation of funds and the launch or 
continuation of workstreams. The two co-chairs of the working group, which rotate 
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among the membership in staggered two-year terms, are responsible for steering and 
leading the working group’s deliberations for effective decision-making. This 
governance structure, including preparations and follow-up of meetings, issuance of 
contracts with implementation partners and administration of the initiative’s trust 
fund are supported by the secretariat, which is housed at the UNEP office in Paris. 
Likewise, the CCAC has robust processes for transparent and regular 
monitoring and evaluation of its work. Annual reports of the overarching initiative 
trace the efforts taken by the initiative and their aggregate effects, but more than that, 
according to the annual reports published by the CCAC, the activities undertaken by 
the CCAC are monitored, evaluated and reported to the governance structure. For 
projects undertaken one the ground, such as demonstration projects, the CCAC 
website features assessment reports. In specific sub-initiatives, such as the CCAC's 
Oil and Gas Methane Partnership launched at the 2014 Climate Summit, the 
companies that committed to reducing gas flaring produce annual reports on their 
progress, which are publicly available on the CCAC website, in addition to synthesis 
reports being produced by the secretariat. 
Finally, the CCAC has received stable and significant funding since its launch, 
from a core group of governments, including Canada, Denmark, the European 
Commission, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
States. For example, the 2014 annual report indicates $43.3 million received by the 






5.2.4 Ambitious and Stringent Goal-Setting: Improving Over Time 
Given the professional process management of the initiative, the CCAC has 
articulated clear goals since its launch. Guided by the vision statement of the 
overarching initiative, the CCAC’s framework document outlines its purpose and the 
functions it seeks to fulfil, ranging from capacity-building to improving scientific 
understanding to enhancing existing public and private efforts, to mobilizing support 
for developing countries, among others. Annual process goals and milestones for the 
initiative are agreed upon by the working group each year. The sub-initiatives of 
CCAC, which focus on particular SLCPs or particular jurisdictions, each articulate 
specific goals and targets within their domains. For example, the HFC initiative, 
when launched, explicitly included the following two goals: “By 2016, an HFC-phase 
down amendment to the Montreal Protocol is negotiated; followed by gradual 
reduction of HFCs by all countries; Countries promote public procurement of 
climate-friendly alternatives to HFCs; Dramatic reduction of HFCs in the food cold 
chain; 30-50% reduction of HFCs by 2025 in the refrigerant servicing sector.”287 
Thus, the specificity of the goals varies depending with the level of the initiative 
being considered. In other words, the CCAC has been able to articulate increasingly 
specific, ambitious and time-bound goals over time via its sub-initiatives.  
5.3 The Interactive Influence of IGOs in Driving the formation and 
Quality of CCAC 
This section conducts a multilevel analysis to understand the interactive 
effects, if any, of system-wide efforts and initiative-level efforts of IGOs on the 
                                               





quality of the CCAC over time. For the initiative-level efforts, this analysis focuses 
on UNEP. While the CCAC counts 18 IGOs in its membership, including multilateral 
development banks, UN technical agencies, funds and programmes, and regional 
organizations, the IGO with the greatest influence at the sectoral and initiative levels 
in the formation and quality of the initiative has arguably been UNEP, which serves 
as CCAC’s secretariat. For the system-wide efforts, this analysis considers those of 
the UN General Assembly and UN DESA under Rio+20 in 2012, those of the UN 
Secretary-General under the 2014 Climate Summit, and those of the LPAA, which 
included the UN Secretary-General and the UNFCCC Secretariat, in 2015.  
This analysis therefore treats the combined system-wide and initiative-level 
efforts in the three years as test cases for the findings of chapter three, most 
immediately for the conditions of subsidiarity and leadership with centralized 
decision-making for successful growth of cooperation, but also for the four other 
organizational attributes (strategic timing, high visibility, sectoral orientation, and 
emphasis on cooperative commitments) as well as the two enabling conditions of high 
convening power and autonomy of the actor making the system-wide efforts. 
The findings of this section are as follows. The quality of the CCAC has been 
strongly and positively influenced by UNEP deploying its own convening power, 
technical expertise and autonomy since the formation phase. UNEP has interacted 
variably with the system-wide efforts of IGOs, in keeping with the findings from 
chapter three. In 2014, the interactive effect of the Secretary-General and UNEP 
served to spur appreciable growth in CCAC’s quality—notably by broadening its 





2012, when CCAC was formed, the purposive system-wide efforts by the UN General 
Assembly and DESA under Rio+20 had almost no positive effect on CCAC. Yet, the 
CCAC experienced strong growth at Rio+20, but this was due to the efforts of the US 
Government and other CCAC leaders. These findings all provide strong support for 
the findings from chapter three, and also nuance them: centralized decision-making 
need not come from an IGO. The convening power, autonomy and decision-making 
of the US Government provided the ingredients necessary at the formational phase 
and early years of the initiative, essentially circumventing the need for system-wide 
IGO support. The following sub-sections consider the interactive effects of IGO 
efforts at various stages of CCAC’s growth, on the aspects of CCAC’s quality 
highlighted in the previous section.  
5.3.1 UNEP, Government Leadership and the Absence of System-Wide IGO 
Influence on the formation of CCAC 
The CCAC was formed and launched during the preparatory phase of the 
Rio+20 conference, but had no interaction with the organizers for the formation. As 
expected from the findings of chapter three, due to the relatively hands-off approach 
of UN DESA and consensus-based decision making of the UN General Assembly, as 
well as no demand for cooperative commitments, Rio+20 did not create an especially 
conducive environment for the launch of cooperative initiatives. While there was 
subsidiarity, there was no central decision-making.  
Instead, the formation and initial quality of CCAC, including the mix of 
partners and the attention to goal-setting, was the result of combined efforts by UNEP 





was therefore in effect, but it was between UNEP and the United States government. 
The system-wide IGO effort at the time, namely the Rio+20 conference, was used for 
its high visibility and convenience, but had no role in spurring the formation or the 
quality of the CCAC. The following descriptions of how goals were set and partners 
onboarded in the early years of CCAC illustrate this. 
CCAC’s commitment from the outset to ensuring its membership would have 
a multi-stakeholder character was heavily influenced by UNEP during the formation 
phase. During deliberations on the potential governance structure and membership of 
the initiative, some founding countries expressed preference to keeping the initiative 
more multilateral. UNEP made a strong case for a role for non-state actors, including 
the private sector, in the governance structure. A typical example of the advice given 
by UNEP in shaping the governance process is found in its inputs provided to the 
2011 Montreal meeting, at which the details of the initiative were discussed and 
agreed: “If partners feel they have no stake in the partnership it will not work. To get 
their engagement, support and activities, they must feel they are part of it, are listened 
to and can also express their priorities/concerns and have—some limited—influence 
on decision making.”288 A senior UNEP official involved in these discussions 
explains that convincing governments to make the initiative fully multi-stakeholder 
was challenging. “From the beginning, the coalition was not just member states; there 
was an openness for a multi-stakeholder coalition, but UNEP wanted it to have a 
multi-stakeholder nature much more than the countries did. We were asked to soften 
                                               





our approach, but it was important to stand our ground on this.”289 Nevertheless, 
reservations by the national governments on giving too much influence to the private 
sector and NGOs meant that despite advocacy within the governance-building 
process, the representation of the private sector in the CCAC remains limited, and 
hurdles for private sector actors to join the CCAC remain higher than for NGOs and 
national governments. “The private sector is not well represented in CCAC. They are 
involved in work on the ground in the initiatives, but not institutionally at a sufficient 
level.”290 This conservative and cautious approach to multi-stakeholder governance 
also reflects the primarily political purpose served by the CCAC: as a trust-building 
exercise between developed and developing countries, and one that could help 
advance the United States government’s strategy for HFCs.  
While UNEP influenced the decision to make CCAC multi-stakeholder, it did 
not have the capacity to convince national governments to join the coalition. This was 
a task taken up by the founding governments. The United States, Canada and Sweden 
did much of the legwork in engaging with countries to convince them to join the 
CCAC. For example, being a primary champion of CCAC, the United States used the 
opportunity as host of the G8 summit in May 2012 to broker an agreement among all 
eight members of the G8 to join the CCAC. Likewise, the expansion of CCAC 
announced at Rio+20 in the form of the sub-initiative on municipal solid waste was 
the result of United States leadership. The State Department pursued a partnership 
pursued with the coalition of cities known as C40 (then led by Mayor Michael 
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Bloomberg), the Clinton Climate initiative, and the Global Methane Initiative—all 
partnerships that had in common a close-knit community of former and current 
staffers of U.S. Democratic administrations, which paved a smooth path for the 
formation of this partnership. Rio+20 was a convenient touchpoint in the international 
calendar for its announcement, when high visibility and media attention would be 
assured. However, there is no evidence that these partners came on board because of 
the opportunity afforded by Rio+20. The strong sense of ownership by the United 
States and its desire to make quick progress on the climate agenda--including, it then 
hoped, an HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol before the Paris Agreement in 
2015, was the primary driver.291  
The strength of the goals and goal-setting process at the formation stage of the 
CCAC was likewise the result of close interaction between UNEP and the CCAC 
leadership. As noted in the previous section, a range of non-state actors had promoted 
the leadership of the United States government, which was determinant in the 
formation of the CCAC, together with the leadership of governments such as Canada 
and Sweden. Interestingly, although UNEP did not directly spur the US or other 
countries to show leadership, it played a crucial role by providing the legitimacy and 
narrative kernel around which motivated leadership could galvanize. 
Speaking at the launch event of the CCAC at the State Department in 
Washington D.C., Secretary Clinton observed that the “UN Environment Program has 
determined that reducing these pollutants can slow global warming by up to a half 
                                               






degree Celsius by 2050... Now, exceptional work has already been done to investigate 
how to reduce these pollutants. For example, UNEP has identified a package of 16 
major actions, which include replacing inefficient cookstoves and traditional brick 
kilns with more efficient ones to cut down on black carbon, stopping the burning of 
agricultural waste, harvesting coal mine methane, improving wastewater treatment, 
and adopting emissions standards on vehicles.”292 More than a generous diplomatic 
nod to the role of UNEP, Secretary Clinton's reference to this report by UNEP was a 
reflection of its value as a galvanizing factor for leading governments in the 
formation of the CCAC and deciding on its goals.293  
Prior to 2011, no common or unifying term existed for the disparate set of 
these gases and particulate matter. They were the result of processes often unlinked to 
each other. For example, black carbon is a product of residential combustion of 
kerosene such as in the use of cookstoves across Africa and Asia, and also in the land 
transport sector as a side product of internal combustion engines; methane is a 
product of industries as diverse as animal husbandry, fossil fuel extraction and 
municipal waste management. While IPCC reports had referenced methane, they had 
not referred to short term pollutants as a group.  
As a result, even though the scientific basis for SLCPs was becoming clearer, 
specific projects on the viability and profitability in reducing SLCPs were being 
demonstrated, and key governments including the United States, Sweden, Canada and 
others as well as Small Island Developing Countries were beginning to recognize the 
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significant gains to be made, SLCPs did not have high profile as one coherent issue 
among domestic policy makers worldwide. Indeed, even the term SLCPs did not 
exist, which prevented them from gaining traction as a priority policy-relevant issue. 
Consequently, many governments, NGOs and research institutes were recognizing the 
need for an authoritative and policy-relevant publication that could be used by policy-
makers to justify and galvanize voluntary cooperation on SLCPs at scale.  
Defining SLCPs as a greenhouse gas emissions sector in itself, with practical 
near-term solutions, was therefore necessary. Those civil society actors and some 
developing country governments already engaged in the network called on UNEP to 
produce such a report. A former cabinet minister from a Latin American country 
notes, “There was a need for a more important report. It couldn't come from the NGO 
community. We suggested this to UNEP, and they put together a team very quickly. It 
was not a negotiated process. UNEP did a very good and fast job in putting this 
together.”294 
Given its in-house scientific capacity and mandate on knowledge generation, 
it is perhaps not surprising that UNEP was able to quickly produce this report. Indeed, 
the production of policy-friendly reports that bridge dense scientific literature and the 
needs of policy-makers had become a modus operandi for UNEP by then. For 
example, the annual Emissions Gap Report has become staple reading for domestic 
policy-makers on climate as more accessible and policy-relevant than the IPCC, and 
UNEP also saw it as an opportunity to influence countries away from entrenched 
                                               






negotiating positions. A senior UNEP official remarked, “It's impossible to 
orchestrate anything with dense, scientific reports. But once you start to break things 
down with policies, then it begins to resonate and you can do useful things.”295 As 
well, UNEP had been working hand-in-glove with many of these civil society actors 
to raise the profile of this class of GHGs at the international level. Many of these 
organizations enjoyed access to UNEP and as is typically the case with UNEP reports 
such as the IPCC and the Emissions Gap report, UNEP relied on a distributed system 
of lead and contributing authorship to develop the report.  
The UNEP report was a milestone in that it coined the term “Short-Lived 
Climate Forcers”, which was soon changed to “Short-Lived Climate Pollutants” and 
served as a focusing device for the governments and civil society actors to prioritize 
the issue and advance on the notion of a cooperative initiative on SLCPs. A former 
senior official of the Obama Administration observed, “People used the UNEP report 
to bolster the case for a conversation that was already going on in the government.”296 
Likewise at the international level, following the launch of the report, in the margins 
of the negotiations at the UNFCCC, national governments met over the course of 
2011 to discuss the potential of an initiative outside the purview of the climate 
convention, which would demonstrate political will and advance concrete action that 
would deliver some quick results. In short, the report played the role of a focusing 
device and galvanizer for a process that was already underway and of which UNEP 
was a part, but not a lead. “The UNEP report played an important role, but was not 
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the deciding factor. It's not that the UNEP report pushed the political will. First, we 
had the political will, then we decided to make the scientific foundation clear. It was 
clear that there was a need for an authoritative report, and that couldn't come from the 
NGO community. Science does not shape policy. It's policy that uses science as a 
foundation to use as needed.”297 
Following the launch of this report, UNEP played an influential and 
foundational role in ensuring it shaped the goal setting process of the CCAC. During 
the formation phase, when the framework document of the initiative was being 
drafted, UNEP advocated for the importance of CCAC being goal-oriented. Drawing 
on lessons learned from other cooperative initiatives for which it had acted as a 
secretariat, UNEP argued for the importance of setting clear goals from the 
beginning. For instance, a typical comment made in the margins of the drafts of the 
framework document is: “On the basis of priorities, resources and partners, [sic] need 
to consider what could be a set of specific deliverables of the SLCF (evaluation of 
PCFV underlined importance of setting clear achievable targets right at the 
beginning).”298 Furthermore, since the launch of CCAC, for initial projects to be 
undertaken and specific goals to be set, the steering committee turned to the 
recommendations made in the report, which included specific policies that would 
have high impact in the mitigation of SLCPs, categorized by the type of SLCP as well 
as region. Many of the policies recommended in the report became defined as goals in 
the sub-initiatives and activities of the CCAC after its launch. As a result, projects 
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and programmes focused on building capacity, conducting demonstrations and 
influencing national regulations and legislation to enable these specific policies is the 
aim of many CCAC activities. For example, on methane, recommended policies 
include separation and treatment of biodegradable municipal waste, extended 
methane recovery/utilization and reduced fugitive emissions from oil and gas 
production; and pre-mine degasification and recovery of methane from coal mine 
ventilation air, among others. From the recommended policies on methane, the 
municipal solid waste initiative directly promotes the separation and treatment of 
biodegradable waste, and the oil and gas methane partnership specifically targets 
methane emissions from oil and gas production. The goal-setting process in the 
CCAC, while now mediated by the steering committee and working group, has 
therefore been shaped significantly by the policy-relevant knowledge function led by 
UNEP in close interaction with the initiative’s leadership and existing network of 
actors engaged on the issue. 
5.3.2 Improved Goals and Partners in 2014: Strong Multilevel IGO 
Interaction 
The 2014 Climate Summit saw CCAC make a slate of more stringent goals. 
Two new initiatives were launched, including the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 
and the Global Green Freight Action Plan. In addition, efforts were accelerated to 
reduce SLCPs emissions from municipal solid waste, and a statement of intent was 
made to begin negotiations under the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs.  
By 2014, the strong leadership of the United States in CCAC had waned, as 





process and relationships with China, India and others to smooth the way to an 
agreement in Paris. The climate summit hosted by the Secretary-General provided an 
opportunity to significantly raise the profile of SLCPs and draw additional 
commitments. In the preparation of the summit, SLCPs was identified as one of the 
eight action tracks or sectoral sessions of the summit and UNEP empowered to be the 
sectoral convener. This was not a foregone conclusion, however. Although the 
organizers of the summit had used the UNEP Emissions Gap Report to identify the 
potential action tracks from the list of main sectors contributing to greenhouse gas 
emissions, they had not included SLCPs as priority in the summit planning. Instead, 
the inclusion of an SLCPs-focused action track in this summit was a negotiated 
decision with UNEP. A senior member of the Secretary-General's team recalled, 
“Originally we didn't have SLCPs as an organizing action track for the summit. 
[UNEP] came to [EOSG] and made the case for it to be included.”299 The 
commitments that arose were the result of combined efforts by UNEP and the office 
of the Secretary-General, each using their unique advantages. 
As the sector-level convener, UNEP engaged within the governance structure 
of the CCAC to identify potential commitments that could be developed. In this, the 
original UNEP report that helped galvanize the formation of the initiative itself, 
continued to be relevant. While green freight had been identified as a priority for 
CCAC since its launch, a multi-stakeholder coalition committed to advancing the 
issue had not yet formed, with commitments having been made mainly within 
constituencies. The high visibility afforded by the summit as well as emphasis on 
                                               





sectoral, rather than constituency-focused sessions, helped coalesce this partnership, 
which UNEP shepherded among the partners in green freight. As one senior CCAC 
staffer observed, “Green freight was a ripe issue but was not one of our flagship 
programmes. The 2014 Summit provided a platform and opportunity for us to 
advance on this issue.”300 The Executive Director of the Smart Freight Centre noted, 
“What is unique about today’s announcement is that for the first time, national 
governments, multinational companies and global institutions are coming together to 
reduce emissions from global freight movement in a coordinated way.”301  
Likewise, on methane emissions in the oil and gas sector, the high visibility of 
the summit was used by the office of the Secretary-General and UNEP to attract the 
interest of oil and gas companies and obtain a joint commitment. Indeed, 
commitments by the oil and gas industry were prioritized by the team of the 
Secretary-General, and several partnerships by this industry were announced at the 
2014 summit in addition to that under CCAC.302 In an echo of the type of leadership 
undertaken by the Obama Administration to onboard partners when the CCAC was 
formed, senior officials in the EOSG undertook a significant amount of the outreach 
needed to convince companies to make the commitment and after two years of 
discussions. This was engagement that UNEP was not able to conduct. This enabled 
CCAC to launch the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP), a commitment 
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among six major companies to report against their gas flaring practice and reduce 
it.303  
This was the first time that oil and gas companies had been engaged by CCAC 
directly, and reflected a significant development in the CCAC’s work with the private 
sector. As one senior executive of a founding company of the OGMP said, “For all 
these companies to come together and make a commitment, we needed a few things. 
A moment in time—a year ahead of COP21. A place—where we could put pressure 
to launch it. A scene—which CEOs would be proud about and where they would 
actually be seen. And some support—the high-level support of the Secretary-General 
and the executive secretary of the UNFCCC. And we needed credible partners. For 
each initiative to be credible and to be launched, we need all of this. It is a Greek 
drama.”304 The value of high visibility and convening was recognized by others in the 
initiative as well. The CEO of Statoil noted that effective climate action “will require 
new policies, new innovation and not the least, action through effective partnership 
between government, business and civil society. The United Nations is where it can 
happen.”305  
The combined system-wide and initiative-level efforts to spur new and 
ambitious commitments on SLCPs therefore resulted in the expansion of the partners 
engaged, notably oil and gas companies. This complementary division of labour 
supports the findings on subsidiarity and leadership with central decision-making in 
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chapter three, as well as the necessity of other attributes including high visibility and 
sectoral orientation for system-wide IGO efforts to be successful.  
Following the 2014 Summit, the LPAA process continued to include SLCPs 
in the sectoral organization of COP21, and UNEP was asked to take on the 
responsibility of organizing the deliverables, which further entrenched the role of 
CCAC and UNEP as the lead convener in the SLCPs sector. Interestingly, minutes of 
planning meetings for the LPAA reveal that under the LPAA, the CCAC deliberately 
chose to pursue a strategy that prioritized the implementation of existing initiatives 
rather than the launch of new ones. With the large number of sub-initiatives that had 
been launched by the CCAC in the previous three years, the member countries of the 
CCAC felt that a focus on their implementation was key. At COP21, the CCAC made 
a commitment to further expand its coalition in future years.  
5.3.3 Strong Process Management: Not Attributable to System-Wide Efforts  
The system-wide IGO efforts made little to no contribution to the high level of 
professionalism in the process management of CCAC. Rather, this was influenced 
strongly and positively by UNEP since its inception in two key ways. First, in the 
formation phase of CCAC, much of the work of drafting the core documents of the 
CCAC including its governance structure was done by the governments of the United 
States, Canada and Sweden, and UNEP staff members. UNEP played an influential 
and strategic role in this interaction, making concrete recommendations on the 
governance structure of the initiative based on past experiences of supporting 
cooperative initiatives, such as the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV). 





were consequences of UNEP’s inputs. Sometimes, the advice given went against the 
grain of what the founding governments were thinking, and overturned decisions 
made by the founding governments. Thus, for example, at UNEP’s insistence, the 
scientific advisory panel was expanded from 10 individuals to 20, to ensure the 
different sectors pertinent to SLCPs are adequately covered.306 Second, UNEP has 
taken on the role of the secretariat for the initiative, and is responsible for the 
governance structure working smoothly. In this role, not only does it ensure 
professional organization of meetings, preparation of agendas, follow-up, and 
administration of the trust fund, it is also an active participant in the discussions and 
often steers conversations productively and provides proactive connective tissue 
between the various governance units. “From very early on, we fought quite hard to 
make sure we were an active secretariat. We certainly had to convince the countries 
on this. They were used to the UNFCCC process, in which the secretariat is not really 
allowed to do anything but organize meetings. We were able to demonstrate, quite 
early on, that there is much greater value added in having a secretariat that can 
understand and produce the science and can move it into action. In the meetings, 
UNEP was always very involved in the conversation.”307 Governments agree that the 
higher than expected influence of UNEP as the secretariat has been positive: “The 
CCAC is not a negotiating body, so the secretariat has more flexibility on what it 
needs to do. It's a more active secretariat that what you usually expect from a treaty 
secretariat. It's done that very well.”308 
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The strong monitoring and evaluation arrangements of the CCAC reflect a 
consensus decision made by the membership, and supported by UNEP in its capacity 
as the secretariat. While UNEP conducts the technical work of M&E effectively 
(given its in-house M&E capacities as a technical intergovernmental organization), it 
cannot be said to be a driver on this as there is and has been broad agreement on its 
importance from the outset.   
Finally, neither UNEP nor system-wide IGO efforts have been influential in 
the funding of CCAC. Although the lack of progress in the intergovernmental 
negotiations acted as a passive driver for governments to pursue the CCAC, and while 
UNEP provided estimated costs for running the initiative and while the 
professionalism of the process management instilled confidence among governments, 
the founding countries did not need to be convinced or persuaded to provide funding, 
and often also provided human resources. As one UNEP official observed, “Large 
amounts of funding came into the CCAC very quickly. This gave it credibility. All 
the members also put in staff time behind it from the outset to make it real. Countries 
took on the responsibility of leading on individual workstreams. Canada, for example, 
and the [Environmental Protection Agency of the United States].”309 
Yet, the pre-existing high quality of CCAC’s process management covers up 
the fact that neither the UN Secretary-General nor the LPAA Quartet prioritized the 
longevity and sustainability of the commitments when pursuing them for the 2014 
Summit and COP21 respectively. This was left to the conveners within the network to 
figure out. While it has not been a significant problem in this case due to the work 
                                               





done by UNEP and the founding members of CCAC in previous years, it is 
nevertheless a serious issue if and when the sectoral convener is less well prepared. 
The importance of sustained engagement by IGOs at the system-wide level remains.  
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter conducted a sector-wide network analysis to understand the level 
of influence that IGOs have in the wider sector of voluntary cooperation on SLCPs by 
participating in initiatives themselves. In addition, this chapter conducted a multilevel 
analysis that considered the interactive effects of IGOs working at the initiative and 
system-wide levels, on the formation and growth in quality of the CCAC initiative. In 
conducting the multilevel analysis, this chapter also tested the findings of chapter 
three, namely that six organizational attributes are necessary for the effectiveness of 
system-wide IGO efforts in spurring the growth of cooperation.  
Through the sector-wide analysis, this chapter found that one IGO, UNEP, has 
played a highly influential role in shaping the growth trajectory of the SLCPs network 
of voluntary cooperation. By being among the most prolific actors in the network and 
consistently taking up secretariat and funding roles from the early 2000s, UNEP has 
positioned itself as a convener and bridge-builder among disparate entities as well as 
being seen as the partner of choice by other influential entities in the network, notably 
governments.  
Through the multilevel analysis, this chapter found that the interactive effects 
of system-wide and initiative-level IGO efforts can be such that they spur a growth in 
cooperation--whether as more ambitious and stringent goals, or new partners, or both. 





IGO efforts are present: strategic timing, high visibility, sectoral orientation, an 
emphasis on cooperative commitments, subsidiarity and leadership with central 
decision-making. Thus, Rio+20 did not have any appreciable interactive effect with 
UNEP, while the 2014 Climate Summit and the LPAA did. This chapter therefore 
provided strong support for the findings of chapter three. At the same time, this 
analysis showed a strong interactive effect between UNEP and the United States 
Government as well as other founders of the CCAC in the formation of the CCAC 
and its growth in early years. As such, well-positioned lead governments are 
evidently able to choreograph the growth of cooperation, since they possess the 
convening power and autonomy to do so. 
Finally, this case study has illustrated the fluidity of the network of SLCP 
initiatives. The CCAC was conceived and developed as a trust-building exercise 
between developed and developing countries, and to advance the agenda of the HFCs 
phaseout under the Montreal Protocol. As such, it built on the achievement of earlier 
initiatives (e.g. the Refrigerants, Naturally! initiative) and in turn coalesced many 
sub-initiatives to broaden the partners engaged in the sector and to enable more 
stringent commitments. By building upon existing initiatives, many of the same 
actors have remained highly central to the network over time. In other words, the 
quantity of initiatives has often increased as a direct result of efforts to improve the 
quality of cooperation in the sector.  Similar to the findings of the previous chapter, 
the CCAC and its sub-initiatives are therefore aptly seen as mutations in the evolution 





least some aspects of the quality of cooperation at the sectoral level rather than only 





6 Land Transport 
This chapter focuses on the network of cooperative initiatives on land transport 
and in particular considers the Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport 
(SLoCaT), which was launched in 2009. This chapter seeks to fill two gaps in 
knowledge, namely (i) an understanding of the levels and types of influence wielded 
by the various IGOs that participate in land transport initiatives on the growth of 
voluntary cooperation within the land transport sector; and (ii) an understanding of 
how IGOs working at the system-wide and initiative levels have interacted and 
affected the growth of voluntary cooperation in land transport. To fill the first gap, 
this chapter conducts an exploratory, sector-wide study using network analysis, while 
to fill the second gap, this chapter conducts a multilevel analysis on SLoCaT. The 
multilevel analysis also serves to test the key findings of chapter three, in particular 
the requirements that system-wide IGO efforts organize by the principle of 
subsidiarity and leadership with centralized decision-making—this corresponds to 
IGOs at the initiative and system-wide level, respectively. The remaining findings 
will also be tested.  
The transport sector is defined in a variety of ways: by the medium of travel (that 
is, land, water or air) and by items being transported—humans or otherwise. This case 
study deals with land transport and both passenger and freight transport, within and 
across countries. A variety of industries therefore comprise this sector, including road 





this sector, including national and subnational governments, and supranational 
regions. Mitigation action in the transport sector could contribute to reducing GHG 
emissions by up to 2.5 GtCO2e/y by 2030,310 or about 13% of total global emissions. 
Transport has been defined as a priority sector from an environmental governance 
perspective since the Stockholm conference of 1972, with many different IGOs 
implementing mandates on various aspects of transport. While entities such as the 
ICAO and the IMO are coordinating bodies for air and maritime transport 
respectively, no one IGO has a dominant mandate on land transport. The GHG 
emissions relevance, the variety of jurisdictions pertinent to the land transport sector 
and the lack of a dominant IGO with focality on the issue make this an important case 
study for voluntary cooperation and for this dissertation.  
Similar to the previous two case studies, this chapter is organized in four 
sections. In the first section, the network dataset is used to illustrate the evolution of 
the land transport network of voluntary cooperation including the formation of 
communities and to identify which actors have been most central in the network over 
time. This is used to understand the influence the IGOs have wielded. The second 
section focuses on the Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT), 
and presents an assessment of the various facets of its quality, which sets up the basis 
for the multilevel analysis in the following section. In the third section, a multilevel 
analysis focuses on the interaction of the main IGOs that have engaged in SLoCaT at 
the system-wide and initiative levels. For the former, these include the efforts under 
Rio+20, the 2014 Climate Summit and the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. For the latter, 
                                               





these include the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Department for 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Whether and how the efforts of these 
IGOs has affected the formation, growth and quality of SLoCaT over time is the 
focus of this analysis, which also serves to test the key findings of chapter three. The 
fourth section summarizes the key findings of this chapter and concludes.   
6.1 IGOs and the Network of Cooperative Initiatives on Land 
Transport 
This section uses tools of network analysis to reveal the growth of the SLCPs 
network of voluntary cooperation over time and to identify the most influential actors, 
including the potential paths of influence they may have wielded. The network is 
visualized in five-year increments to show its evolution, including the diversity of its 
actors, their interconnectedness and variation in the density of connections across the 
network. Community detection is used to identify if and how entities form sub-
communities in the network—that is, which entities are more closely linked to each 
other than to others, which points to greater strength of cooperation within those 
clusters than between them. Finally, three centrality measures are used to identify the 
most central or “important” actors in the network over time: out-degree, betweenness 
and eigenvector. Out-degree centrality provides a measure of how prolific an entity is. 
The higher the score, the more initiatives of which it is a member. Betweenness 
centrality measures the information-sharing, bridge-building or convening roles 
played by an entity. The higher this score, the more an entity is depended upon by 
others to connect them to other parts of the network and/or to share information. 





connected to. In other words, it’s a measure of prestige. The higher this score, the 
more an entity is sought-after by or connected to others who are also highly-sought 
after. For this large network, the actors scoring in the 95th percentile of centrality 
scores are presented, as this provided sufficient data points for inference. When 
centrality measures of the 90th percentile were considered, other than the names of 
more entities that are influential, no additional patterns of influence were discernible. 
6.1.1 IGOs and the growth of a large, highly diverse network 
The network of voluntary cooperation on sustainable land transport 
considered in this study consists of 42 cooperative initiatives, which have high 
variation in purpose, scope and membership (see Annex 5 for a list of the initiatives, 
their acronyms and dates of launch). The majority of the initiatives have below 100 
members each and there is no discernible pattern to increasing or decreasing 
membership size over time. A large number of initiatives also have high diversity of 
entity types as members, with 16 having at least 8 different types of entities as 
members. Interestingly, philanthropic foundations and cities participate in more than 
one quarter of all transport initiatives, which is a departure from what has been 
observed in the forests and SLCPs case, but in the case of cities, a logical 
development given the concentration of road vehicles in cities. Notably, 29 initiatives 
include other initiatives as members, and there are 47 intergovernmental 
organizations participating in this network. 
 Visualizations of the network at different points in time provide several 
insights into its growth (figure 6.1 A-D). While the network consisted of only one 





each other. Over the course of this decade, the membership base of transport 
initiatives began to expand as the number of initiatives increased. Research institutes, 
NGOs, financial institutions, intergovernmental organizations and national 
governments began to engage as participants. By 2010, not only was the network 
considerably bigger, but also much more densely interconnected, with many 
initiatives sharing many members. This interconnectivity further grew up to 2015. 
However, even as the network grew interconnected, there are clear areas of higher 
and lower connectivity. Peripheral areas of the network consist of initiatives that 
share few members with other initiatives. Notably, these peripheral areas appear to be 
dominated by constituency-based initiatives—those with businesses and private 
financiers, and those with subnational authorities (for example, see the group of 
initiatives in community 2 in figure 6.1E). Evidently, many subnational authorities 
and businesses only participate in one initiative. By contrast, national governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and research institutions are found most 
commonly in the initiatives that have higher inter-connectivity among each other (for 
example, see the group of initiatives in community 1 in figure 6.1E). The 
visualization therefore suggests that as the network has grown, it has fragmented into 
several large components determined by the type of entities engaged in the network.  
The communities detected in the 2015 network (figure 6.1E) confirm this 
demarcation of constituency-based clustering and multi-stakeholder clustering. Some 
initiatives in the periphery are sufficiently isolated to be seen as communities unto 
themselves. This includes, for example, the Caring for Climate initiative of the UN 





shares a small percentage of its membership with other initiatives (see community 4 
in figure 6.1E). However, there are other relatively homogenous communities that 
include several initiatives. In particular, communities with several initiatives 
consisting largely of subnational authorities, and several initiatives consisting largely 
of businesses, are evident (see communities 2 and 3 respectively in figure 6.1E).   
What does this visualization tell us about the roles of IGOs in this network 
over time? The IGOs in this network have appeared as members of initiatives from 
the early 2000s, and have increasingly engaged over time. Most of the 47 IGOs in this 
network appear to be members of multi-stakeholder initiatives rather than those 
dominated by individual constituencies, and IGOs are closely associated with national 
governments by co-participation in the same initiatives (an unsurprising finding, 
given that IGOs are the creations of governments). The pattern of growth in this 
visualization suggests that IGOs were not influential in the development of 
constituency-focused initiatives in this network, but rather have paid most attention to 
the development of multi-stakeholder initiatives. Further, the absence of IGOs from 
the periphery indicates that IGOs have tended to engage in multiple initiatives, rather 
than just one, which further increases their likelihood to have influenced the growth 






Figure 6.1 Growth of the network of cooperative initiatives on land transport from 2000 to 2015. 
The network has grown more interconnected over time (Figure 6.1A-D), but has done so unevenly, 
with many businesses and subnational authorities forming constituency-based communities in the 
network periphery (Figure 6.1E). Source: This study’s dataset. 
Legend
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Figure 6.2 provides an alternative perspective on the evolution of the network, 
showing annual changes in the composition of the network and highlighting the 
specific roles that entity types have played in initiatives over time (that is, whether 
they have engaged in the network as ordinary participants, as secretariats or as 
funders of initiatives). The number of entities in the network began to increase rapidly 
in the 2000s, with major jumps happening in 2005 and 2014-2015, primarily 
associated with large influx of businesses during these years as participants. Although 
data on donors to initiatives was not available for the pre-2000 period, during the 
2000s governments and philanthropic foundations took the lead in funding land 
transport initiatives—in contrast to the network on forests and SLCPs, in which 
philanthropic foundations were not significant donors. Notably, however, the 
remainder of the group of donors is marked by diversity, including businesses, 
intergovernmental organizations, subnational governments, industry associations 
and—interestingly—initiatives themselves (the significance of this is discussed 
below). Secretariat functions have been dominated by the initiatives themselves, but 
have increasingly been taken up also by intergovernmental organizations 
(approximately 10 percent of all secretariat functions), national governments, industry 






Figure 6.2 Distribution of entity types by their function in the network on land transport over time. 
The count distribution of entity types, left, according to the roles they play in initiatives shows no 
particular dominance of intergovernmental organizations. The percentage distribution of the same data, 
right, shows that intergovernmental organizations take up a large ratio of the secretariat roles in the 
2000s. Source: This study’s dataset. 
6.1.2 Centrality Measures: IGOs are among a diverse group of ‘drivers’ in 
the network 
The centrality measures of actors in the land transport network indicate that a 
group of 99 distinct actors score in the 95th percentile of out-degree, eigenvector or 
betweenness centrality in at least one year. These include national governments, 
philanthropic foundations, businesses and industry associations, research institutions, 
cooperative initiatives and intergovernmental organizations. A consideration of each 
entity type and the types of influences wielded by those entities in the network over 
time follows. 
Governments are evidently among the most prolific entities in the network of 
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distinction. The governments of France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and the 
United States are the most prolific, engaging as funders and participants in initiatives, 
but with Germany and more recently France, engaging as secretariats as well. 
France’s centrality in this network began in 2015, which suggests that it increased its 
participation in the context of hosting COP21 and leading the LPAA. By contrast, 
Germany and the United States have been members of many initiatives most 
consistently over time. Tellingly, no governments score highly on eigenvector 
centrality—unlike the SLCPs network, governments have not formed ‘clubs’ around 
initiatives on transport, and have not been sought-after as partners by entities in a 
significant way. Germany and Indonesia also show high betweenness centrality. This 
points to a stronger convening and connecting role for Germany in the network over 
time, compared to the other donor governments.  
Philanthropic foundations, as funders and participants, are among those 
entities engaging most prolifically in the network and also among those who connect 
the most entities across the network. In particular, this includes three philanthropies, 
the ClimateWorks Foundation, Energy Foundation and Fia Foundation. This suggests 
an influential role in shaping the network over time, akin to those of national 
governments. Notably, ClimateWorks Foundation became highly central as a funder 
in the early 2000s, when no government was a central funder. This, given the small 
size of the network at the time, suggests an especially influential role played by this 
foundation in the formational phase of the network of land transport.  
Businesses and industry associations dominate the high scores in 





fewer still have been prolific. Most have been central as participants only, and a few 
as funders. This is a similar pattern to that seen in the forests sector, and also similar 
is the fact that many businesses within particular industries are found in this list (for 
example, ten oil and gas companies, including Total, Repsol, Eni, Equinor, OMV, 
CEMEX, CNOOC, Petrobras, Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil, and seven consumer 
goods companies, including Unilever, Mars, Ikea, PepsiCo, Carlsberg, Coca-Cola, 
and Nestlé). Since the majority of these companies do not have high scores in 
betweenness or out-degree centrality, their participation in the network has likely 
been guided by a constituency-based prestige and/or cautiousness (companies may 
see competitive safety in numbers of their own kind when making voluntary 
commitments). The few businesses that show high betweenness centrality are likely 
to have been leaders in shaping the engagement of the business community in the 
network, since a high betweenness centrality score would need them to engage in a 
more diverse set of initiatives than their peers, in effect becoming the bridge-builders 
between their own industry and other industries, or between the business community 
and other actors. These potential leaders and bridge-builders include Michelin, FGC, 
H&M, Ikea, Kjaer, Siemens, Arup, Alstrom and Shell. 
Civil society organizations, although few in number among the group of 
most central entities, have evidently influenced the growth of this network since its 
early years in the 2000s. The World Resources institute in particular has been a 
prolific funder and participant while also playing a strong connecting role in the 
network. In the years 2005-6, WRI also appears as a high scorer on eigenvector 





of businesses in this network and was sought-after by them as a preferred partner just 
as they were becoming more engaged in the network and making cooperative 
commitments. This suggests that WRI has been influential not just in shaping the 
composition of the network in its formational years, but also in the engagement of 
businesses most central to the network. 
Cooperative initiatives are among entities that are most prolific and 
prestigious or sought-after as well as being crucial connectors among actors in the 
network. While some of the high scores in centrality for cooperative initiatives are not 
insightful or trivial (for example, as the only cooperative initiative in this network 
during the late 20th century, the IPIECA shows high betweenness as a secretariat, 
since it was the only entity connecting other entities), the fact that several initiatives 
score highly on betweenness centrality as funders and participants further suggests 
that these initiatives are encouraging the formation of new initiatives over time. In 
addition, unlike the networks on forests and SLCPs, cooperative initiatives in 
transport among the most prolific members of other initiatives within the sector, as 
participants, funders and also as secretariats. For initiatives to score as leaders in 
becoming members of other initiatives, there needs to be a strong mechanism at work 
which compels existing initiatives to participate in new ones. This further points to an 
evolutionary logic, in which new initiatives build on the functions and achievements 
of existing initiatives, in ways that the existing initiatives are not able to contribute in 
their given configurations. Understanding the quality or strength of cooperation at the 





acting this way, initiatives and their members are building the quality of cooperation 
in the network over time.  
Intergovernmental organizations have been among the most prolific, 
connective and sought-after entities in the network of voluntary cooperation on land 
transport since the late 2000s, as funders, participants as well as secretariats. This 
suggests a highly influential role played by IGOs, which include the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), International Energy Agency (IEA), UNEP, UN Global 
Compact, UNFCCC secretariat, and World Bank. Of these, UNEP and the World 
Bank have been the most consistently central over time.  
The high eigenvector centrality of the IGOs, notably the UN Global Compact 
and UNEP, suggests that they have influenced the development of the business 
constituency-based parts of the network. As the arm of the UN with the specific 
mandate for partnership with business, it is unsurprising that the Global Compact is 
sought-after by businesses or vice versa. The UN Global Compact shows high 
eigenvector centrality in all three capacities. UNEP has also pursued partnerships 
with these central businesses, as a funder and secretariat, but not as a participant 
itself. Especially, since no other non-business entity shows high eigenvector centrality 
during the years 20009-2015, when the engagement of business grew the most, a 
reasonable inference is that these two UN entities had uncommon influence over the 
process by which businesses were making voluntary commitments on transport.  
IGOs also show high betweenness centrality in the network (in particular, 
UNEP, UNFCCC, IEA and the World Bank), which points to an important convening 





In summary, out of the 47 IGOs that have engaged in the land transport 
network of voluntary cooperation over time, six have been influential in shaping the 
composition and growth of the wider network. Of these six, UNEP and the World 
Bank have been the most influential.  
The fact that six IGOs have been among the most influential in the growth of 
this network, when land transport is a sector characterized by the lack of a focal IGO, 
reflects a complex reality in which different IGOs may have been competing or 






Figure 6.3 Entities with the top 5% centrality measures in the land transport network from 2000 
to 2015. 99 distinct actors have been highly central in the growth of the network, but only five show 
high centrality scores across the three measures, including UNEP and the World Bank.  
Source: This study’s dataset. 
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6.2 The Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport 
This section focuses on the Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport 
(SLoCaT), which was launched on 25 September 2009 in Bangkok. As a thought 
leader in the Transport sector, it aims to develop new analytical approaches and 
enable their uptake in policies in developing countries. Interestingly, although a 
multi-stakeholder partnership itself, it aims to cultivate additional multi-stakeholder 
partnerships to mitigate emissions in the land transport sector, without necessarily 
participating in them or, conversely, expecting their formal participation in SLoCaT. 
This role of SLoCaT is recognized as important for instigating cooperation in the land 
transport sector by many actors in the transport community, including representatives 
of philanthropic foundations, governments, and civil society organizations.311   
This section assesses the quality of SLoCaT based on the categories of “actor 
(optimality of partner mix and leadership) and “process” (goal-setting, 
professionalism of process management, monitoring and evaluation arrangements, 
and funding). The purpose of this assessment is to form the basis of the multilevel 
analysis in the next section. 
6.2.1 A diverse but suboptimal mix of partners 
At the time of its launch, SLoCaT had thirty founding members.312 SLoCaT 
currently has a diverse membership of ninety partners, including 9 businesses; 7 
industry associations; 27 research institutes; 19 civil society organizations; 3 national 
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governments; 3 philanthropic foundations, 4 transnational organizations, 18 
intergovernmental organizations, of which 9 are multilateral development banks and 
6 cooperative initiatives, including those that convene cities and subnational 
authorities, which are not directly members of SLoCaT.  
Assessing the optimality of this partner mix requires an understanding of two 
distinguishing features of the transport sector. First, the sector contains a large 
diversity of industries, each of which has specific characteristics. Thus, for example, 
the rail industry is distinct from the automobile industry, which in turn is distinct 
from the fuel industry. Second, decisions over fuel use in the transport sector are 
made largely by end-users. Taken together, these characteristics imply that the 
governance of emissions reductions in the transport sector will need to enable 
bespoke solutions for the various industries that transport encompasses, as well as 
target the behaviours of end-users as a priority. 
For the partner mix of a multi-stakeholder initiative such as SLoCaT to 
approach optimality, it would need to include decision makers and influencers in the 
relevant industries, as well as in national governments, in addition to civil society 
organizations that can influence community behaviours. SLoCaT’s heavy emphasis 
on civil society organizations and research institutes reflects the latter need. “The 
end-user has a much greater say in transport than in other areas. The real fly in the 
ointment is that every trip is made by people not sitting at the policy-making table. 
individuals decide how to get to work. Sometimes they are captive, but it's not as 
controlled as the way the energy sector may be. One option was seen as to bring all 





groups.”313 However, the few national governments and businesses in SLoCaT’s 
membership limits the optimality of the partner mix.  
In addition, few of SLoCaT’s members are highly central in the network of 
transport initiatives. Out of 90 members, only 6 have scored in the top 5% of any of 
the three centrality measures. This, coupled with SLoCaT’s own consistently high 
score on betweenness centrality since its launch indicates it has played a strong 
convening role in the sector, bringing together actors that on their own have not 
wielded much influence in the network. Notably, since it doesn’t have a high 
eigenvector or out-degree score, SLoCaT is likely playing a connecting role among 
disparate actors without being particularly prioritized by businesses (the entities who 
are evidently most prestige-seeking in this network), nor has it actively pursed its own 
formal participation in other initiatives. However, while SLoCaT counts some highly 
central entities, including IGOs such as the World Bank and lead governments such 
as Germany, in its membership, others are notably absent, such as UNEP, and it must 
be noted that the World Bank only joined in 2015.  
Yet, while the official membership of SLoCaT has not broadened significantly 
to approach optimality, SLoCaT has played a driving role in bringing together 
different stakeholders within the sector, for the formation of new initiatives, which it 
considers as part of its goal-setting process (see the following sub-section for a 
discussion of this). Thus, for example, SLoCaT deliberately pursued the development 
of the Transport Decarbonization Alliance in 2018, in order to bring national 
                                               






governments, subnational authorities and businesses together in joint commitments to 
implement sustainable transport priorities. “This is what we had in mind while 
launching the Transport Decarbonization Alliance. By making this an initiative of 
countries, cities and companies, we got the implementing partners together.”314 The 
value-added of considering the optimality of partner mix as an evolution of the 
transport sector writ large over time, rather than only within specific initiatives, and 
the driving role of SLoCaT in achieving that, is a notion that many members and 
observers of SLoCaT agree on. “These initiatives are not isolated. they are not 
isolated situations or incidents. A lot of excellent work is done and funded, seen in 
isolation, then falls down. Everyone forgets about it. It's a typical wicked problem 
issue. We have to think of the additionality of each different initiative.”315 
6.2.2 Cooperative and Consequential Leadership 
 SLoCaT has clear leadership cadre, which consists of a Board of Directors 
appointed for three years, and a Secretary-General. While this initiative-level 
leadership is well-established now that SLoCaT is operational, the formation of 
SLoCaT was the result of leadership by a group of like-minded individuals that 
occupied interstitial spaces as consultants and technical advisors between 
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, the Wuppertal Institute, TRL, 
and the Fia Foundation—all organizations that included sustainable transport in their 
work programmes.  
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During the early to mid-2000s, actors working on sustainable transport had 
begun to establish cooperative initiatives to advance the agenda, such as the 
International Council on Clean Transportation, or the Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles. However, these efforts were largely disparate, often oriented around the 
jurisdictional subsector they occupied, and there was no unifying agenda for these 
actors to follow, nor was there a unifying theory of change. The founders of SLoCaT 
sought to redress this. “After the Johannesburg summit it became clear that the 
transport sector was fragmented. And we didn't have a good story. It became quite 
obvious that we needed to do something about it.”316 
 To this end, this group of individuals, which had formed a professional 
community over the years, while meeting in the margins of the climate convention 
COPs, and engaging in advocacy activities together, convened a meeting hosted by 
the Rockefeller Foundation at its facilities in Bellagio, to develop an agenda for 
sustainable transport. The outcome of this meeting, the Bellagio Declaration, consists 
of a set of principles and a common framework to guide voluntary action and 
cooperation on sustainable transport.317 As a secondary outcome, the participants 
agreed to form SLoCaT, which would be a means of following-up on the agenda and 
ensuring it has impact. The Bellagio Declaration then became the founding document 
of SLoCaT. “We did not go to Bellagio with the aim of setting up an initiative. We 
went with the aim of developing an agenda. During the last session, when we 
discussed who would be responsible for overseeing or coordinating the 
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implementation of this agenda, it was clear that there was a willingness to create an 
initiative for this.”318 
 In addition, and critically, the founders of SLoCaT engaged in an aggressive 
campaign to diffuse the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework as the overarching 
analytical and organizing theory of change for the land transport sector. Originally 
developed by the Wuppertal Institute as an input to the German Parliament, SLoCaT's 
efforts to turn this into the accepted theory of change in sustainable transport has 
served to galvanize a diversity of actors around has served to enable precision and 
ambition in goal-setting for the sector. This was a deliberate strategy. “[SLoCaT 
members] worked as consultants for a number of intergovernmental organizations and 
managed to get Avoid-Shift-Improve into a lot of strategic documents. For example, 
we wrote the transport methodology for the GEF. So, Avoid-Shift-Improve has 
become the leading paradigm for sustainable transport. This has been very helpful to 
create a voice for the transport community. In the UN context, civil society has been 
speaking with one voice on transport as a result.”319 
 The leadership in partnership-formation as well as the thought leadership by 
the SLoCaT founds have served to establish SLoCaT as a central partnership in the 
transport sector, attracting funders and supporters. While utilizing the institutional 
centres in which they were anchored, it is the concerted efforts of the group of 
individuals that provided the leadership for SLoCaT’s formation, rather than 
institutional leadership.  
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6.2.3 Professional, Well-Funded and Goal-Oriented 
SLoCaT has prioritized professionalism of process management, both within 
the initiative as well as for the wider sector. A dedicated and independent secretariat, 
comprising about thirteen professional staff members including a Secretary-General, 
form the backbone of the initiative. SLoCaT also has a clear governance structure, 
with established and transparent procedures for decision-making detailed in its 
constitution, led by its board of directors, which consists of thirteen members 
including representatives of its membership, its financial supporters and independent 
observers. By engaging in practices such as commissioning independent reviews of 
its functioning (the last one was completed in 2018), SLoCaT has maintained high 
confidence in its process management among its members and observers. Notably, 
however, a full secretariat took several years to develop, and in the early years of its 
formation, SLoCaT was not a formal organization. Indeed, for several years, the 
secretariat was supported on a pro bono basis by the private company of one of the 
founders, based in Shanghai. As such, the strong individual leadership of the founders 
was essential in turning SLoCaT into a professional organization. 
This professional process management depends on funding for the initiative, 
which has been provided consistently by a group of multilateral development banks, 
industry associations, the German government, and several philanthropic 
organizations including the Fia foundation, Ford Foundation and the Volvo research 
and Education Foundations.320 As a result of this diversified and predictable base of 
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funding, SLoCaT has been able to invest resources in the development and 
implementation of multi-year workplans. “If someone hadn't unlocked a small 
amount of money to keep us going, it would not have happened. This is where there is 
a disconnect between what ambition wants to do and the realities. That funding piece 
doesn't come easily from any of the development agencies. Very few trust funds are 
set up to do that kind of work. But that piece of funding is critical. We were lucky to 
have it for a number of years. The German government put in seed funding.”321 
Several founding members of SLoCaT have also observed that the fact that the same 
individuals held influential positions in the various donor offices made a big 
difference; institutional memory enabled continuity in funding. 
Enabled by the professionalism of process management and flows of funding, 
SLoCaT has also emphasized ambition and stringency in goal-setting. By virtue of 
playing a convening role in the land transport sector—one that would normally be 
taken up by a focal IGO—the goals that SLoCaT pursues can be considered in two 
broad categories. On the one hand, SLoCaT has sought to create a coherent 
community of land transport stakeholders and ensure adequate recognition by system-
wide intergovernmental processes that allocate resources and political attention. On 
the other hand, SLoCaT has sought to improve the state of voluntary cooperation on 
land transport through practical action as well as thought leadership. 
Within this context, the goal-setting process of SLoCaT is guided by its 
founding vision and mission, encapsulated in the Principles for Sustainable Transport, 
which were endorsed by participants to the Bellagio meeting in 2009, in which 
                                               





SLoCaT was founded. Rooted in this set of principles, and responding to current 
events, opportunities and challenges, the Board of Directors approves an annual work 
programme, which contains specific goals for SLoCaT to achieve during the year, 
including indicators and targets in the form of a log frame. These goals range from 
administrative concerns, such as the maintenance of the SLoCaT website to strategic 
priorities, such as ensuring that the sustainable development goals and targets 
adequately reflect sustainable, low carbon transport.322 
An explicit strategy in its goal-setting is to advance the stringency of goal-
setting in the wider transport sector. By acting as a convener and catalyst for new 
initiatives that have increasingly specific targets, SLoCaT has aims to create more 
ambitious and stringent goals within the transport sector. For example, as will be 
described in more detail in the next section, SLoCaT took an active lead to coordinate 
and broker an agreement among four multilateral development banks to commit 
$175billion for sustainable transport, an announcement made to coincide with the 
Rio+20 conference in 2012. In addition, SLoCaT supported the establishment of 
several initiatives to be announced at the 2014 Climate Summit, such as the 
Sustainable, Low Carbon Rail Challenge. Likewise, at COP21, SLoCaT brokered a 
partnership with Michelin, resulting in the Paris Process on Mobility. The formation 
of new initiatives reflects the adoption of new goals or targets by an existing 
partnership (such as in the case of the Rail Challenge) or the joint commitments of 
actors that have not worked in partnership before (such as in the case of PPMC). In 
                                               





either case, the result is that the sector benefits from more stringent, ambitious goals 
than were committed to before.  
By pursuing the establishment of new initiatives with more specific and 
ambitious goals, SLoCaT functions in a similar way to the Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition explored in chapter 5, which has pursued a goal-setting strategy by 
establishing sub-initiatives with specific and ambitious goals. The difference is that 
the initiatives SLoCaT helps found are not its own sub-initiatives, and it does not 
prioritize its own formal participation in the initiatives it helps to form. “The 
establishment of SLoCaT was a very important moment for the transport sector. It 
sought to bring actors together. Its impact was felt most around COP21. There was a 
serious level of integration, brought about by the association with Michelin.”323 Thus, 
is an explicit evolutionary theory of change is being followed for voluntary 
cooperation in the land transport sector. 
Closely related to its focus on goal-setting, SLoCaT has prioritized the regular 
monitoring and evaluation of activities resulting from its goal-setting processes. With 
regard to the goals it sets for itself, which are included in the annual work 
programmes, SLoCaT’s secretariat produces quarterly reports on activities 
undertaken by the initiative, which are reviewed by the Board of Directors and which 
inform their decision-making for future work programmes. Interestingly, the goals in 
the work programmes also include the follow-up of initiatives that SLoCaT helps to 
form, even if those initiatives do not fall under the immediate remit of SLoCaT. For 
                                               






example, in its 2014 work programme, SLoCaT defined a goal of monitoring 
voluntary commitments on sustainable transport made under the Rio+20 conference. 
It did so by producing a report on all such commitments, the content of which was 
included by UN DESA in their Sustainable Development in Action report for 2014. 
Likewise, SLoCaT coordinated inputs from the various initiatives launched at the 
2014 Climate Summit, to produce an overview of progress made by these initiatives 
since their launch. SLoCaT has therefore taken on a convening, coordination and 
organizing role within the transport sector, not unlike one that could be played by an 
IGO with a relevant mandate.  
6.3  The influence of IGOs on the Formation and Quality of 
SLoCaT 
This section builds on the insights from the previous section to conduct a 
multilevel analysis of IGOs working at the system-wide and initiative levels, and 
assess their influence on the formation and growth of SLoCaT. As such, this analysis 
also acts as a test for the findings of chapter three, namely the six organizational 
attributes necessary for successful system-wide IGO efforts to spur growth in 
voluntary cooperation on climate change (strategic timing, high visibility, sectoral 
orientation, emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments, subsidiarity, and 
leadership with central decision-making) and the requirements that IGOs with high 
convening power and autonomy are the only ones able to ensure these six attributes. 
Several IGOs and their efforts form the focus of this section. Since the launch 
of SLoCaT, the main system-wide IGO efforts to promote voluntary cooperation, and 





COP21; and the 2016 Summit on Sustainable Transport. As well, the 2009 Climate 
Summit of the Secretary-General took place just a few days before the launch of 
SLoCaT. At the initiative level, the primary IGOs engaged within SLoCaT are the 
ADB and UN Habitat. The interaction between these groups of actors and their 
influence on the quality of SLoCaT forms the focus of inquiry for this section. 
This section finds that the interactive, combined efforts of EOSG, LPAA and 
SLoCaT were essential for the formation and quality of several high-ambition 
cooperative initiatives in 2014 and 2015, while strong interaction between ADB and 
DESA for Rio+20 yielded largely individual commitments. Importantly, despite no 
initiative-level IGO engagement during 2014 and 2015, since SLoCaT took one the 
convening role, the result was still positive. These findings provide strong and 
nuanced support for the findings of chapter three. In addition, this section finds that 
the lack of attention of system-wide IGO efforts to process management and 
continuity has significantly hampered the initiative and sector-level efforts.  
6.3.1 A Lacuna of IGO Leadership: The Need to Form SLoCaT 
Arguably, the formation of SLoCaT was spurred in large part by the absence 
of coherent leadership by IGOs. Several actors in the transport community, including 
SLoCaT’s founders, attribute its formation to the lack of sectoral cohesion, which was 
seen to be a result, in large part, of the absence of an intergovernmental organization 
with the dominant mandate on Transport. Instead, IGO support to the issue has been 
characterized by a hodgepodge assortment of intergovernmental organizations that 
have tried to assert leadership and convening authority in the transport sector, and that 





practical action (such as through cooperative initiatives), and promoting the 
importance of sustainable transport in intergovernmental negotiations and agreements 
to raise the profile of the issue and direct political and material resources to it. As 
examples of the former, UNEP and the World Bank have engaged very actively in 
voluntary cooperative initiatives, as evidenced by the network centrality measures 
presented in the previous section. In terms of the latter, UN DESA, UN Habitat and 
the UNFCCC Secretariat have all increasingly promoted the issue in the UN General 
Assembly, the Habitat conferences and the climate COPs. “There has been a never-
ending debate on whether the UN should have a special home for transport. The UN 
hasn't done what it could have done. And nobody else can do what it can do. But 
that's changing. UNEP has been a firm part of the partnership on vehicle efficiency. 
UN Habitat is increasingly playing a role.”324 Rather than being additive, however, 
these efforts have created uncoordinated pockets of IGO activity on transport at the 
intergovernmental and practical levels. This has spurred the UN General Assembly to 
recently issue a resolution that “Invites the Secretary-General to continue to promote 
effective international cooperation on road safety issues, including in the broader 
context of sustainable transport, and in this regard encourages further efforts, as 
appropriate, to strengthen the coordination of the work of the United Nations system 
on sustainable transport, while taking into account the need to adequately address 
road safety issues”.325 This state of affairs has caused one founding member of 
SLoCaT to lament, “Even though UN players were around, we didn't have a 
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champion”326 and a senior executive of  a major business in the transport sector to 
complain, “it's clear that the UN doesn't know what to do with Transport. I could 
imagine that had we had a UN agency focused on transport, things might have been a 
little different.”327 
The lacuna of IGO leadership in the transport sector had detrimental political 
and material effects on the sustainable transport agenda in intergovernmental fora, 
and ultimately acted as an indirect driver for the formation of SLoCaT. The low 
political attention to transport resulted in its low prioritization for climate finance 
flows, and vice versa, in downward, self-reinforcing spiral. This was particularly 
noticeable the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol which 
saw climate finance flowing to energy-focused infrastructure projects in developing 
countries, such as power plants, but not those on transport, due to energy-focused 
skew in methodologies approved by countries for assessing projects. “There is no 
global authority on transport. That's why it failed in the CDM as well. The 
methodologies were so inappropriate for transport.”328 Even the few transport-focused 
projects that received funding became financially untenable due to the inappropriate 
methodologies. “We got some allocation under the CDM, but as things got tighter and 
we got to the MRV, it cost more money to report than what we had received. It was a 
net loss. If we had been sitting at the table, we would have been able to demonstrate 
that this is different from transport, but it was so rigid because it came out of the 
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energy side and it was applied to all sectors.”329 This has led, in the eyes of many, to a 
downward spiral for the importance of transport and funding allocated to it. “The 
same frustration applies in the negotiations. If people were geared to where the 
money was, if they weren't interested in transport, then transport went down in the 
political agenda, since it doesn't attract the money anyway.”330 There is, in short, a 
direct connection between the absence of IGO leadership on transport and the 
formation of SLoCaT. 
The ability of the transport sector organize itself despite and because of the 
lack of leadership by IGOs, and the detrimental effects of that lack of leadership are 
encapsulation in the following observation by a representative of a philanthropic 
foundation central to the transport network of cooperative initiatives: “I don't think 
the UN has to be involved for the issue to be addressed. Except, if you are not named 
or allocated a special entity in the UN then you get less attention and funding.”331 
In addition to such indirect IGO drivers for the formation of SLoCaT and the 
organization of the transport sector, some direct, positive forces led by IGOs were 
also at work. Notably, the Asian Development Bank was consequential for SLoCaT’s 
formation as it played the formal convening role for the foundational meeting in 
Bellagio, and relied on the membership of its Clean Air Asia initiative to identify the 
foundational members of SLoCaT.  
                                               
329 Interviewee 28 (senior officer at the Asian Development Bank), in discussion with author, 25 June 
2019. 
330 Interviewee 28 (senior officer at the Asian Development Bank), in discussion with author, 25 June 
2019. 






6.3.2 ADB, DESA and the Formation of SLoCaT 
During the formation phase, ADB played a prominent role in convening a 
diversity of actors for the foundational meeting in Bellagio. In doing so, it utilized a 
mandate it had received by the UK government under the Gleneagles Dialogues 
arising from the 2005 G8 Summit. As chapter 3 revealed, the government of the 
United Kingdom prioritized the development of voluntary cooperation as part of their 
G8 Presidency. Given the lacklustre attention to sustainable transport in the UNFCCC 
negotiations, and authoritative reports indicating the importance of this sector for 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as the importance of Asia as the locus of projected 
emissions rise in this sector, the ADB was requested to take a leading role among 
MDBs and make policy recommendations on sustainable transport.332 The United 
States too, had engaged with the ADB for similar reasons (although rooted in the 
Bush Administration’s preference to avoid multilateralism, funding the establishment 
of Clean Air Asia. The ADB therefore used it convening authority from the 
Gleneagles Dialogues and as secretariat to Clean Air Asia, to bring together the group 
of actors and institutions that would form the first set of members of SLoCaT.  
According to the meeting minutes of the foundational meeting in Bellagio, the 
participants mostly comprised members of Clean Air Asia, which set the scene for the 
partner mix for SLoCaT for the coming years.333 “We tapped into the membership of 
Clean Air Asia to organize this meeting.”334 
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Indirectly, the UNFCCC process and its secretariat also influenced the partner 
mix of SLoCaT, both during the formation phase and after its establishment. During 
the 2000s, as leading actors in the transport sector (such as research institutes, NGOs, 
MDBs and industry associations) sought to overcome their fragmentation, they 
focused efforts first on convening side events at the UNFCCC COPs, a site that had 
become the ‘place to be seen’. A particular breakthrough came in 2007, when the 
COP Presidency made it easier for non-heavyweight academic institutions to get side 
events. “So, there was a sudden surge of people wanting to have side events. The 
secretariat had to combine us in different ways. As it happened, they combined UITP 
and UIC with TRL and GTZ and some Japanese institutions. We were fortuitously 
pushed together and we kept in contact for a long time afterwards.”335 Each of these 
entities were among the founding members of SLoCaT.  
At the same time, the lack of proactive effort by IGOs has contributed to the 
limited engagement of national governments in the initiative. For example, UN 
DESA, as a founding member of SLoCaT, is in a position to encourage participation 
by members of the UN General Assembly. Indeed, as described in chapter three, 
DESA was the secretariat to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and 
held annual partnership fairs. However, the low convening power of these events 
(which attracted ministries of foreign affairs and not technical line ministries) meant 
that their ability to attract governments as partners to SLoCaT and develop further 
initiatives was limited.  
                                               





The UN Secretary-General was engaged in the planning of his 2009 Climate 
Summit during the same time that SLoCaT was being formed. However, there was 
zero interaction between ADB and the Secretary-General’s office on this issue. As 
described in chapter three, the Secretary-General did not conduct the outreach 
necessary among central actors in the network, in particular in the various sectors 
pertinent to GHG emissions, to try to cultivate partnerships. 
The thought leadership of the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework, which was an 
essential part of the leadership necessary for the formation of SLoCaT and the 
coalescence of the transport sector, was enthusiastically supported by a range of 
IGOs, including UNEP, UN DESA, ADB, the World Bank, UN Habitat and others—
many IGOs that have been highly central to the network of transport initiatives. 
Prominent reports published by these organizations all promote this framework—a 
feat achieved by SLoCaT’s membership working hand-in-glove with these 
organizations to promote the framework, often as technical consultants and editors for 
these reports. However, the primary leadership and driving roles on this framework 
was the work of research institutes and NGOs, including the Wuppertal Institute. 
IGOs supported the framework, but the legwork to make it ubiquitous was done by a 
group of civil society and research actors. This is in contrast to UNEP’s active 
leadership of the development of science for SLCPs and its widespread adoption. 
6.3.3 Increasingly Ambitious Goals: Strengthening Interactive Effects 
Perhaps the greatest collective influence of IGOs has been on the goal-setting 
process of SLoCaT over the years, which resulted in the formation of new initiatives. 





COP21 have all caused SLoCaT to enhance the ambition and specificity of the goals 
it pursues. 
At the Rio+20 conference, less than three years after its launch, SLoCaT’s 
efforts led to the announcement of 17 voluntary commitments by the transport sector, 
of which two were cooperative initiatives.336 The confluence of a number of factors 
created a win-win situation for actors involved, and enabled this to happen. Overall, a 
core strategy of the Rio+20 conference was to promote voluntary commitments. As 
DESA was the secretariat to the conference and had also been assigned by previous 
conferences in the series as the custodian of the transport agenda, staff members at 
DESA was highly motivated to demonstrate progress on this agenda in time for the 
conference, but lacked the technical capacity and convening power to galvanize the 
transport sector themselves. Taking place a few years after the failure of the 
Copenhagen COP in 2009, many non-state actors were highly motivated to help 
propel cooperative action and solutions on climate change and sustainable 
development. By 2012, the SLoCaT initiative had developed a sufficiently robust 
secretariat and membership to undertake significant efforts to deliver on its founding 
motivations, and Rio+20 provided a clear opportunity. The availability of a ready-
made, expert and influential group on transport that enjoyed strong credibility among 
transport stakeholders was a gift for DESA, especially so given the high expectations 
of Rio+20.  
A symbiotic relationship therefore formed between DESA and SLoCaT, 
whereby, using the principle of subsidiarity, DESA effectively engaged SLoCaT to 
                                               





not just generate commitments, but also provide inputs to the sustainable transport-
focused elements of the Rio+20 outcome document, and SLoCaT used its access to 
DESA to raise the profile of transport in the intergovernmental process. “After 
launching SLoCaT, it was a gradual effort to build up the secretariat… what was very 
significant for the development of SLoCaT was the Rio+20 conference. We were able 
to get substantive language in the outcome document of Rio+20. SLoCaT team 
members were sitting in the room and drafting language. And we also encouraged our 
members to make voluntary commitments. We considered this to be a success. Since 
we had a technical secretariat, we were able to do reporting on these commitments. 
By making this effort and by making reports available, we also made it easy for the 
UN to quote from them and refer to them.”337 
Notably, however, since Rio+20 did not emphasize partnerships over 
individual commitments, there was no pressure on SLoCaT to help create 
partnerships per se. Neither was there any organizing mechanism such as a vetting 
process or limitations on participation that compelled actors to maximize the ambition 
level of the commitments being made. The majority of the announcements facilitated 
by SLoCaT were therefore individual commitments, reflecting ongoing work 
programmes, and in keeping with the findings of chapter three (given the absence of 
emphasis on ambitious cooperative commitments). Nevertheless, there was one 
significant exception. The high motivation of SLoCaT to raise the visibility of 
transport meant that SLoCaT’s leaders undertook great efforts to broker an agreement 
among four leading MDBs to announce jointly that they have allocated USD 175 
                                               





billion for sustainable transport. This was seen as a highly impactful and important 
announcement at Rio+20. This announcement was not the result of a driving force by 
DESA or the UN member states or the government of Brazil as host of Rio+20, but 
rather the leadership and membership of SLoCaT, including the ADB.  
The system-wide push by IGOs for cooperation rather than individual 
commitments would come two years later, at the 2014 Climate Summit, in which 
SLoCaT once again played a central role to generate new commitments, this time 
primarily cooperative. 
The 2014 Climate Summit included transport as one of its sectoral sessions, 
and saw the launch of six cooperative initiatives in this area, of which SLoCaT 
facilitated four. Although by 2014 a strong relationship had formed between DESA 
and SLoCaT, the autonomy and convening power of the Secretary-General meant that 
the EOSG team became the primary interlocutor with SLoCaT on the development of 
the initiatives to be announced at the summit. For this summit, the opportunity for 
CEOs to share the stage with world leaders was a major galvanizing force for the 
transport sector. The combination of SLoCaT’s technical capabilities and influence 
within the sector and the EOSG’s convening power meant that cooperation at a high 
level was possible. “There was a real need, almost a desperation, by the Secretary-
General’s team to get non-state actors to make commitments. In the Abu Dhabi 
Ascent, it was the first time we were in a room with all ministers. This was the 
[realization] moment. We were going to have the biggest stage in the world. We were 





agendas.”338 In addition, participants in the transport initiatives launched at the 2014 
Climate Summit acknowledge that the vetting process gave credibility to the process 
and encouraged a competitive atmosphere that forced them to set more ambitious 
goals than they would have otherwise. For example, the commitment on eco-drivers 
was one that participants were considering before the summit was announced. They 
were aiming for a 75% reduction. However, after discussions with EOSG and amid 
demands for higher ambition as the price of admission, they managed to reach 
consensus for a 100% reduction commitment.339  
In addition, the preparations for the summit also served to forge greater 
cooperation among disparate constituencies, notably subnational authorities, transport 
authorities, and businesses, which is necessary for a distributed issue such as 
transport. “It really engaged the NSAs. It allowed industry players to state their case 
and allowed follow through on other things that were going on. It allowed a 
connection to form between the cities and transport communities that hadn't really 
happened. In land transport, you have ministers of transport just interested in building 
infrastructure. Then you have cities struggling with the fact that there are too many 
cars. Public transport is a cumbersome piece of infrastructure and technology to deal 
with. The SG's climate summit and its Abu Dhabi preparatory process really helped 
explain to people why transport was so complex, and that the ministry of transport 
might not be the right entity to speak to about this.”340 The combined leadership with 
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centralized decision-making, high visibility, and reliance on the principle of 
subsidiarity meant that the transport sector was able to overcome existing barriers to 
cooperative commitments. 
This mode of working continued under the LPAA for COP21, which further 
advanced the partnership-building among constituencies within the sector, with 
SLoCaT being asked by the LPAA Quartet to continue to play a central convening 
role. In 2015, SLoCaT focused on building partnership with the private sector, 
particularly given that the French presidency had used its convening power and 
autonomy to attract the interest of Michelin. As a leading company in the automobile 
parts industry, Michelin was able to bring many other companies to the table for 
potential initiatives, but did not want to be subsumed under an existing initiative. This 
led to the formation of a new initiative at COP21. “Leading up to Paris, it was clear 
that SLoCaT was not strong on private sector members. But Michelin was there and 
they were organizing transport private sector members. How could we join forces? 
Michelin could become a member of SLoCaT, but we also wanted to mobilize the full 
ecosystem of members of Michelin. That's why we set up the PPMC.”341  
The formation of these new initiatives and setting of goals during 2014 and 
2015, while promoted by the system-wide IGO efforts, were advanced at the initiative 
level by the SLoCaT secretariat, and not be a particular IGO. This is in keeping with 
the findings in chapter three that the empowered convener at the initiative/sector level 
should be a central actor in the network. It need not be an IGO, and as the evidence 
shows, strong outcomes are nevertheless obtained. 
                                               





6.3.4  Process Management: Undermined by System-Wide IGO Efforts 
Given the limited roles of IGOs in SLoCaT’s secretariat, they have not 
influenced the professionalism of the process management in any significant way. 
Likewise, in terms of funding, IGOs have had little impact on SLoCaT. Although 
Initial costs during the formation phase were absorbed by ADB, IGOs have not been 
among the consistent donors to SLoCaT. Similarly, IGOs have not played 
determinant roles in the decision for SLoCaT to prioritize monitoring and evaluation 
of its activities. While entities such as the ADB and World Bank supported such 
M&E arrangements, so did other members of SLoCaT. Indeed, funding partners had 
requirements for M&E (e.g. Germany and the Fia foundation), so SLoCaT members 
were in agreement on this aspect of their partnership.  
In fact, at the sectoral level and system-wide levels, IGOs have undermined 
M&E of the new initiatives that SLoCaT has helped create at the system-wide events 
such as Rio+20, the 2014 Climate Summit and COP21, by shirking any 
responsibilities for following up on the announcements made at the summits. For 
example, after close engagement in the context of generating commitments for the 
2014 summit, the EOSG has not continued collaboration with SLoCaT, which 
effectively removes the additional heft that EOSG had provided SLoCaT for the 
launch of the initiatives in 2014 and 2015. “These years after Paris, we are getting 
closer and closer to 2020 and frankly there is very little progress. There is nobody that 
is actually following that lack of progress.”342 In addition, due to Decision by Parties 
to the climate convention, the UNFCCC has become the primary system-wide venue 
                                               





for cultivating voluntary action, but lacks the autonomy, convening power and 
capacity to do so effectively. As a result, though non-state actors are invited to 
discussions under the COPs to advance cooperative action, “once the discussion is 
over, there is no follow-up; no way of using what has been done.”343 Furthermore, 
lack of institutional memory in the UNFCCC Secretariat, the high level champions 
for climate action under the UNFCCC as well as in the EOSG means that rather than 
considering the cooperative initiatives as parts of a continuum that can build on 
existing components to effect greater impact over time, “everyone wants to reinvent 
the wheel. SLoCaT and PPMC used to be the ones representing the transport sector in 
UNFCCC convenings. But now it's an open process and everyone has to compete.”344 
These developments have caused many in the network of transport initiatives to 
express the sentiment that, “If we really want to decarbonize, we need more 
accountability. There are limits to the UNFCCC in engaging at the country level.”345 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter sought to fill two gaps in knowledge about IGOs and the growth 
of voluntary cooperation to mitigate GHG emissions in the land transport sector. 
First, by participating in initiatives, how much influence have IGOs wielded 
throughout the wider network of voluntary cooperation in the land transport sector 
and its growth? This was addressed through a sector-wide study using network 
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analysis. Second, what has been the interactive effect of efforts by IGOs at the 
system-wide and initiative levels, on the formation and quality of SLoCaT?  This was 
addressed through a multilevel analysis, that covered several system-wide processes 
or events, including Rio+20 supported by UN DESA, the 2014 Climate Summit, the 
LPAA, and the 2016 Sustainable Transport Summit also supported by UN DESA. 
The initiative-level IGOs considered were ADB and UN Habitat, both of which are 
members of SLoCaT.  
The key findings of the sector-wide analysis are surprising. Despite the lack of 
a focal IGOs on land transport, 47 IGOs have engaged in the network of voluntary 
cooperation on transport, of which six have been highly influential in shaping the 
growth trajectory of the network. By taking up funding and secretariat roles and being 
among the top 5% of most prolific actors in the network, IGOs have positioned 
themselves as essential connectors for different entity types, as well as becoming the 
preferred partner for businesses seeking to make voluntary cooperative commitments 
in transport. IGOs have also been engaged in the network from the early years of its 
formation, and shown high centrality since then, indicating influence in the 
composition and topology of the network over time. UNEP and the World Bank have 
been the most influential among IGOs.  
The multilevel analysis, while challenged by the fact that IGOs do not play a 
strong secretariat or leadership role within SLoCaT, provided strong and nuanced 
support to the findings of chapter three precisely because of the idiosyncrasies of this 
case. On a general note, it was found that the lack of an authoritative IGO with a clear 





quality of SLoCaT, which has sought to bring coherence to the transport sector and 
cultivate cooperative initiatives as well as raise the political profile of transport in the 
intergovernmental negotiations on sustainable development and climate change. In 
other words, the lack of leadership by IGOs has been a driving force in the formation 
and quality of SLoCaT.  
Within this context, it was found that when the six organizational attributes 
were not fully present (as was the case in Rio+20), the efforts of the IGO at the 
initiative level (ADB) yielded largely individual commitments rather than cooperative 
commitments. When the six organizational attributes were present (that is, strategic 
timing, high visibility, sectoral orientation, emphasis on ambitious cooperative 
commitments, subsidiarity and leadership with centralized decision-making), as was 
the case for the 2014 Climate Summit and the LPAA, the combined efforts at 
initiative level and system-wide level were highly fruitful, yielding cooperative 
initiatives with improved mix of partners and more ambitious targets. However, in 
these cases, at the initiative level, the empowered entity was the leadership of 
SLoCaT, and not an IGO. This provides stronger support for the findings of chapter 3 
than the two previous cases have been able to provide, since the subsidiarity 
requirement does not entail the entity at the sectoral level being an IGO; and SLoCaT 
is a positive case in this regard. As well, this chapter highlighted the critical 
importance of continued system-wide support for sectoral voluntary cooperation, 
rather than a punctuated approach. 
Finally, this chapter found that an essential concept in understanding the 





have occurred at the sectoral level, with new initiatives being formed by 
amalgamating existing initiatives while adding additional partners or new targets. 
This was clearly supported by the network centrality scores of cooperative initiatives 
as well as by interviews of actors within the network. Yet, even while enabling this 
growth in 2014 and 2015, IGOs have not fully recognized the continuum along which 






7 Conclusion: The Collective Choreography of Cooperation 
Did intergovernmental organizations drive the growth of voluntary 
cooperation on climate change? Largely, yes. This work demonstrates that while the 
answer is nuanced, intergovernmental organizations have had an outsize effect on the 
growth of voluntary cooperation on climate change in the period 2000 to 2015. This 
has been both as actors trying to cultivate the phenomenon without partaking in 
partnerships themselves, and as actors taking up particular roles within the 
cooperative initiatives. In other words, IGOs have been consequential for the growth 
of cooperative action by working on the outside as well as on the inside of the 
network of cooperation. They have done so by proactively creating the conditions that 
stakeholders need to be able to cooperate. Since different IGOs have played these 
roles on the outside and the inside, this study has considered their individual as well 
as combined effects on the growth of cooperation. The greatest growth in voluntary 
cooperation has occurred as a result of IGOs harmonizing these roles, acting as 
choreographers as well as participants in a collective choreography of cooperation 
among the variety of germane stakeholders.  
The key findings of this study relate to these roles of IGOs in this process as 
well as to the nature of voluntary cooperation itself. Briefly stated, these findings are:  
• The ecosystem of cooperative action succeeds or fails at the sectoral level 






• The UN Secretary-General has an outsize ability to choreograph surges in 
cooperation 
• Collective choreography depends on six organizational attributes 
• Punctuated surges are necessary but insufficient to maintain adequate 
cooperation over time 
A review of these findings and their contribution to knowledge is in order 
before considering their implications for the study and practice of voluntary 
cooperation and the work of intergovernmental organizations. 
7.1 Key Findings and Contributions 
The key findings of this study are presented in five parts, with each finding 
advancing the state of knowledge. They are as follows.  
7.1.1 The ecosystem of cooperative action succeeds or fails at the sectoral 
level 
Cooperative initiatives on climate change form ecosystems among inter-
connected entities within sectors that emit greenhouse gases. New initiatives are best 
understood as evolutionary changes to the strength—or quality—of cooperation in 
these sectors. Given this, the quality of cooperation must be understood at the sectoral 
level in addition to the initiative level.  
An increase in, for example, the breadth of partners and ambition of 
commitments being made in the greenhouse gas-emitting sectors is often manifested 
primarily in the form of new initiatives. This is evident in sectors as diverse as 
forests, short-lived climate pollutants and transport. As such, initiatives are—and 





motivation and feasibility among entities at a given moment in time. Thus, rather than 
treating the quality and effectiveness of an initiative as intrinsic attributes, it is more 
apt to consider how an initiative may have improved the quality of cooperation that 
already existed within the sector, such as the optimality of the partners engaged vis-à-
vis the problem and the ambition of goals articulated, as well as how it may have led 
to the formation of new initiatives within the sector.  
This finding contributes to knowledge by countering the prevailing conception 
of cooperative initiatives as self-contained units, and pointing to the more “zoomed 
out” unit of analysis of the sector as the appropriate one to understand the 
phenomenon of voluntary cooperation. Thus, while multiple initiatives in a sector 
may at times undermine each other (as current scholarship highlights), they may also 
be adding to the quality of cooperation in the sector in other ways and over time. 
When considered as a manifestation of the quality of cooperation in a sector, multiple 
initiatives are not inherently a sign of failure. For example, partnerships within 
constituencies may precede multi-stakeholder partnerships as a natural function of 
trust-building. Neither is it necessarily a sign of failure of cooperation when 
initiatives are not achieving their stated purpose. If they have been superseded by 
other initiatives and actors have effectively “moved on” to the new initiative which 
creates slightly better conditions for cooperation, the specific failure of the initial 
initiative may in fact be a signal of improvement in cooperation in the wider sector. 
Using a sectoral lens therefore provides us with a source of new insight on challenges 





Furthermore, the network dataset produced for this study, which enabled this 
and other findings, is in itself a contribution to our pursuit of knowledge of voluntary 
cooperation, and can be a resource for future study. It is a significant improvement 
over the only known previous attempt to model cooperative initiatives as a network, 
in several ways: the number of initiatives covered is much greater; the definition of 
partnerships/initiatives has been applied discerningly and more methodically; the 
dataset has a temporal component, thus allowing for analysis of how the network has 
evolved over time; and the nodes and edges have data on attributes, which allows for 
richer contextual analysis. 
7.1.2 Sector-based IGOs are central drivers of the evolution of voluntary 
cooperation 
As members of voluntary cooperative initiatives, technical IGOs can have a 
significant, positive and often decisive effect on the quality of cooperation over time 
in the wider sector, in addition to the initiatives in which they participate, and are 
among the most central drivers of evolutionary growth of the sectoral ecosystems.  
Despite being few in number, technical agencies such as UNEP, UNDP, the 
World Bank and others are among the most “important” entities in the sectoral 
networks of voluntary cooperation, and have greatly influenced growth trajectory of 
these sectoral networks. Their neutral convening role, technical capacities and some 
autonomy give IGOs a comparative advantage in building trust among stakeholders 
that may traditionally be competitors or adversaries, and thus cultivating and 
implementing ambitious multi-stakeholder partnerships. By taking up secretariat and 





knowledge-generation functions, IGOs have mediated among governments, private 
sector entities, civil society organizations and subnational authorities to forge 
partnerships. By doing so more prolifically and strategically than most other entities 
in the network (that is, by engaging in many and consequential initiatives), a core 
group of IGOs have positioned themselves very strongly as bridge-builders, 
conveners and preferred partners (especially of businesses) in their sectoral networks. 
As such, by virtue of their strategic participation in initiatives, these IGOs have 
become central and relied-upon community-builders for the wider sectoral networks. 
This finding contributes to existing knowledge on the roles of IGOs within 
partnerships by reaffirming the influential roles they play within initiatives in which 
they participate, but also extends this knowledge by assessing and revealing their 
influence in the wider sector. In other words, participation within specific initiatives 
causes some sector-based IGOs to wield significant influence in the evolution of the 
quality of voluntary cooperation within the wider sector. IGOs are not only important 
for the initiatives in which they are members; their participation in initiatives has 
been and is important and determinant for the entire phenomenon.  
7.1.3 The UN Secretary-General has a unique ability to choreograph surges 
in cooperation 
IGOs that have convening power and autonomy can catalyze a surge in the 
growth of voluntary cooperation, effectively acting as choreographers of participants 
in the network. Governments that possess the convening power, autonomy and 
internationally-sanctioned legitimacy are also able to perform this role. This catalytic 





in 2014 and subsequently adopted by the Government of France for the Lima-Paris 
Action Agenda in its capacity as President of COP21 in 2015.  
Having established a good offices role on climate change, the office of the UN 
Secretary-General currently stands unique among intergovernmental organizations in 
possessing the convening power and autonomy sufficient to choreograph surges in the 
growth of voluntary cooperation. While autonomy and independent action by 
secretariats or bureaucracies of intergovernmental organizations have long been 
recognized as important elements of organizational behaviour, the extent of the 
independence claimed by the UN Secretary-General in this context is arguably a 
qualitative shift. The ability of the Secretary-General to convene a leaders’ summit on 
an issue for which member states have established a multilateral architecture and 
which they have guarded for decades as the appropriate forum for addressing this 
issue; retain decision-making rights on the agenda and content of such a summit; and 
reserve the right to decline speaking opportunities to member states depending on the 
content of their speech; all without losing the interest of the leaders, represents the 
emergence of a power centre within the global governance of climate change that was 
not present in decades past.   
This is particularly relevant given that the only other entities with similar 
convening power and high autonomy are national governments, whose motivations to 
undertake such a choreographic effort to advance the climate agenda are vulnerable to 
the vagaries of domestic political contexts. Thus, the ability of the UN Secretary-
general to act autonomously vis-à-vis member states at a leaders’ level opens 





well as potentially other issues that require coalitions of entities beyond national 
governments to make commitments and act on them in order to reach specific goals. 
This finding contributes to knowledge on the autonomy and entrepreneurship 
of IGOs. By revealing the highly path-dependent development of autonomy on 
climate change by the Secretary-General, it furthers our understanding of how 
entrepreneurial space is created within institutions and how organizational culture 
changes. As well, it extends our understanding of the mediation role played by the 
Secretary-General. 
7.1.4 Collective choreography depends on six organizational attributes 
The catalytic surge in cooperation depends on the presence of six enabling 
organizational attributes, which together characterize the collective choreography that 
accelerates the growth of cooperation. The six conditions are as follows.  
First, efforts must be strategically timed, ideally occurring in the runway 
period up to a major intergovernmental milestone, during which governments, 
businesses, civil society and other stakeholders are highly motivated to cooperate, but 
also with a long planning period to ensure adequate preparation by all relevant 
entities.  
Second, efforts must provide high visibility to entities engaged in the 
cooperative initiatives featured, thus motivating governments, businesses and civil 
society organizations alike through the promise of enhanced reputations.  
Third, they must be sectorally oriented, rather than constituency-oriented. This 





governments and civil society organizations, that are each pertinent for cooperative 
solutions within specific sectors.  
Fourth, they must emphasize ambitious cooperative commitments as the 
measure of success. This implies not just encouragement of such commitments by 
participants, but their requirement as a price for admission to the culminating event—
a price that can be maximized through vetting processes that cause entities to revise 
their ambitions upwards to the extent feasible. In other words, entities must make 
speech acts, not just speeches in the culminating events.  
Fifth, these efforts should adhere to the principle of subsidiarity, whereby 
those entities with capacities to convene and lead cooperation within sectors are 
empowered to do so, without the organizers seeking to take on those specialized 
tasks.  
Sixth, the principle of subsidiarity must be balanced by leadership with central 
decision-making, whereby the organizer makes proactive efforts, using his convening 
power and autonomy, to facilitate partnerships, and holds the ultimate decision-
making authority on all aspects of the processes and culminating events, without 
needing to cede to deliberation among members.  
Together, these six enabling conditions create a strong imperative for 
motivated entities to expand and deepen partnerships within sectors, in effect creating 
a ‘pipeline’ of commitments. The high visibility and strategic timing capitalize on the 
existing motivations of actors, and promise a reputational reward. The emphasis on 
ambitious cooperative commitments serves to focus the efforts of the motivated 





commitments, which are easier, and also injects a competitive dynamic among actors 
to raise their ambition levels. The sectoral orientation encourages multi-stakeholder 
engagement over within-constituency cooperation, in effect corralling actors together 
rather than apart. Critically, subsidiarity ensures that the actors best able to convene 
and galvanize stakeholders at the sectoral level are empowered to do so, while 
leadership with central decision-making by the organizer maintains the control and 
agility to choreograph the organization and actors to maximum effect. Thus, while 
known drivers of cooperation remain necessary, these findings show that they alone 
do not account for the surge in growth seen in 2014 and 2015.   
Critically, while the process requires lead organizers with high convening 
power and autonomy, it builds on existing motivations of entities in the network, has 
their enthusiastic support, and benefits from their inputs, since doing so enables them 
to overcome existing barriers to cooperation and accelerate their voluntary efforts. In 
short, if the entities in the network are the performers in a modern dance, then this 
catalytic approach is its collective choreography—an act of mutual creation that 
generates the dance.  
These findings show that the existing explanations or accounts of how and 
why voluntary cooperation on climate change has increased in recent years and 
especially in 2014 and 2015 are insufficient. While governments, businesses and civil 
society are indeed motivated and compelled to cooperate for a variety of functional, 
self-interested, and normative reasons, without the intervention described here, the 
rate of growth of their cooperation has been significantly lower. Collective 





pertinent actors to create a competitive-cooperative dynamic among them that 
accelerate the growth of cooperation. This is a systemic endeavor; one in which the 
stakeholders willingly take part; and one which they also contribute to shaping.  
This conceptualization of IGO behaviour is more nuanced than the currently 
vogue notion of orchestration, in which intergovernmental organizations act as 
orchestrators of intermediaries in influencing the behaviours of their targets.346 
Embracing the non-linear and more complex reality in which intergovernmental 
organizations find themselves, collective choreography points to the systemic roles 
played by different intergovernmental organizations at multiple levels over time—a 
phenomenon that orchestration theory recognizes but does not consider at a 
sufficiently fine-grained level to differentiate between the functions and effects of 
IGOs at the different levels. Indeed, collective choreography is a notion closer to the 
roots of the word orchestration, the etymology of which is the ancient Greek word 
orkhestra (ὀρχήστρα), “the area where the chorus danced” in a theatre, which in turn 
is rooted in orkheisthai (ὀρχεῖσθαι), “to dance”.347  
7.1.5 Punctuated surges are necessary but insufficient to maintain adequate 
cooperation over time 
Sustained and adequate institutional support over time is necessary for the 
gains resulting from the collective choreography to be impactful. Conversely, efforts 
that don’t receive this sustained support, often fail to be sustained, or to grow and 
deliver on their initial promise.  
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In each of the case studies presented, the importance of sustained catalytic 
engagement and follow-up for the effective implementation of voluntary cooperation 
has been clear. In both forests and transport, this clarity emerged due to the absence 
of limited institutional follow up by any of the IGOs involved in the formation of the 
initiatives in 2014 and 2015, which has impeded progress in implementation since 
then. For short-lived climate pollutants, the continued institutional support in the form 
of the governance structure of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition has enabled 
progress on the implementation of the commitments made, but the rigid governance 
structure within the sector has also impeded further entrenchment of partnership with 
the private sector in particular. In short, given the dominance of intergovernmental 
organizations as choreographer as well as performer, the combined multilevel efforts 
of intergovernmental organizations from both outside and within the network of 
voluntary cooperation must be maintained to ensure the effectiveness of voluntary 
cooperation. This finding is significant because it points to the insufficiency of short-
term choreography directed just at the launch of an initiative, such as that of a 
summit, in facilitating a high-growth trajectory in voluntary cooperation over years 
and decades. 
7.2 Directions for Future Research 
Research on multi-stakeholder partnerships is an uphill task made doubly 
difficult by the nebulous nature of partnerships and the lack of available data on their 
composition and achievements. It is therefore unsurprising that the ready availability 
of a dataset on “partnerships” announced at the Johannesburg world summit in 2002 





“partnerships” were conceived and presented has meant that the research on 
partnerships has also internalized and promoted a static conception of partnerships. 
Although careful case studies in the literature have revealed the importance of the 
context in which partnerships find themselves, this has been interpreted largely as the 
national and international context, and not the context of other partnerships in an 
issue area. 
This study has highlighted the value-added to placing partnerships in the 
context of their network of other partnerships in a given issue area and to considering 
the progress and effectiveness made by a network of partnerships over time, rather 
than taking snapshots of individual partnerships at given moments in time. In doing 
so, it has raised several questions that could guide research on partnership, and 
intergovernmental organizations. As well, the limitations of this study demand that 
future research address them in order to build more robust foundations for analysis. 
7.2.1 Extending the Parameters of this Study 
The dataset developed and presented in this study, and the case studies 
conducted, are initial steps in the analysis of voluntary cooperation as an ecosystem 
that changes over time. As such, the dataset can and should be improved, for example 
through the addition of currently missing data on participants in initiatives; and the 
addition of data on geographic location of each entity in the network. 
In addition, further case studies such as those undertaken in this study can 
serve to add robustness to the findings presented here. Have IGOs play significant 
roles in other sectors such as renewable energy or agriculture? How did national and 





cooperation? Additional case studies that aim to answer these questions will help to 
support, refute or fine-tune the findings presented here and may serve to add to their 
generalizability.  
7.2.2 Network Analysis for Multi-Stakeholder Partnership 
The network analysis approach demonstrated in this study can be further 
developed to improve our understanding of how voluntary cooperation evolves and 
how it can be improved. As illustrated in the study, network analysis can yield useful 
insights that are otherwise unavailable. For example, the outsize influence of 
particular actors or types of actors in a network over time can pinpoint the particular 
entities that may be in a position to make necessary changes to partnerships. Evidence 
of clustering of specific actor types in sub-communities in a network combined with 
actors that hold strong bridge-building positions in the network can point to pathways 
for consolidation and improvement of interaction among entity types in the issue area. 
These are only exploratory steps in the possibilities presented by network analysis. 
Additional tools and measures in network analysis such as the density and 
connectivity of the network, forward and backward reachable paths (the assessment 
of the temporal influence of individual entities in the network, to identify “patient 
zero”-type entities that have had and can have transformational impact on the 
network), and homophily, can all be utilized to reveal more nuanced and sophisticated 
understandings of the form and evolution of the network.   
Some pertinent questions for future research to tackle include: Are 





does participation of entities from developing countries evolve over time, and what 
are the factors or entities that spur their increased participation?  
7.2.3 Systemic Impacts of Intergovernmental Organizations 
The study of intergovernmental organizations has in recent years increasingly 
focused on the agency available to or seized by bureaucracies and the influence that 
different organizations wield on states and non-state actors in delivering their goals 
and mandates. Little attention has been paid to the interactions among different 
intergovernmental organizations in the context of the delivery of specific goals. This 
study has shown that considering the combined effect of intergovernmental 
organizations working at multiple levels of governance and in concert can yield 
insights into their working that are not available when considering the actions of 
organizations in isolation. This opens an avenue of research on the systemic effects of 
intergovernmental organizations, and the conditions under which intergovernmental 
organizations can be jointly most impactful.  
7.3 Policy Implications 
The five key findings summarized above have several implications for policy-
making in climate governance as well as global governance writ large, particularly 
multi-stakeholder partnership and the role of intergovernmental organizations in the 
twenty-first century.  
7.3.1 Measure differently: See the forest and the trees 
 Since cooperative initiatives form an evolving ecosystem and together reflect 





the sectoral level can guide the development of new initiatives and can also be used to 
assess the value-added of new initiatives. Thus, funders of cooperative initiatives and 
central influencers within a sectoral sub-network should consider how a new initiative 
would improve the mix of partners in a sector (whether by the type of entity they are 
or their geographic location, for example), or the ambition or specificity of the goals 
being set in the sector. This could be an important rationale for steering the formation 
of an initiative. From a different perspective, entities performing a watchdog function 
can use these sectoral level measures to assess whether new initiatives meaningfully 
contribute to the growth of cooperation in the sector or not. In both cases, the 
existence and use of a network dataset such as that pioneered in this study would 
enable the pertinent entities to make their assessments.  
7.3.2 Make Partnership Capacity Ubiquitous Among IGOs  
The importance of IGOs in driving the quality of voluntary cooperation and 
the entrenched path dependency of their roles in the network means that enhancing 
their capacities to facilitate and develop high quality partnerships would significantly 
help improve such cooperation in the future. The sector-wide analyses made clear that 
only a few IGOs have been consequential for the growth of cooperation in their 
respective sectors. If this is due to a limitation in knowledge and capacity among 
most other IGOs, it is one that should be addresses as a matter of priority. At the same 
time, the abilities of the currently central IGOs in the network must be supported and 
enhanced to the extent possible.  
In recent years, IGOs have institutionalized the pursuit of partnerships. For 





stakeholder partnership as core elements of their strategic plans for 2018-2021. Yet, 
the conceptual understanding of multi-stakeholder partnership varies significantly 
among IGOs, as does their respective capacity to facilitate them. An effort by IGOs to 
share their own knowledge of best practices among each other and develop robust 
partnership facilitation abilities and agility should be prioritized. Such an effort, led 
by the UN Secretary-general, could enhance capacities across the UN System. In the 
early 2010s, Secretary-General Ban had attempted to reverse institutionalize a so-
called Partnership Facility by General Assembly resolution in order to provide such 
capacity-building functions for the UN system. This was unsuccessful, but in recent 
years, in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, a significant UN reform 
effort has been undertaken, with UN member states recognizing and encouraging the 
role of the Secretary-General in playing a more robust leadership role vis-à-vis the 
UN development system. In addition, technical IGOs recognize this need—UNDP 
has established a global platform to support the collective capacity-building of UN 
System entities in this regard. If funded for multiple years by one of the central 
donors in the network, the executive office of the Secretary-General could leverage 
these institutional developments and effectively ramp up the partnership ability and 
know-how of the UN system to enhance the effectiveness of IGOs as participants in 
voluntary cooperation.  
7.3.3 Empower the Right Choreographers 
The need for high convening power and autonomy to accelerate growth in 
voluntary cooperation means that resources expended for this purpose should 





office of the Secretary-General should be supported to continue to play the role of 
choreographer for enabling surges in the growth of the network of cooperation. In 
addition, powerful and appropriately motivated countries such as particular members 
of the Group of Seven should also be urged to play this role when possible. Contexts 
such as the G7 summits could prove useful in this regard, and proactive leadership by 
countries in designing these summits according to the criteria uncovered in this study 
could help accelerate cooperation significantly. 
However, over the last five years, IGOs with relatively low convening power 
and autonomy have been tasked by governments to catalyze voluntary cooperation. 
At COP21, following the deliberations under the ADP2 and the work of the LPAA, 
the government of France, together with several Parties to the convention, introduced 
proposals for Decisions to be adopted by the Parties on the pursuit of voluntary 
cooperation. This institutionalized an architecture for the promotion of voluntary 
cooperation, including the convening of a high-level event at each COP, with the 
purpose to announce new initiatives or coalitions, and the establishment of two high-
level champions to be appointed by COP Presidencies, each serving staggered two-
year terms, whose purpose is to galvanize additional voluntary cooperation among 
stakeholders. These decisions were mandated for the 2016-2020 period at COP21, but 
have since been extended to cover the 2021 to 2025 period.  
Institutionally, the high-level champions have low convening power. As 
individuals appointed by the Presidents of COPs, their ability to attract the attention 
of government leaders and parts of national governments pertinent to implementation 





convene and steer those entities that are important to the growth of the network 
including the implementation of the commitments made, such as technical agencies of 
national and subnational governments, IGOs with technical mandates and on-the-
ground presence, donor governments and philanthropic foundations. The combination 
of subsidiarity and leadership with central decision-making is therefore lacking. As 
well, their autonomy is limited. While they are appointed to act on behalf of COP 
Presidencies, two successive Presidencies are not always aligned on the value of 
voluntary cooperation, nor on the methods to be used to promote it. Further, the 
secretariat support to this architecture comes from the UNFCCC Secretariat, which 
itself has low convening power and autonomy. Thus, over the last five years, despite 
intensive efforts by the UNFCCC Secretariat, actors in the network have been 
increasingly dissatisfied with the effectiveness of this architecture to catalyze the 
growth of voluntary cooperation.  
While it is infeasible to discontinue the role that has been allocated to the 
high-level champions and the UNFCCC Secretariat, the findings of this study could 
be used to augment their convening power and autonomy, such as through partnership 
with the UN Secretary-General and specific national governments—a modus 
operandi that was successful in the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.  
7.3.4 Organize for Success: Summitry 101 
 Since the key findings include six enabling conditions for system-wide efforts 
to be successful, it is clear that these six elements must be prioritized by entities 
undertaking such efforts in the future. Whether summits of the Secretary-General, 





accelerate voluntary cooperation should all use the six enabling conditions as an 
organizing checklist to maximize their effectiveness.  
Following COP21, there have been multiple attempts by entities to cultivate 
voluntary cooperation writ large. For example, the ocean conference convened by the 
UN General Assembly in 2017; the Global Climate Action Summit (GCAS) in 2018 
co-hosted by Governor Jerry Brown and Michael Bloomberg; and the UN Secretary-
General’s 2019 Climate Summit. None of these events prioritized all six enabling 
conditions. The ocean conference lacked central decision-making and strategic 
timing, was limited in its sectoral orientation and did not prioritize the announcement 
of cooperative initiatives (settling for individual commitments). While GCAS 
generated publicity, its inability to attract the participation of national leaders meant 
that the visibility and reputation enhancement it would offer commitment-makers 
across the world was relatively low compared to leaders’ level summits. In addition, 
GCAS welcomed individual commitments and cooperative ones alike. The 2019 
Climate Summit was limited in its centralized decision-making, despite the autonomy 
available to the Secretary-General.  
While a detailed examination of the outcomes of these summits is beyond the 
scope of this study, a desk review indicates that the summits did not succeed in 
significantly improving the quality of cooperation within sectors. The ocean 
conference, similar to Rio+20, succeeded in attracting many individual 
commitments—over 1600—but few cooperative initiatives. In the case of the GCAS, 
the low convening power of the organizers meant that national government 





Secretary-General’s 2019 summit, the process did not retain central decision-making 
on the formation and launch of the initiatives, instead ceding much of that power to 
groups of two or three national governments per sector. As a result, while the press 
release of the summit announced over 30 new initiatives, many of them were vague 
statements of intention or reaffirmations of existing commitments. As such, only four 
of them have been included in the UNEP database of cooperative initiatives. One of 
the senior team members of this summit observed, “It’s a pity we didn’t make full use 
of the Secretary-General’s advantage. It was just another type of debate on climate 
change. We could have made it more selective. We lost the real objective of why we 
were doing this summit. We gave ownership to member states, and as a result they 
felt momentum and responsibility, but that also meant they felt they needed a final 
say in how to present results.”348 
A more in-depth analysis of these events is necessary before the causal 
mechanisms at work can be explicated, but this initial review supports the findings of 
this study and reiterates the need to prioritize the six conditions in the organization of 
these events. 
7.3.5 Institutionalize Continuity 
The need for sustained institutional support means that IGOs and national 
governments that are motivated to host events to promote voluntary cooperation must 
commit to using these events to follow up on the progress of initiatives launched at 
previous events as well as put in place adequate institutional support between events. 
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While the need for such follow-up has been recognized by the host entities as well as 
others ever since the Johannesburg summit in 2002, there has been little to no action 
taken. Even for events that have high autonomy and decision-making, such as the 
summits of the Secretary-General, there has been no discernible effort to ensure 
follow-up of initiatives.  
This state of affairs can be corrected via two interventions. First, since events 
are spread among different hosts, but often funded by the same core group of 
countries and philanthropic foundations, it is feasible that a donors’ pact on this issue 
can put sufficient pressure on the hosts to ensure the continuity needed. Second, the 
creation of a robust data commons for the network of cooperative initiatives, that is 
accessible to and used by all entities engaged in cultivating the network, can serve to 
orient the various conveners and choreographers around a common task of growing 
the ecosystem of cooperation. The strong support of actors central to the network and 
the primary choreographers of the network would be needed to ensure the dataset is 
used effectively. The dataset developed for this study can form the basis of such a 
commons.   
7.3.6 Think Beyond Climate Change: Choreography as the New UN Modus 
Operandi? 
 The collective choreography that enabled the surge in the growth of voluntary 
cooperation on climate change could perhaps be usefully applied for advancing other 
global public goods. Although the cultivation of voluntary cooperation among 
different types of stakeholders may not be the appropriate or effective mechanism to 





like climate mitigation, can be addressed through an aggregate effort of stakeholders, 
or that may need all pertinent stakeholders to take action, and which are facing non-
compliance challenges in the multilateral arena.  
Global pandemic response and management is one such public good. The 
World Health Organization (WHO), as a specialized agency of the United Nations, is 
responsible for coordinating the response of nation states to emerging pandemics. 
Governed by the World Health Assembly, which is composed primarily of ministers 
of health, the WHO is limited in its convening power and autonomy. Pandemics 
require a whole-of-society approach to be adequately mitigated, with jurisdictions of 
not just ministries of health, but also others such as transport, finance, and food and 
agriculture, being pertinent to effective action. In addition, jurisdictions of 
subnational governments play a significant part in the policy response. Further, civil 
society organizations and businesses are highly influential entities, for example in 
shaping mass behaviours and in the development and dissemination of vaccinations. 
In the absence of comprehensive and coherent intergovernmental leadership, the 
management of pandemics faces similar structural challenges as those presented in 
the intergovernmental management of climate change over the past three decades.  
The development of a ‘good offices’ role by the UN Secretary-General on 
pandemics over the next decade may strengthen the ability of the intergovernmental 
system to respond to this challenge, and may help accelerate the growth of voluntary 
cooperation that is already starting to take shape on this issue. A similar such role 






As instruments in service of “We the peoples”,349 intergovernmental 
organizations are most true to their founding ideals when engaging in the collective 
choreography this study described. At the various iterations of the People’s Climate 
March that have taken place since 2014, one phrase commonly appears on banners: to 
change everything, it takes everyone. The vast and interconnected sectoral networks 
of peoples that together produce and are affected by greenhouse gases are the 
“everyone” that need to cooperate if the world is to successfully tackle climate 
change. If the value of collective choreography can be demonstrated in additional 
areas that demand cooperation, and if this mode of working is adequately nurtured, 
then the transformative value of intergovernmental organizations—particularly the 
United Nations—for the peoples of the world may begin to be realized. In a zeitgeist 
marked by rapidly rising nationalism and retreat from international cooperation, such 
a role seems not an elective, but a necessity, if we are to achieve our collective aim of 
“better standards of life in larger freedom”.350
                                               
349 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, sec. Preamble. 





8  Appendices 
Annex 1 List of sectors and entity types used in the network dataset  
Sectors 
Agriculture; Cities and Regions; Energy; Finance; Industry; Non-CO2 Gases; 
Transport and Navigation; Waster; Water; Resilience 
 
Entity Types 




Private organization (i.e. a business) engaged in financial services, with 
or without a development/climate objective 
Transnational 
Organization 
Global-level membership-based organization (collects dues from 
members) established for a specific purpose. Membership is not limited 
to governments only and neither does it need to be limited to specific 




National-level membership-based organization (collects dues from 
members) established for a specific purpose. Membership need not be 
limited to governments only and neither does it need to be limited to 
specific industries. Scope of work is usually oriented around specific 
economic goals. Consequently, there is a self-selection of 
businesses/other entities that become members, in contrast to industry 
associations, which generally have the interests of the whole industry as 
their mission, rather than being oriented around a goal that is not 
necessarily aligned with the current trajectory of the whole industry. 
Industry Association Membership-based organization (collects dues from members) 
established for a specific purpose, but not by governments, limited to 
specific industries; high likelihood of lobbying and advocacy efforts; 
standard-setting; issuing industry reports; acting as governing body 
Business (non-
financial) 
Profit-making company or companies (not financial services) 
Philanthropic 
Foundation 
Foundation that provides funds for specified charitable purposes (not 
governmental). May be family foundation, private, or pubic according to 
U.S. Government classifications. 
Civil Society 
Organization 
Not profit-seeking; depends upon donations (from organizations or 
general public) and fund-raising; largely independent from national 
government; 
Research Institution An academic research centre, whether a think tank, higher education 
entity etc. (but not a school or college in which research is not conducted 
as main purpose) 
Cooperative Initiative Cooperative initiative on climate change; shared responsibilities among 






Annex 2  List of Interviewees 
Interviewee Affiliation Date of Interview 
Interviewee 1  Head of a prominent philanthropic foundation 29 August 2019 
Interviewee 2  Senior official of the United States Government and of the IEA 2 August 2019 
Interviewee 3  Senior official of multiple prominent research institutes 9 May 2019 
Interviewee 4  Senior official of the Government of Norway 19 May 2019 
Interviewee 5  Senior executive of a Fortune Global 500 company 24 June 2019 
Interviewee 6  Senior official of IRENA 10 May 2019 
Interviewee 7  Senior official of the United Nations and senior official of the Government of Denmark 11 June 2018 
Interviewee 8  Head of a prominent think tank 12 April2019 
Interviewee 9  Senior official of the UNFCCC Secretariat 31 July 2019 
Interviewee 10  Senior official of the United Nations and senior official of the Government of Barbados 22 May 2019 
Interviewee 11  Senior officer at the United Nations 14 June 2018 
Interviewee 12  Senior officer at UNEP 13 June 2018 
Interviewee 13  Senior official of the World Bank 23 October 2019 
Interviewee 14  Senior official of the United Nations 18 May 2020 
Interviewee 15  Senior elected official of the Government of Norway 3 May 2019 
Interviewee 16  Senior official of the IUCN, UNEP and UNDP 4 October 2019 
Interviewee 17  Founding member of SloCaT 20 June 2019 
Interviewee 18  Senior official of UNDP 3 May 2019 
Interviewee 19  Cabinet minister of the Government of Peru 9 October 2018 
Interviewee 20  Senior civil servant of the Government of India 5 August 2019 
Interviewee 21  Senior official of the UNFCCC Secretariat 8 June 2018 
Interviewee 22  Senior official of the United Nations 13 June 2018 
Interviewee 23  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of India 8 May 2018 
Interviewee 24  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of Ireland 9 May 2018 
Interviewee 25  Senior executive of a Fortune Global 500 company 10 May 2019 
Interviewee 26  Senior advisor to the COP20 President 22 October 2018 





Interviewee 28  Senior officer at the Asian Development Bank 25 June 2019 
Interviewee 29  Member of the Indian Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change 1 August 2019 
Interviewee 30  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of Cuba 10 May 2018 
Interviewee 31  Senior advisor to the UK Government and to the New Climate Economy 27 May 2019 
Interviewee 32  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of Tanzania 8 May 2018 
Interviewee 33  
Senior advisor to the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development and the World 
Economic Forum 
24 May 2019 
Interviewee 34  Senior advisor to the COP21 President 9 October 2018 
Interviewee 35  
Senior negotiator of the Government of 
Pakistan and senior officer at the United 
Nations 
14 June 2018 
Interviewee 36  Senior official of the United Nations and head of a prominent philanthropic foundation 22 April 2019 
Interviewee 37  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of China 9 May 2018 
Interviewee 38  Founding member of SLoCaT 18 June 2019 
Interviewee 39  Senior official of the United States Government 28 May 2019 
Interviewee 40  Senior executive of the World Economic Forum 23 September 2018 
Interviewee 41  Staff member of the CCAC secretariat 14 May 2019 
Interviewee 42  Cabinet minister of the Government of Argentina 12 April 2019 
Interviewee 43  Senior official of the United Nations 9 May 2020 
Interviewee 44  Senior climate negotiaor of the Government of Fiji 9 May 2018 
Interviewee 45  Senior official of the UNFCCC Secretariat 18 January 2018 
Interviewee 46  Head of a prominent civil society organization 4 August 2019 
Interviewee 47  Senior executive of a transport business association 24 May 2019 
Interviewee 48  Senior executive of a Fortune Global 500 company 3 October 2019 
Interviewee 49  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of Russia 10 May 2018 
Interviewee 50  Senior official of the Government of Mexico and senior official of the United Nations 16 October 2019 





Interviewee 52  Senior officer at the United Nations and senior civil servant of the Government of China 25 September 2019 
Interviewee 53  Senior climate negotiator of the Government of Iran 7 May 2018 
Interviewee 54  Head of a prominent think tank 21 June 2018 
Interviewee 55  Senior officer at the United Nations 13 June 2018 
Interviewee 56  Senior executive of a Fortune Global 500 company 25 September 2019 
Interviewee 57  
Senior executive at the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development and the World 
Economic Forum 
24 September 2019 
Interviewee 58  Senior officer at the United Nations 19 May 2020 
Interviewee 59  Senior official of the United Nations and senior executive of a prominent NGO 14 May 2019 
Interviewee 60  Senior officer at the FAO 4 April 2018 
Interviewee 61  Senior civil servant of the United States Government 11 April 2019 
Interviewee 62  Senior officer at the OECD 10 July 2019 
Interviewee 63  Senior official of the United States Government 10 September 2018 
Interviewee 64  Senior official of UNEP 10 April 2019 
Interviewee 65  Senior executive at the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 4 October 2019 
Interviewee 66  Senior negotiator of the Government of Canada 10 June 2019 
Interviewee 67  Senior officer at the United Nations 10 September 2019 
Interviewee 68  
Senior official of the United States Government 
and senior executive at a philanthropic 
foundation 
13 June 2019 
Interviewee 69  Senior official of the UK Government 23 July 2019 
Interviewee 70  Senior officer on climate change at the World Economic Forum 20 June 2018 







Annex 3  List of Cooperative Initiatives in the Forests Network 
Start Year Acronym Name 
1986 RA Rainforest Alliance 
1990 CA Climate Alliance 
1993 FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
1998 FT Forest Trends 
2001 CPF Collaborative Partnership on Forests 
2003 CCBA Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance 
2003 GPFLR Global Partnership on Forest and Landscape Restoration 
2003 GSF Gold Standard Foundation 
2004 RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
2006 GBP Global Bioenergy Partnership 
2007 C4C Caring for Climate 
2008 FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
2008 GGWSSI Great Green Wall for Sahara and the Sahel Initiative 
2008 SOCIALCARBON SOCIALCARBON 
2008 UNREDD UN-REDD Programme 
2009 GCFTF Governors Climate and Forests Task Force 
2010 CGF-DF Consumer Goods Forum Zero-Net Deforestation Initiative 
2010 Climate-KIC Climate-KIC 
2010 CLUA Climate and Land Use Alliance 
2010 PTPA Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement 
2010 REDD+ REDD+ 
2011 BCI Blue Carbon Initiative 
2011 Bonn Challenge Bonn Challenge - Landscape Restoration 
2011 CGIAR: CCAFS 
CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and 
Food Security 
2011 LEDS Low Emissions Development Strategies 
2011 R4 R4 Rural Resilience Initiative 
2012 TFA2020 Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 
2013 BCFISFL BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes 
2013 POIG Palm Oil Innovation Group 
2014 400m Ha Protection of 400 million Hectares of Forests 
2014 I 20x20 Initiative 20x20 
2014 NYDF New York Declaration on Forests 
2015 AFLR African Forest Landscape Restoration 
2015 LCTPi Low Carbon Technology Partnership Initiative 
2015 RCDD Remove commodity-driven deforestation 
2015 Under2 Under2 Coalition 
2015 ZDC CPT 








Annex 4  List of Cooperative Initiatives in the Short-Lived Climate 
Pollutants Network 
Start Year Acronym Name 
1980 ARAP Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy 
1998 ICSA International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation 
2002 PCFV Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles 
2004 R,N! Refrigerants, Naturally! 
2008 EUROCITIES EUROCITIES 
2010 CGF-HFCs Consumer Goods Forum HFC Phase-out Initiative 
2010 GACC Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves 
2010 GMI Global Methane Initiative 
2012 CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
2012 CCAC: BI CCAC: Bricks Initiative 
2012 CCAC: HFCs CCAC: Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs 
2012 CCAC: MSW Mitigating SLCPs from the Municipal Solid Waste Sector 
2014 CCAC: GGFAP CCAC: Global Green Freight Action Plan 
2014 CCAC: OGMP CCAC: Oil & Gas Methane Partnership 
2014 I 20x20 Initiative 20x20 
2014 OGCI Oil and Gas Climate Initiative 
2015 CCAC: AI CCAC: Agriculture Initiative 







Annex 5 List of Cooperative Initiatives in the Land Transport Network 
Start 
Year Acronym Name 
1974 IPIECA 
International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association 
1990 CA Climate Alliance 
1990 ICLEI ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability 
2001 CAAsia Clean Air Asia 
2001 ICCT International Council on Clean Transportation 
2002 PCFV Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles 
2003 LCVP Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership 
2004 TCG The Climate Group 
2005 C40 CCLG C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group 
2005 REN21 Ren21 
2006 Walk21 Walk 21 
2007 C4C Caring for Climate 
2007 TCR The Climate Registry 
2007 VERRA Verra 
2008 EUROCITIES EUROCITIES 
2008 L&G Lean and Green 
2009 30X30 Res "30 by 30" Resolution 
2009 GFEI Global Fuel Economy Initiative 
2009 LCRS Logistics Carbon Reduction Scheme 
2009 SLOCAT Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport 
2010 PTPA Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement 
2011 EMA EcoMobility Alliance 
2011 GFEN Green Freight Asia Network 
2012 CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
2012 Urban-LEDS Urban-LEDS project 
2013 UEMI Urban Electric Mobility Initiative 
2014 CCAC: GGFAP CCAC: Global Green Freight Action Plan 
2014 LCSRTC Low-Carbon Sustainable Rail Transport Challenge 
2014 PTDCL Public Transport Declaration on Climate Leadership 
2014 SE4All: ET SEforAll: Energy and Transport 
2014 VFEA Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Accelerator 
2015 C40 CBD C40 Clean Bus Declaration/Low emission vehicles 
2015 CDGG Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals 
2015 CNCA Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance 
2015 ITS4C ITS for Climate 
2015 IZEVA International Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance 
2015 LCRRTI Low Carbon Road and Road Transport Initiative 
2015 LCTPi Low Carbon Technology Partnership Initiative 
2015 MYCP MobiliseYourCity Partnership 
2015 PAECC Paris Declaration on Electromobility on Climate Change 
2015 T4SC Taxi4SmartCities 
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